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ABSTRACT
Bizuru, Omar Khalfan, M.A., International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program,
School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2021. A Model of
Regime Change: The Impact of the Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East and North
Africa.

This study examined the catalysts for social movements around the globe; specifically,
why and how the Arab Spring uprisings led to regime change in Tunisia, why they
transformed into civil war in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Syria),
and why they did not lead to significant change at all in other places (Bahrain). The
overall results of the study confirmed that political and socio-economic grievances
caused the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Bahrain, and Syria. Tunisian protesters succeeded
in regime change because of a united and structured social movement leading to an
effective transitional democracy in the country, whereas Syria and Bahrain used their
coercive apparatus, with the help of foreign intervention, to suppress demonstrators.
Thus, on the Syrian side, protests transformed into civil war.

Keywords: Arab Spring; Bahrain; Middle East and North Africa; Protests; Regime
change; Social Movements; Syria; Transition Democracy; Tunisia.
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Chapter One
General introduction
Introduction
This study has showed how and why the Arab Spring --in the form of social
movements -- affected Arab nations with varying outcomes. The Arab Spring did not just
happen; it had driving factors. Peoples from Tunisia, Syria, and Bahrain felt that socioeconomic and political injustices had been inflicted upon them and became frustrated and
alienated. The Arab countries either lacked the political will or the ability to adopt
policies that should have aimed at transforming existing institutions into transitional
democracies. Confronted with consequences from authoritarian regimes, citizens in the
Arab nations had to endure the social unrest that caused the Arab Spring when a
Tunisian, Mohammad Bouazizi, triggered the situation late in 2010.
One common goal of the Arab Spring was regime change. Tunisia, in the entire
Arab world, was the only success story in transitioning from dictatorship to democracy.
The Arab Spring in Egypt succeeded in overthrowing President Hosni Mubarak, but
because of the lack of organized opposition to the former government of Mubarak, and
with the nature of how the protests erupted, at the end of the demonstrations, the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB), as the long-time organized movement in the country, profited from
the disorganized Tahrir Square movements and grabbed the reigns of the Arab Spring
victory, which brought the nation to general elections in 2012. Ultimately, the election
was won by Mr. Morsi of the MB, the first ever democratically-elected president in
Egyptian history.
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Because the Arab Spring affected the majority of North African nations, Libya wasn’t
spared from protest. Although former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi was ousted from
power, Libya ended up spiraling into civil war, which ravaged the country from the
beginning of the Arab Spring to the international military intervention. Similarly, Syria
and Yemen are other examples of failure to the extent that they have been transformed
into the battlefields of various armed movements and foreign military interventions. The
Arab Spring, although it did not bring about total change in most Arab countries, brought
forth some change and caused some superficial reforms in countries such as Bahrain,
Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.
Background
This study focuses on how social movements erupt and, in some cases, become the
“domino effect of democratization.” The aim of any social movement is to bring total
change -- “regime change” -- to modify the current social order in response to the need
for protests; and then, to begin the exercise of transitional democracy. As we shall see in
the literature review in Chapter 2, social movement theories attempt to understand the
origins of social movements and why they occur. These theories can be used to explain
some prominent social movements. For instance, the deprivation theory was used to
explain the birth of the civil rights and the feminist movements in the United States. The
resource mobilization theory demonstrated how modern electronic technologies (like the
internet and cell-phones) helped in the mobilization of human resources in the anti-WTO
demonstrations that were organized in various cities around the world, Anindya and
Ömer (2016); and thus they had been used in most of the Arab Spring of 2010-2012.
These electronic technologies were effective tools in the Arab Spring uprisings, as the
2

protestors used them to communicate not only within their respective countries but also
to network with the diasporas and international backers of the protests; this led, to some
extent, to the success of protests in Tunisia and Egypt.
The Arab Spring, which was in the form of social movements, began at the end of
2010 in Tunisia, and continued in early 2011 in Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, and other
parts of the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab Spring was caused by various types
of political regimes, economic grievances, and the responses of Arab governments to a
variety of the people’s needs. In examining the economic and political failures in the
MENA region, despite the number of Middle Eastern countries which have petrol oil and
gas, the ability of states to implement social justice measures and guarantee economic
security has plunged over the decade(s) in most Arab nations. Being a “rentier state” does
not guarantee continual economic progress if the state does not set up other strong
economic measures that do not rely only on petrol oil and gas. As someone who lived
almost a decade in Egypt in the 1990s, I have witnessed the declining quality of degraded
life that has affected the Arab citizens’ basic dignity1, or Al Karamah Al-assassiyah as
they call it. The lack of respect of al-Karamah al-Assassiyah ignited protests and has
been a critical factor in animating the Arab Spring, beginning with Mohamed Bouazizi’s
self-immolation in Tunisia.

Basic dignity:Al Karamah Al-assassiyah ﺍﻟﻜﺮﺍﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ1
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Although some scholars have agreed on the effectiveness of economic grievances
as a sufficient factor for people to take to the streets against a government, a number of
other scholars have contended that the disgruntled citizens who joined demonstrations
have not necessarily become political protesters. In the Arab Spring, the principal
beneficiary has been political Islam, the perennial factor of the Arab world (Henry and JiHyang 2012). However, Arab regimes and their international backers often have the
specter of Islamic extremism to justify authoritarian practices, and oftentimes, these
regimes have abused human rights.
Problem statement and research questions
The study examines how and why social movements erupt and protests begin;
how and why the Arab Spring, in the form of protests, has caused the fall of authoritarian
regime(s) in some countries; how, at the end of the protests, the situation in some
countries returned to their previous status, or even worse; and how and why some
revolutions failed to create political change altogether. This study investigates why and
how the Arab Spring has been able to change regimes in Tunisia; why the protests
transformed into civil war in some places (Syria); and why the Arab Spring did not
change things at all in other places (Bahrain).
Exploring the case studies, I propose analyzing them to explain why the protests
were able to successfully oust dictators in Tunisia and achieve regime change in the
country but transformed into civil war in Syria. Moreover, this study also examines what
motivated protesters to stop demonstrations in Bahrain.
This study is designed to answer the following questions:
-

What motivates social movements to take place?
4

-

How and why have some of the Arab Spring’s protesters been able to reach their
political goals -regime change - while other demonstrators in the same region,
with similar demands and cultural beliefs, have failed to do so?

-

Are economic and political incentives offered by some Arab countries key to
quelling demonstrations or silencing protesters calling for regime change?

-

What was the role of great powers in the Arab Spring?

Hypotheses
The study of the impact of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North
Africa will attempt to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.
The more accumulated political and socio-economic grievances, the more people are
likely to experience dissatisfaction and to begin forming and joining social movements
with the aim of changing the current social and political order to satisfy their needs.
Hypothesis 2.
The more structured and united the leadership of a social movement, the more likely
it is to gain success.
Hypothesis 3.
The more unified the coercive apparatus of the state, the more likely it is to repress
protests and allow it to survive with its illegitimate status.
Hypothesis 4.
The more government offers in payouts, the less likely protests will lead to change.

5

Hypothesis 5.
Support of the state by an outside great power increases the resilience against regime
change. By contrast, support of state’s opponent [protesters] by an outside great power
increases the chances of regime change.
Assumptions
The assumption behind these hypotheses is that social movements are assumed to be
rational as they aim to change social order by establishing new regimes or achieving
partial changes. For social movements to occur, there should be reasons compelling in the
direction of protests such as political and socio-economic grievances; and for a success of
social movements there should also be a well structured and unified leadership leading all
involved organizations in the protests. However, it is assumed that in some cases,
demonstrators encounter hindrances in achieving targeted goals [changing the current
regime] once the government offers payouts as a form of government’s willingness to
partial changes. Moreover, when the government gets support from an outside great
power, it increases its chances to survive and hence, it resists against regime change. By
contrast, it is also assumed that when opponents [protesters] receive support from an
outside great power, it does increase the chances to change the current political and social
order.
Research design and methodology
This thesis uses the comparative case method. As Table 1 shows, the cases for this
study are selected with variation on the dependent variable. Tunisia provides a case of
success in regime change, Syria provides a case of protests leading to civil war, and
Bahrain illustrates a case of protest failure to lead to change, see table below.
6

Table 1: Selected cases
Case(s)
Case of Success

Country
Tunisia

Status
2010-2011: Revolution succeeded to
regime change: New Government:
stability.
From 2011 to the present: Protests
[Mostly Sunni Muslims against Shia
Alawites in power. Revolution failed
and turned into civil war. Foreign
countries intervened on both sides:
Assad regime and Protesters then
Rebels.
From 2011: Protests failed and they
have been cracked down on by
government security and military
forces supported by the Saudi
military and other GCC member
states’ armed forces. Bahraini
government uses coercive apparatus
to maintain relative stability in the
country.

Case of Failure: Protests Syria
turned into civil war

Case of Failure: Relative Bahrain
Stability

Research design
The research has established a study plan with theories, a conceptual framework,
and methods that will be used to assess the overall relationships between the independent
variables and dependent variables. There are two factors of IVs (internal and external).
Internal factors: army defections, government payouts, youth associations, university
members, syndicates, labor unions, religious organizations, and civil society
organizations; there are also external factors such as the patronage, as in the political or
military role played by the United States, France, the U.K., and Russia. The patronage of
great powers entails supporting social movements financially, politically, and/or
militarily to achieve their goals, but also great powers such as Russia have played a role
to maintain the incumbent in power in Syria.
7

Figure 1:Mutually reinforcing determinants of how independent variable affects
dependent variable through actors (causal mechanisms).

According to Gerring’s basic causal diagram which the researcher has adopted, social
movements/Arab Spring/ mass demonstrations, economic payouts, repression, security
forces, great power patronage, military defections are all independent variables [IVs] an
‘X’ in the figure 1; and they have contributed to (1) successful protests of Arab Spring
and regime change [in this study, the case of Tunisia; (2) failed revolution and partial
reforms because of resistance from the current government’s security forces and foreign
interventions, [the case of Bahrain]; and (3) the revolution which transformed social
movements into civil war, the case of Syria, which is considered by some scholars as a
case between failed and success revolutions, pending the outcome of the civil war. The
causal mechanism or pathway of theoretical interest, a ‘Z’ in the figure one is the roles
and actions of different actors. And an outcome of theoretical interest or dependent
variable [DV], is a ‘Y’ in the figure one. In other words, dependent variables are the
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results of successful protests, on one side; regime change, partial reforms, and civil war
on the other.
The table below explains each case among three cases of the study
Table 2: Cases: Bahrain, Syria and Tunisia
Bahrain
Bahraini security forces
cracked down on protests.
The Revolution did not
reach its goal of regime
change. It failed.

Syria
Mass protests transformed
into civil war. The Syrian
case is positioned between
failed and successful
revolution pending the
outcome of the civil war,
despite the Assad regime
advancing toward victory to
regain the entire Syrian
territory from the armed
rebel groups.
Compiled by the Researcher 2021

Tunisia
Tunisia, a unique success
story in the study, but also
the only successful one in
the Arab Spring that has
become a transitional
democracy, and it is still
performing well in terms of
its political institutions.

Research methodology
The study used qualitative methods to gain an understanding of underlying
reasons, opinions, and motivations for the Arab Spring and how it spread across the Arab
world from North Africa to the Middle East. Moreover, this study used a comparative
case method to compare the Arab Spring in different countries with the aim of
discovering why mass demonstrations have worked in one country by bringing about
total change, but did not have the same result in other countries. This has been assessed
by taking into consideration different compelling situations. Furthermore, existing
literature on the Middle East and North Africa have also been a source for this study.
Significance of the study
This study seeks to discover the reasons behind social movements in general and
the impact of the Arab Spring throughout the Arab world in particular. In order to
9

thoroughly examine this impact in the Arab nations, I examined three cases: Bahrain,
Syria, and Tunisia, as the latter started transitional democracy, although it met some
political challenges as a novice in the democratic process. In the summer of 2013, the
Tunisian transition seemed on the verge of collapse. However, Tunisia is doing well in
terms of inclusive political governance. The disastrous turn of events in Egypt persuaded
Ennahda leaders (a political party that aligns itself with the Islamic faith and culture) to
make painful compromises to prevent a similar authoritarian reversal in Tunisia. This has
included compromises in the text of the constitution, the timing of elections, and the
agreement to cede power to a government of “technocrats.” The Egyptian precedent, in
other words, convinced Ennahda leaders to “play the long game” (as Egypt’s Morsi had
refused to do) and thus keep the democratic experiment moving forward (Bellin 2018).
In contrast, the Syrian protests have resulted in civil war, and the country has
faced unprecedented political crises between different factions (Alawites in power and
Sunnis as the government’s opposition). Likewise, despite the fact that the Kingdom of
Bahrain’s protests were not transformed into civil war, the Shiite majority challenged the
ruling family to the extent that the protests would have overthrown the government if the
Saudi military had not stepped in, followed by Bahraini security forces moving in to
crack down on the demonstrators and clear the Pearl Roundabout and other streets. The
MENA’s deep involvement in international power struggles and patronage, because of its
endowment with oil and gas resources, and because it is a geographic nucleus of Islamic
radicalism and terror, signals that democratization will continue to face international
challenge more often than support. Tunisia is relatively rent-poor, unlike Syria and
Bahrain (Bahrain having more resources than Syria) Tunisia, being “resource-cursed,”
10

encounters special challenges in attempting democratization. The experience of the Arab
world has important lessons for conceptualizing democratization as well, even if the
outcome of the Arab Spring has been far more disappointing than originally hoped.
This study shows, importantly, that the Arab world has failed to endorse previous
waves of democracy and that the Arab Spring has contributed, to a small degree, in
bringing changes to the region. This de facto situation in the Middle East and North
Africa, for some scholars, stems from Islamic cultural beliefs and from the influence of
power patronage on the region and this continues to encourage some rulers to impose
policies that will cause citizens to hate and oppose Western-styled democracy. The study
aims to reflect on the lessons/findings that the Bahraini, Syrian, and Tunisian examples
offer concerning the possibility of future democratization in the Arab world. The study
findings will help provide understanding as to why the Arab Spring protests resulted in
only one country, Tunisia, enjoying success; why Syria’s protests transformed into civil
war; and how Bahrain successfully used a coercive apparatus to silence its Shia
community opposition to the al-Khalifa family. Another important element in this study
is the examination of how Arab nations have fallen behind other parts of the world when
it comes to embracing democratic governance.
Conclusion
This chapter presented a core basis of the research and its study objectives. As
explained in this chapter, the study seeks to answer the following questions:
-

What are the root’s causes of social movements?

-

How and why have some protesters in the era of the Arab Spring been able to
harness political momentum in changing regimes, while other demonstrators in
11

the same region, with identical needs, similar cultural beliefs, and in the same
period, have failed to do so?
The study of the impact of the Arab Spring throughout the Middle East region
investigates how the Arab Spring effect has brought transitional democracy to Tunisia;
however, it also examines how the protests in Syria were not able to realize their goals of
regime change and why this country ended up descending into civil war. Furthermore, the
study explores the factors that led to silencing protesters in Bahrain. The independent
variables in this study are economic payouts, repression, coercive apparatus, the
patronage of great powers, and military defections.

The process of transitional

democracy that started in Tunisia is a democratic exercise that continues to go well. The
dependent variables in this study are the successes of social movements and the
effectuation of regime change (success story: Tunisia; unsuccessful failures: Syria and
Bahrain. The latter has successfully used security and military forces to quell
demonstrations, but a part of its citizenry (the Shiite community) is still demanding
changes. In the following Chapter Two, I have surveyed and analyzed the literature
related to theories of social movements, the patronage of great powers and their
respective foreign policies in the MENA region, politics and economics in the region, and
the coercive apparatus.
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Chapter Two
Theory and literature review
Introduction
The literature review is organized under broad thematic areas. The first area is the
conceptual framework and theories of social movements. The second area examines how
the Arab Spring has shaken the Arab world, and how the protesters were able to
completely change regimes and topple their rulers from power; this thematic area will
deal with countries being able to initiate transitional democracy. The third thematic area
is premised on how some Arab countries halted the advancement of protests and
promised some economic and political reforms. However, most governments in the
Middle East have resisted the protests and responded by offering economic incentives to
citizens in order to prevent or stop the spread of revolution as it has represented a major
threat to their regimes.
The theories of social movements and their conceptual framework
I begin with the conceptual framework and theories of social movements that will
help test successes and failures of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Theory of Social Movements:Social movements bring about change, and/ or cause
reforms. According to Foweraker (1995, p.2), “Theory is shaped by society and the
historical context of each place and region.” In other words, “the story of social
movement theory can be told only together with the story of social movements
themselves” (Garner in Garner & Tenuto 1997:1). For this theory to be applicable, it is
assumed that there should be compelling political or socio-economic reasons or other
existing problems in a society to push citizens to form (or join existing) societal
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movements to start demonstrations against an oppressive regime. The main objective is
either total political change or to at least cause some reforms. Social movements
sometimes fail to achieve their ultimate goal, which is to transform the society with a
total regime change.
Some scholars have used the term “collective action theories” to describe social
movements because of the persistent nature of their collective behavior. Social scientists
have developed many classic and modern theories; but in this section, the focus is on the
following:
Little et al. (2013) see resource mobilization theory as the strategic element that is
required by social movements to successfully garner support, challenge adversaries and
other social movements, and present political arguments to the state. They further
explained that “framing theory focuses on the way social movements make appeals to
potential supporters by framing or presenting their issues in a way that aligns with
commonly held values, beliefs, and commonsense attitudes” (2013, p.p. 657-58). And
they also defined “new social movement theory” as “the specific qualities that
characterize the Green, feminist, peace, and other post-materialist social movements”
(2013, p. 658).
In order to understand the trends of revolutions and how they can succeed in
changing “incumbent” political momentum, I pose the following question: why do
revolutions succeed in some societies and fail in others, even when they occur in the
same time period and for the same reasons? According to Skocpol (1994), the answer is
found in one of the following three approaches: Aggregate psychological theories explain
revolutions by looking into how and what pushes people to engage themselves in political
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violence or what motivates them to join opposition groups. On the other hand,
systems/value-consensus theories explain revolutions as aggressive reactions of an
ideological movement to instability in a social system. Political conflict theories consider
competition for political power between government and opposition groups as something
that must be given special attention.
Aggregate psychological theories
Aggregate psychological theories describe why people engage in political
violence or join oppositional movements. Systems/value-consensus theories explore
ideological movements and the violent reactions that occur as a result of social
imbalances. Political conflict theories focus on the political conflicts between
government and organized groups vying for power. Schwartz (1972) has noted that
aggregate-psychological theorists operate under the assumption that revolutions originate
in the human mind (Schwartz 1972 as cited in Skocpol 1994:100). Skocpol (1994) has
further argued that the root cause of violent conflict, according to aggregatepsychological theories of revolutions, is discontent. Skocpol supported this premise by
examining psychological theories that link violence and aggression to frustration.
Skocpol (1994) has argued that frustration-aggression theorists typically view
revolution, normally defined as foundational psychological change achieved through
violence, as just one potential form of furtive, violent political action prompted by a
certain frame of mind. (Gurr 1970, cited in Skocpol 1994:101) has added that revolution
includes guerrilla wars, coup d’états, riots, and rebellions. Davies (1962, 1969);
Feierabend and Feierabend (1972); the Feierabends and Nesvold (1969, 1973); and Gurr
(1968a, 1968b, 1970) have led the approach. Skocpol (1994) has asserted that, in contrast
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with frustration-aggression theorists, who view mass discontent as the critical explanation
for revolutions, systems/value-consensus theorists cite revolutionary ideology and
systemic crises as the crucial factors for revolutions. This perspective has been advocated
most prominently by the sociological theorist Talcott Parsons (1951).
The systems/value-consensus theory
The systems/value-consensus theory most notably applies to the definition of
political revolution by Chalmers Johnson (1966). Johnson (1966) has defined revolution
as “a special kind of social change, one that involves the intrusion of violence into civil
social relations” (cited in Skocpol, 1994:105). While both Gurr (1970) and Skocpol
(1994) have included violence as an essential factor in their definitions, Johnson (1966,
cited in Skocpol, 1994) has not. Instead, Johnson has argued that violence is not an
emotional reaction leading to destructive action, but rather a logical strategy meant to
effect change through social reconstruction. Skocpol (1994) has further explained that
authorities

have

the

option

to

revise

existing

standards

and

institutions

(resynchronization); however, they may need to use coercion to stave off successful
revolution, typical in non-democratic countries. However, Johnson (1966) has argued that
suppressing protests through coercion is not a long-term solution, and that insurrection is
sometimes unavoidable. Indeed, Johnson, in the vein of systems/value-consensus theory,
has asserted that governments must mollify the citizenry and their value standards to
avoid revolution.
The political conflict perspective
Oberschall (1969, 1973); Overholt (1972); Russel (1974); and Tilly (1969, 1975)
(the latter as the prolific spokesperson for this perspective) have emphasized the role of
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organized group conflict to achieve political goals (Skocpol 1994:108). This counters the
views of aggregate-psychological and system/value-consensus theorists who focus on
discontent, disorientation, and the relegation of institutions and organizations to
intervening factors.
The political conflict perspective emerged as a response to the discontent and
societal disintegration explanations of political violence. Tilly (1975) has rebuked Gurr,
Davies, Johnson, and Smelser for their failure to recognize political violence as a
consequence of pervasive political conflict among organized groups and governments
that exert control over resources. Tilly has further placed political conflict as the central
focus; it should be analyzed along with the general model of governments and contenders
for power. Tilly has likewise argued that a revolution begins when two or more distinct
entities make effective claims on a government previously under the jurisdiction of a
single sovereign polity.
Deprivation or relative deprivation theory (DT/RDT)
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988) and Opp (1988) have noted that
Deprivation or Relative Deprivation Theory (DT/RDT) refers to social movements which
emerge when people or groups in a society believe they have been deprived of certain
goods, services, or resources. Deprivation theory can be divided into two distinct
branches: absolute deprivation and relative deprivation. The absolute deprivation camp
asserts that the affected group’s grievances exist in isolation from the position of the
group within the society. Conversely, proponents of relative deprivation look at the
disadvantageous standing of the group compared to other groups in the society. In other
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words, as Anindya and Ömer (2016) have argued, the emergence of a social movement
relies on the presence of other factors in addition to deprivation.
Resource mobilization theory (RMT)
Dobson (2001); Foweraker (1995); McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988); and
Phongpaichit (1999) have discussed Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), which
highlights the important role of resources in social movement development. These
resources are essential in the success of social movements. RMT thus posits that when
certain groups or people in a society have grievances, they may be successful in
mitigating those grievances by harnessing necessary resources, such as money, labor,
social status, knowledge, and support from media and political elites. While RMT offers
compelling arguments as to why some grievances may lead to successful social
movements, the theory has been criticized for its emphasis on material resources. It
should be noted that some social movements have emerged despite the scarcity of
material resources.
Political process theory (PPT)
Tilly (1978); Foweraker (1995); Phongpaichit (1999) and Dobson (2001) have
explained that Political Process Theory (PPT) views social movements within the context
of political opportunities. In other words, PPT examines social movements in comparison
to the power of the state. If the government in charge has a firm grasp on power and uses
this power to suppress, there is a high probability that a social movement will be
unsuccessful. However, if the government is weak or more tolerant of dissent, then the
there is a greater chance for the social movement to succeed.
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The structural strain theory
Smelser (1965) has proposed the structural strain theory, which argues that
emerging social movements need six factors to flourish: a problem people in a society are
experiencing (deprivation); recognition of the problem by people in the society;
identification of an emerging, influential ideology claiming to provide a solution to the
problem; a critical event or series of events that transform the ideology into a bona fide
social movement; “the society and its government are receptive to change; resources are
mobilized as the movement continues to evolve” (cited in Anindya and Ömer 2016,
p.128).
The following figure 2 illustrates the prototypes that help understand how social
movements on different stages differ from outcomes and reform and revolutionary
movements which fall under this study will be discussed below.
Figure 2: Aberle’s Four Types of Social Movements
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Social movements can occur on the local, national, or even global stage. Are there other
prototypes or categorization that can help to understand them? Sociologist Aberle (1966)
has addressed this question by categorizing social movements according to the specific
changes and the degree of changes desired. Little et. al. (2013) has asserted that reform
movements are attempts to reshape aspects of society while stopping short of completely
transforming society. Reform movements occur only in democratic societies where
people are free to exercise their rights including that of criticizing institutions.
Revolutionary movements attempt to replace social/political systems by deposing
existing systems. While reform movements seek to correct deficiencies in existing social
systems, revolutionary movements attempt to eradicate the systems themselves and to
create new ones. When reform movements are thwarted, revolutionary movements thrive,
as they represent the only alternative available. The Arab uprisings that spread across the
Arab nations have caused the outcome of regime change in Tunisia; but failed to do so in
other Arab countries such as Bahrain and Syria. The below section explains how the Arab
Spring erupted in Tunisia and spread across North Africa and the Middle East region.
The Arab Spring as an action of social movements
Most Middle Eastern countries exercise authoritarian regime systems. Soon after
demonstrations began in Tunisia, they spread across the northern African region and in
many Middle Eastern countries. This is the case of the so-called Arab Spring, which
overwhelmed the region and surprised the world with the aim of creating winds of
change.
Unexpectedly, the Arab Spring erupted in late 2010 and early 2011. It was
characterized in the beginning by huge and largely peaceful popular protests in a number
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of Arab countries against long-standing entrenched regimes. According to Haas and
Lesch (2017, p.1) “Arab Spring began in Tunisia, where an ordinary Tunisian fruit
vendor in abject anger set himself on fire and his action was borne of frustration and
disillusionment over the socioeconomic malaise and political repression in his country.”
In the end, the researchers agreed on the economic issues and political turmoil that
brought Tunisians to the street to change their social and political order.
Haas and Lesch (2017, p.3) have observed that “youth bulges, general frustration
with the status quo, and socioeconomic difficulties caused by the 2008 global financial
crisis played a critical role in the proliferation of protests throughout the Arab world”.
Herve et al. (2014) noted that some protesters have enjoyed more success than others. In
Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, protesters managed to overthrow governments or expel
current rulers. Only with the assistance of massive foreign military aid were Libyan
rebels also successful. Demonstrations in Bahrain and Syria have not led to successful
outcomes for protesters, and protest movements in Saudi Arabia have had almost no
meaningful traction. While early successes of the Arab Spring became inspirations for
people to hold demonstrations in other countries, negative outcomes, particularly in
Libya and Syria, dissuaded people from mobilizing in other states. Nevertheless, the
government of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was overthrown by youth
protesters, reminiscent of the Arab Spring model. Otherwise, Sub-Saharan African
countries experienced minimal influences from the Arab Spring movement.
Clement and Jang (2012) have reported that the overwhelming majority of Arab
countries escaped mass protests, with Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Oman, UAE, and Palestine experiencing sporadic protests. None of these
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countries experienced the widespread, mobilized, regime-threatening protests like those
in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Haas and Lesch (2017) have
explained that when a country’s military is composed of minorities with ethnic, religious,
or kinship bonds (as with the Assad government and military in Syria, dominated by the
minority Alawite sect; likewise, many Saudi military personnel are members of the royal
family), it is far more likely that the military will remain loyal to the regime and even fire
on fellow citizens engaging in political protests. In fact, this occurred in Syria. Haas and
Lesch (2017) also noted that the events of the Arab Spring have proved that the “tyrannyanarchy loop,” a term coined by political scientists, is accurate. The “tyranny-anarchy
loop” describes the fluctuation between tyranny and anarchy in many societies. Societies
often find it difficult to establish stable democracies and exit the cycle.
Bayat (2017) has asserted that the Arab uprisings led to more discouraging
outcomes than other revolutions, causing many to question the decisions to foment these
uprisings in the first place. For example, Syria descended into civil war, and the
revolution in Bahrain was thwarted by Saudi military intervention. Furthermore, civil war
broke out in Yemen, with Houthi rebels and deposed President Ali Saleh confronting the
central government backed by the Saudi regime. Post-Qaddafi Libya witnessed civil
unrest between the dawn militias and an elected government. The military ouster of
Morsi in Egypt in July 2013 led to a restoration of the counterrevolution. A common
question is, “why did the Arab revolutions face such an unfortunate destiny?” Most
commentators have highlighted counterrevolutionary plots (both domestic and regional),
conservative coups, deep state manipulation and control, and foreign states (great
powers) meddling in the Arab world’s internal affairs.
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Why has this occurred in the Middle East and North Africa? Bayat (2017) has
argued that both oil and the state of Israel have shaped the “geostrategic exceptionalism”
of the region, causing geopolitical competition. Foreign actors pursuing geopolitical and
economic interests have interfered, as in the case of NATO forces in Libya crushing
Qaddafi’s regime and developing close ties with the post-Gaddafi government. In Syria,
Russia, Iran, and the Lebanese Hezbollah gave unconditional support to Assad’s regime;
while the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia maintained consistent support for the
Syrian rebels both financially and militarily. Qatar was a supporter of the Islamist groups
in Libya and Egypt in addition to ISIS, while UAE was against them. Geopolitical
competition between regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, led to the downfall of the
Yemeni revolution, as Saudi Arabia deployed its military to fight Houthi rebels backed
by Iran.
The Middle East and North Africa region in the aftermath of World War I
In David Fromkin’s book, entitled A Peace to End All Peace, the author discussed
the notion that the present-day Middle East cannot be understood without an appreciation
of its formation in the aftermath of World War I. He stated that by 1922, European
powers had divided the former Ottoman Empire into states and puppet regimes, drawing
boundaries and imposing rulers, while ignoring the wishes of those who actually lived
there (Fromkin 1989). It was the nature of this division process that led to the creation of
states-without-nations in the Middle East. The newly-drawn boundaries cut across
religious, social, and ethnic lines. The presence of such antagonistic and conflicting
groups in these drawn-up states posed a huge threat to the subsequent process of nationbuilding. Such divergent groups are fighting each other in Syria, with ongoing political
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crises in various parts of the region, including Bahrain. Tunisia has escaped the upheavals
for reasons that will be explained later in this chapter.
Paraschos (2017, p. 17) regarded the Middle East as a “shatter belt,” a name, in
geopolitical terminology, that is given to a region that is highly fractured and predisposed
to conflict. Shatter belts are “instability generators” that can spread insecurity into
surrounding regions and interrupt the flow of international trade and commerce.
Furthermore, shatter belts are geopolitical realms where Great Powers vie for advantage
through client states and proxy forces or seek to maintain stability by intervening against
aggressive regional powers”. The modern Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
is a quintessential shatter belt. Twelve years ago, the MENA region was relatively stable
compared to today. Most regional countries were ruled by long-lived autocratic regimes
that had imposed a frangible form of domestic stability, and the primary regional
conflicts of concern were in Iraq and Israel. In striking contrast, the MENA region today
is considerably more volatile: Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen continue to be embroiled in
violent conflict, producing a degree of insecurity that is unprecedented in the region’s
modern history and revolutionary in its implications for regional and international order.
Each of these fractured states creates instability far beyond its own borders, and it
remains to be seen whether any of them can ever be stabilized within their current
internationally recognized borders.
The Arab Spring not only caused the ouster of longtime autocratic rulers in
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, but it also sparked region-shaking conflicts in Libya,
Syria, and Yemen. Significant repercussions of the Arab Spring include the Islamic
State’s invasion of Iraq in mid-2014 and later in Syria and the outbreak of civil war in
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Yemen in 2015. Depending on the estimate, well over 300,000 people have been killed in
Syria’s civil war, with approximately 4.8 million refugees fleeing to neighboring
countries2. About 6.6 million people remain internally displaced inside of Syria. “A
conflict that started as a Sunni Arab uprising against the minority Alawite-dominated
Assad’s regime, became, over time, a complex, interconnected set of sub-conflicts”
(Paraschos 2017, p. 17). “The rapid spread of conflict throughout the MENA region since
2011 allowed al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to grow much stronger, and their
competition for leadership of the global jihad movement has caused the jihadist threat to
rapidly grow and evolve” (Paraschos 2017, p. 18).
Great Powers Patronage and their respective influences toward the Middle East and
North Africa
Foreign policy coalesces the international goals of a state and the strategies for
harnessing national capabilities to realize those goals. The primary objectives of states
are interrelated and can be regarded as a hierarchical structure of instrumental goals; the
most important foreign policy objective of any state is to ensure survival, which is
defined in "terms of some combination of territorial integrity and autonomy" (Levy 2004,
p.32 cited in Prifti 2017, p.11). For example, “the survival of the USA as a free and
independent nation is ranked number one in all of its official national security strategies”
(Rourke and Boyer 2010, p.141) cited in (Prifti 2017). “The most important of its
secondary objectives is to prevent the emergence of another dominant power that would
challenge the status quo of the international community” (Levy 2004, p.32 cited in Prifti
2
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2017). The United States has been the undisputed external military power in the region;
Russia’s geopolitical influence has remained at a post-Soviet nadir; and China has only
begun to develop significant economic and commercial interests in the area. Although
European and Asian powers, including the United Kingdom, France, India, Japan, South
Korea, and others have played important roles in regional affairs, the real competitors in
the MENA shatterbelt are the United States, Russia, and China, all of which exert an
outsized effect on the region. The regional wave of Arab Spring protests at the end of
2010 and in early 2011 deeply fragmented the regional geopolitical order in fundamental
and ostensibly irrevocable ways (Paraschos 2017).
Structural realism
Derived from Waltz’s structural realism, structural realist theorists can be
categorized into two competing camps with competing assumptions and policy measures:
offensive realism and defensive realism (Lobell 2017, p. 2). For offensive realists security
is in short supply. The anarchic essence of the international system pressures states to
maximize their share of world power and to pursue superiority, not equality, in order to
safeguard their own security and increase their chances for survival (Gilpin, 1981;
Liberman, 1996; Schweller 1996; Labs 1997; Zakaria 1998; Mearsheimer 2001; Elman
2004). The end goal of every major power is to become the dominant superpower, the
hegemon. The reasoning is that the more powerful the state, the less chance it will
become a target, since weaker powers will be deterred from challenging it. Defensive
realists argue that the international system empowers states to seek moderation and
restraint to assure their survival and safety, providing incentives for expansion in only a
few specific cases. The rationale is that aggression, competition, and expansion to
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maximize power through superiority and dominance are ineffective, serving only to
induce security dilemmas and counterbalancing behaviors, ultimately derailing the state’s
efforts to increase its security (Lobell 2017). Defensive or positional realists (Joseph
Grieco coined the term “defensive positionalists” in Cooperation Among Nations)
endorse the idea that security is plentiful. Major powers seek to maximize their security
by maintaining the existing balance of power through mostly defensive strategies (Jervis
1978; Waltz 1979; Posen 1984; Walt 1987; Grieco 1990; Snyder 1991; Glaser 1994/5;
Layne 1997; Van Evera 1999).
Offensive realism and maximizing power
Classical realists (such as Thucydides, E.H. Carr, Arnold Wolfers, and Hans
Morgenthau) and offensive realists share the assumption that states strive to maximize
power – that states relentlessly pursue power and influence. Specifically, classical realists
have asserted that “nations expand their political interests abroad when their relative
power increases” (Zakaria 1998, p.19). Thucydides’ assertion in “The Melian Dialogue”
is that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Morgenthau
and other classical realists have argued that the cause of conflict, aggression, expansion,
and wars can be attributed to the human lust for power, and that, therefore, states are
hardwired to act with aggression toward one another. The result is never-ending conflict
among states because of the natural human drive to dominate others ( Lobell 2017).
Is International trade conditioned to the stability of the Middle Eastern region?
The confluence of Western nations and Middle Eastern stability equates to stable
international trade. The MENA region is an insignificant producer of manufactured
goods. Nevertheless, it plays a singularly significant role in global energy production and
27

maritime transportation. The region holds 872.1 billion barrels in crude oil reserves, or
52.5% of the global total. In 2016, MENA crude oil production averaged 27.6 million
barrels per day, accounting for 30.1% of total world oil production. The region also holds
3,096.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, or 44.6% of the global total.
Additionally, the MENA region encompasses three well-known maritime “chokepoints”:
the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean and Red Seas, the Bab al-Mandab,
which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Hormuz, which
connects the energy-laden Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The
maritime transportation of crude oil through these chokepoints accounts for about 45% of
total global maritime oil trade. “Maintaining the free flow of energy and commerce
through these chokepoints is vital to the continuous flow of international trade, and the
presence of US, European, and Asian naval forces has continued to play a crucial role in
averting piracy and other land-based threats to international shipping” (Paraschos 2017,
p. 18).
Instability in the MENA region has directly affected European nations, who now
host over one million refugees, mostly from war-torn MENA countries, with a vast
number of refugees from Syria. The MENA shatterbelt will face consequences resulting
from a resurgent Russia, an increasingly nationalistic U.S., sluggish economic growth,
and high levels of debt. These factors will hamper any possible future democratic
development in the region. The Gulf Arab monarchies, including Bahrain, have withstood
the wave of mass anti-regime demonstrations by cracking down on voices of dissent and
increasing socioeconomic spending to placate domestic sources of resentment. However,
consistently low oil prices since 2014 have caused the monarchies to introduce significant
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austerity measures, including the reduction of energy subsidies. At the same time, the
Gulf Arab states have been spending more on national defense in response to Iran’s
growing military strength and regional presence (Paraschos 2017).
External influences in the Middle East and North Africa region.
During the Obama era, the U.S. significantly reduced its military presence in the
MENA region, primarily by withdrawing all of its combat forces from Iraq in 2011.
However, the U.S. did continue to maintain the largest military presence of any great
power in the region, including ground and air combat forces based in Gulf Arab countries
and at sea in regional waters, along with a growing missile defense architecture stretching
from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. also maintained close
military relations with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Turkey despite considerable tension in
bilateral relations with each of these countries. In retrospect, the general U.S. approach
during the Obama era was to avoid any major “Iraq style” military intervention in the
region, coupled with the reaffirmation of traditional U.S. interests. For example, in
September 2013, Obama announced that the U.S. would employ “all elements” of its
power, including military force, to secure “core interests in the region.” These core
interests included protecting regional allies from external aggression, ensuring the “free
flow of energy from the region to the world,” combating “terrorist networks” that
threatened Americans, and preventing the regional proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Under the Obama administration, U.S. military involvement in regional
conflicts continued, but on a much smaller scale. The U.S. also continued to be the
largest exporter of arms to the Middle East, with approved sales totaling $33 billion since
May 2015, (Paraschos 2017). The evolving paradigm of global competition and
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cooperation among the U.S., Russia, and China will have major implications for regional
order and stability well into the 21st century.
The purported shift in U.S. foreign policy under Obama since 2009 has been
heavily debated. After two terms of expansive U.S. foreign policy under George W.
Bush, informed by the theory that the United States needed to project force overseas
unilaterally in defense of its own and its allies’ national interests, Obama’s approach to
foreign and security policy at first seemed to be non-interventionist, the administration’s
attention being directed more towards domestic matters. (Lindsay 2011). After two
expensive and devastating wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with US taxpayers and service
personnel principally carrying the burden, Obama was unyielding in his belief that in
times of austerity and globalization, military action must be limited to the defense of vital
U.S. interests while being carried out by a leaner, more flexible military force acting
multilaterally in cooperation with local allies, rather than unilaterally (Gerges‚ Fawaz, A.
2013). U.S. foreign policy objectives had not necessarily changed, but rather the means
chosen to achieve them (Manyin et al., 2012). According to Fareed Zackaria3 (2012) the
question was not whether Obama had been a good foreign policy president, but whether
he had been a great one. In the decades after the Vietnam War, Republicans frequently
warned of global dangers, often harshly criticizing their Democratic adversaries for being
gutless appeasers. During the Obama years, however, Republicans infrequently leveled
narrow attacks on the president’s handling of American foreign policy.
Obama’s primary strategic approach to foreign and security policy was guided by
the precept of “multilateral retrenchment,” a principle “designed to curtail the United
3
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States’ overseas commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto
global partners” (Drezner 2004, p.59). Thus, the Obama administration had primarily
attempted to maintain its foreign posture without solely relying on military power or
presence. And while it accentuated the need for “soft power” engagement with its allies,
partners and adversaries, that posture did not equate to completely closing off the option
of military action. (Turse 2012).
On the other hand, some would argue that Obama showed considerable
willingness to use military force to protect vital national interests against geographically
and legally amorphous threats4, which were often ill-defined. However, given the
complexity of the operating environment and domestic limitations, the use of force
employed by the Obama administration was different. The Obama Doctrine was a
product of the shifts in the geostrategic environment examined above. There has been a
realization in Washington that the United States, though still a Great Power, is not
omnipotent, as a variety of different actors actively have attempted to subvert the statist
foundation of the international system.
President Donald Trump inherited this geostrategic dossier, and his first regional
steps sought to restore relations with longtime allies that had become severely strained
during the Obama era, with Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia at the top of the list. Trump
also endeavored to shift U.S. policy in a more activist direction: his chief goal was to
defeat the Islamic State and other “radical Islamic terror groups,” possibly in cooperation
with Russia. The U.S. is no longer the sole external military power in the MENA region
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because of the recent growth of Russian and Chinese military activity, but it is capable of
mobilizing enormous military strength in the area with relatively short notice. (Paraschos
2017).
According to Collins and Rothe (2014), U.S. foreign policy in the region has
remained consistent following the ouster of President Morsi. In fact, the Obama
Administration did not characterize the ouster of Morsi by Egyptian military forces in
2013 as a coup, but rather as a response to the demands of Egyptian citizens. However,
this was considered a violation of U.S. law which prohibits providing aid to countries
where an elected leader has been forcibly removed from power through a military coup.
And the unchanged U.S. foreign policy position in the region was due to its interest in
protecting Israel. Regarding U.S. relations with Egypt, political and diplomatic ties were
not significantly affected because of the new government. U.S. foreign policy gained
strength in the successive Egyptian regimes from Sadat to the incumbent Abdel Fatah El
Sisi. The United States’ interest in the Middle East and North Africa has relied on
dependent collaborators such as Egypt, and U.S. military assistance is a tool to ensure
continuity. Friendly authoritarian regimes are of paramount preference over a
democratically-elected leader who would be unlikely to support U.S. interests.
Another fact is that the “American pursuit of regional security over democracy
dated back to longstanding interests in a US-led security frameworks and cordial ties with
Arab energy exporters,.” The protesters of 2010-2012 have faced

strong coercive

elements, often with support from abroad that seems determined to preserve
authoritarianism in these modern times (Brownlee et al. 2015, p.42).
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While discussing the main impetus of American foreign policy, Prifti (2017) has
asserted that the U.S. seeks to prevent any other great power from becoming a potential
regional hegemon, since such an occurrence could eventually pose a threat to the United
States. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan have been cited as the main examples of U.S.
insecurity. “The problem with this line of argument, however, is that it justifies American
intervention in states on the basis of pre-emption. The U.S. dominance over the flow of
oil in the Middle East and the safeguarding of its alliance with Israel are secondary U.S.
foreign policy objectives in the Middle East” (Prifti 2017, pp. 14, 15).
In discussing the future prospects of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the
author has claimed that it is likely to remain unchanged, based on the theory of offensive
realism, unless there is a change, in terms of influence, in the territory as the maritime
power or regional hegemon status of the United States (Prifti 2017p. 188).
This may appear persuasive if one subscribes to the arguments grounded in
offensive realism; however, current political developments in the form of the emerging
trilateral alliance of Russia, Turkey, and Iran seem to pose a challenge to the continuation
of the American policy to pursue offshore balance in the Middle East. Similarly, the
increasing role of China is another factor that has been overlooked in this context. Some
scholars, based on new political trends, have claimed that the role of China as a
challenger to U.S. power is likely to increase, which appears true if one examines the
country’s economic growth and military strength. Nevertheless, others have determined
that China still lags far behind to challenge the U.S. through military might when
comparing both countries’ military spending. In 2019, the Chinese government reported
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an official defense budget of just under $178 billion 5, while the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2019) estimated the actual (nominal) spending to have
been $261 billion. In 2018, IISS 6 estimated Chinese defense spending to be $225 billion,
while SIPRI put the number at nearly $254 billion. The International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS, 2019) provides estimates that are typically lower than those of
SIPRI 7. The official budget that year was just $167 billion. Foreign estimates of Chinese
military spending have suggested that actual spending may be much higher. Although
China spends little on military development compared to U.S. military spending, some
scholars such as Prifti (2017) have argued that China is advancing not only economically
but also militarily; this approach further contends that China is better placed to compete
with the United States than Russia, which appears to be facing economic problems.
China’s growing military strength and its implications for the U.S. is often not discussed
by American authors. For example, Joseph Nye expresses reservations about the rising
power of China (Prifti 2017, p.198).
As for China, it has begun to secure a naval foothold equal to its substantial and
growing maritime and commercial interests in the region. Since the mid-1990s, China has
steadily acquired major economic and energy interests in the Middle East. China has
invested sizeable amounts in the development of Iranian and Iraqi oil fields, long since
eclipsing the U.S. as the major importer of crude oil from the region. China has likewise
been involved in the construction, financing, and operation of the Mediterranean ports in
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, as well as in Eritrea and Djibouti on the Red Sea.
5

China does withhold data and it is sometimes hard to get into accurate stats of China’s government
IISS, International Institute for Strategic Studies
7
SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org
6
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China is investing enormous sums in Egypt: $45 billion in the Suez Canal
Economic Zone and another $15 billion in Egyptian electricity, transportation, and
infrastructure projects. These investments are vital to China’s continued development of a
“maritime Silk Road,” which flanks the southern edge of Eurasia into the Mediterranean
Sea to ensure access to Europe’s vast market. At the same time, China continues to
develop “blue water” naval capabilities and construct a series of bases needed to project
military power along the entire length of its maritime Silk Road (Paraschos 2017).
In historical terms, however, China’s military presence is new to the MENA
region. China’s first naval visit to the Mediterranean occurred in 2009, and in 2010,
China’s navy conducted its first visit to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In 2011 and again in 2014,
the Chinese military evacuated Chinese nationals from war-torn Libya. In April 2015,
China’s navy evacuated foreign nationals from Yemen, the first time it has ever rescued
non-Chinese nationals from the dangers of a mounting regional conflict. That same year,
China conducted joint naval exercises with Russia in the Mediterranean Sea, gaining
further experience in conducting long-range naval operations. In 2016, China began
construction of a naval base in the East African country of Djibouti, which also hosts the
largest US military base in Africa. Over this same period, China avoided taking on any
major military role in regional conflicts; Beijing has adhered to a relatively low-key
diplomatic stance regarding conflicts in Syria and other countries in the region. For now,
China is content to allow Russia, the US, and other countries deal with these conflicts
while it focuses on the steady expansion of its commercial and naval influence and
establishes stronger relations with regional states, including key U.S. allies (Paraschos
2017).
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As China systematically expands its power and influence, the slow and steady
pace may not bear fruit if dwindling economic growth compels Beijing to choose
between domestic considerations and long-range foreign policy goals. At times, these
interests may overlap, and cooperation aimed at restoring regional stability could occur.
However, at the end of the Obama era, according to Paraschos (2017, p.20), the region
was at a dangerously extant risk of being divided into opposing spheres of U.S. and
Russian influence. As of early 2017, it was unclear if this emergent phenomenon would
harden into a protracted stalemate similar to the Cold War.
Russia and China as the US major challenger at international level
According to Hancock and Lobell (2010, pp. 146-147), offensive realists assert
that “China and Russia, like other great powers throughout history, have primarily
revisionist intentions; at a minimum, the political leaders of other states should assume
that they harbor these intentions in order to protect their own security”. On the other
hand, defensive realists argue that China and Russia are principally driven by securityseeking behavior. For offensive realists, major or emerging powers are rarely satisfied
with the current distribution of power. The rationale is that states, including China and
Russia, can never be certain of the intentions of other states. Specifically, it is difficult for
a state to ascertain how much power it must have compared to its rivals in order to
maintain its security, and it is difficult to ascertain how much power will be enough
power in the future. Even in the absence of a specific or imminent threat, offensive
realists contend, states will maximize power and influence because of the uncertainty of
when or where the next threat might emerge. Uncertainty about intentions and concerns
about miscalculation mean that states always prepare for the worst-case scenario when
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assessing another power. States therefore always appraise each other with fear, mistrust,
and suspicion; moreover, all states regard one another in the same manner. The result is a
constant security competition, even among states that have no reason to compete, hence
the title of Mearsheimer’s book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” (Lobell &
Hancock 2010, p. 147). And the United States and Russia’s influences as external actors
have been also discussed in the cases of Bahrain and Syria.
Israeli politics toward its neighboring Middle Eastern countries and its response to
the Arab Spring
According to Eldar (2012) in a survey conducted on the tenth anniversary of
Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination in 2005, Israeli Jews were asked to assess whether
the decision to engage in the Oslo process had been the correct one. While 62 percent of
the secular respondents answered affirmatively, the answer given by religious and ultraOrthodox respondents was the complete opposite; among those respondents, representing
a growing segment of Israeli society, more than 70 percent said it had been the wrong
decision. Placing “greater Israel” at the top of the value system meant that democracy and
demography were undermined among the wider public, to the extent that they believed
the executive branch and the Knesset did not have a mandate to make decisions on
territorial withdrawals. This is reflected in a statement by Benny Katzover, former
chairman of the Shomron settlers’ regional council and a settler leader: “The main role of
Israeli democracy now is to disappear. Israeli democracy has finished its role, and it must
disassemble and give way to Judaism” (Elder 2012, p.11). Eldar reflected the views of
Gabriel Sheffer, a prominent expert on the study of regime and societal relations in Israel.
He observed the lack of separation between religion and state in Israel as the key factor in
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understanding the country’s recent history. In a 2005 article, he stressed that the historical
failure to separate ethnic-national identity and religious belief has been the primary cause
of events in Jewish society and in the relationship between Israelis, Arabs, and
Palestinians. He explained that this issue has distorted Israeli democracy. More recently,
he characterized Israel as a Jewish national-religious state that naturally excludes many
citizen groups from any serious influence on public policy (Eldar 2012). To exercise
control over the land without giving up its Jewish identity, Israel has embraced various
policies of “separation.” It has separate legal systems for traditional Israeli territory and
for the territory it occupies; it divides those who reside in occupied lands based on ethnic
identity; it has retained control over occupied lands but has evaded responsibility for the
people living there; and it has created a conceptual distinction between its democratic
principles and its actual practices in the occupied territories. These separations have
permitted Israel to maintain the occupation for almost five and a half decades while
maintaining its identity and international status (Eldar 2012).
In polling, the Israeli public about what ought to be done in view of the Arab
Spring, Peace Index (2011), as cited in Haas and Lesch (2017, p. 231) reported that “the
vast majority of Israeli Jews 70.2 percent agreed with the claim that Israel should remain
passive “at this stage” while only 40 percent of Israeli Arabs agreed with this position”.
Haas and Lesch went on to assert that there was no concerted effort by the Israeli
government to convince the public to see any positive aspect of the Arab Spring. The
scholars further explained that the Netanyahu government’s passive position
demonstrated that the possibility of democracy had been ignored in favor of an exclusive
emphasis on the dangers of instability and Islamism. Netanyahu’s stance justified and
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legitimized his do-nothing approach with regard to the Palestinian conflict and the push
for a Palestinian settlement as a way to promote stability (Haas and Lesch 2017).
The concept of waves of democratization
The concept of waves of democracy, or democratization, is meant to describe the
initiation of transitional democracy in which certain countries transition from
authoritarian to democratic regimes for a limited period of time. Some countries may
begin together in one wave of democracy, and a few countries may continue and attain a
certain level of democracy; by contrast, other countries in the same wave of democracy
may revert to non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. Even though the study of Bahrain,
Syria, and Tunisia may yield modest insights into the scope of conditions that govern a
number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, this chapter highlights
the distinctive lessons of the Arab region’s experimentation with democratization (based
on these three cases), and the study in general explains some implications for further
democratization in the Arab world.
Among the distinctive lessons learned by the Arab region’s experimentation with
democratization, according to Bellin (2018, p.167), “three are specifically noteworthy.
First, the experience of Tunisia and other Arab Spring outcomes confirms the need to
reimagine the idea of what constitutes “fatal polarization” for democracy. According to
Bellin (2018, p.p. 471-472) Sartori conceived of polarization as “the ideological distance
that separates key political actors. It is seen as harmful to democracy because it
undermines the possibilities of negotiation and compromise, makes political competition
appear “zero-sum, and threatens to inflict permanent losses on key political actors who
then become irrevocably dissatisfied with democracy”. In contrast to Sartori, however,
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Latin Americanists such as Mainwaring, Perez-Linan (2013) as cited in Bellin (2018, p.
471), and others have redefined the concept of polarization, arguing that “it is not so
much the ideological divide between political actors that is problematic for democracy as
it is the matter of “intransigence and urgency”. If ideologically conflicting political actors
are willing to embrace longer time horizons to achieve their policy objectives, then
democracy-saving compromise can be realized. In Latin America during the 1970s and
1980s, when the primary ideological divide centered mostly on distributional issues, the
survival of democracy depended on the willingness (especially by the left) to take the
long view— postponing some of its redistributional objectives to assuage the worst fears
of the business community and its military allies, Bellin (2018).
By contrast, Bellin (2018) went on to say, in the Arab world today, the most
intense ideological divide is cultural: Islamist versus non-Islamist. However, here as well,
the level of ideological distance between key parties need not portend democratic failure
if political actors are willing to embrace longer time horizons. In Tunisia, the ideological
divide between the Islamist and non-Islamist camps was to a great extent much more
severe than it is in Syria. Ingrained in the French tradition of la laicité, the non-Islamist
camp in Tunisia was much more hostile to the official endorsement of religion.
Furthermore, in Tunisia, the amenability of the Islamist leadership to “take the long
view” and more slowly pursue its policy agenda made the Islamist position less
threatening to its opponents and allowed the transition process to continue progressing. In
Bahrain, the issue is that the minority Sunni Muslims led by the Al-Khalifa ruling family
fear the emergence of the Shiite community as the majority in the country. The
monarchical regime endeavors to exclude them from any influential positions, and Shia
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leaders face unprecedented discrimination. Second, the events in Tunisia, Bahrain, and
Syria (as well as the Arab Spring in general) signal the consequences for democratization
created by changes in the international community: the end of unipolarity and the erosion
of liberal dominance. As Plattner has pointed out, much of the third and fourth waves of
democracy occurred during a unique period when the overwhelming dominance of the
United States and its democratic allies created an international environment amenable to
prodemocracy campaigns. Now, however, well into the twenty-first century, increasingly
insistent nondemocracies, some of them major world powers (such as Russia and China)
and some of them regional power players (such as Iran and Saudi Arabia), regularly
oppose democratization in neighboring or “client” countries. This has proven true in
Egypt, as well as in Syria, Bahrain, and beyond (Bellin (2018). The impact of this
international factor, in addition to the long-standing willingness of major powers to
subsidize authoritarian regimes in the Arab world to combat terrorism and contain
Islamic radicalism, underscores the important international challenges to a “fifth wave.”
Third, Bellin (2018) continued to explain, the Arab region’s experimentation with
democratization (and its abrupt suspension) once again illustrates that, for most people,
democracy is prioritized far below economic and physical security. This is by no means
limited to the Arab world, but the compromise between security and freedom is viewed
as especially striking in the Arab world today. Engulfed in the turmoil of failed states, the
violent radicalism of competing religious movements, and the general plight of economic
and personal insecurity, most citizens (both the elite and the common classes) in the
region, exhibit little enthusiasm for democracy. In war-torn countries such as Syria and
Libya, democracy seems to be a fanciful goal. But even in somewhat stable authoritarian
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countries (Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia), the liberal-leaning have been
taken aback by the threat of neighboring chaos and persuaded by their governments’ selfcongratulatory promotion of stability and order. The current lack of commitment to the
democratization, especially among the elite, is the single most important hurdle to
democratic progress in the Middle East today. The region’s history illustrates once again
that order trumps freedom. In sum, what are the implications of the Tunisian, Bahraini,
and Syrian examples for the rest of the Middle East and North Africa in terms of the
possibilities for democratization?
To some extent, it is difficult to generalize these cases. Tunisia, Bahrain, and
Syria are vastly different in terms of ethnic homogeneity, even though they share Islamic
culture. Moreover, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Syria are underdeveloped countries. However,
these cases suggest two generalizable lessons for the region, two of which are pessimistic
(Bahrain and Syria) and one of which is optimistic (Tunisia). The pessimistic lesson has
already been discussed: the region’s deep entanglement in international power struggles
and patronage, because of its substantial oil and gas resources and geographic location as
the epicenter of Islamic radicalism and terror, signifies that democratization will continue
to face international challenge more often than garner international support. Despite this
recent attention to international variables, few scholars uphold the preeminence of
international factors over domestic ones in propelling democratization. The general
consensus, as comparativists argue, continues to be that democracy must be largely
homegrown to survive (Bellin 2018).
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Democracy, political and economic incentives in the Middle East and North Africa
By the mid-1990s, a new “family of hypotheses,” emphasizing international
factors, had emerged in the study of democratization. Conquest, sanctions, conditionality,
persuasion, and modeling across international boundaries all attracted the attention of
scholars. The “neighborhood effect” of the spread of democracy in Latin America; the
fall of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe (triggered by the end of Soviet backing);
the shift to democracy in Panama, Grenada, and Haiti (under the threat of American
occupation); the tentative support for democracy by sub-Saharan countries (prodded by
debt crises and conditional international assistance) all pointed to the importance of
international (independent) variables in democratization. One of the most sophisticated
contributions to this new trend has been advanced by Levitsky and Way. They have
argued that much of the international pressure for democracy is mediated through two
channels: linkage and leverage. Linkage refers to “the density of ties (economic, political,
diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross border flows (of trade, investment,
people, and communication)” that exist between a given country and Western
democracies. Leverage refers to the degree to which the government of a given country is
“vulnerable to external democratizing pressure” (for example, through aid dependency,
insignificance as a security ally, etc.). Levitsky and Way further argued that where
Western linkage and leverage are low, as in many countries in the Middle East, the
former Soviet Union, and most if not all Sub-Saharan Africa; the effectiveness of
international pressure to democratize is weak. By contrast, where Western linkage and
leverage are high, the reverse is true (Levitsky and Way 2006).
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Democratic institutions and other key elements of democracy
According to Little et al. (2013, p. 534), democratic institutions (parliament,
elections, rule of law, constitutions), citizenship (individual rights and freedoms within a
political community), and the public sphere (spaces for public debate) are the three key
elements of a democracy. These three elements ensure democratic rule by the people.
Habermas (1998) has emphasized that the formation of direct and representative
democracies requires a deliberative process. General consensus among people emerges in
public exchanges. Habermas (1990) has further argued that the ideal speech situation is
the underlying norm of the democratic process. An ideal speech situation allows for
everyone to equally contribute to public discourse, question claims, and present ideas. No
one is restricted arbitrarily from participating, and no one is impeded from participating
because of socioeconomic status, level of education, or other practical restrictions.
Representative democracies support the establishment of democratic will via
political parties competing in elections. Kitschelt (1995) has identified two factors that
embody democratic party systems: (1) “political demand refers to the underlying societal
factors and social changes that create constituencies of people with common interests.
For example, changes in the types of jobs generated by the economy will affect the size
of electoral support for labor unions and labor union politics. (2) Political supply refers to
the strategies and organizational capacities of political parties to deliver an appealing
political program to particular constituencies. For example, the Liberal Party of Canada
often attempts to develop policies and political messaging that will position it in the
middle of the political spectrum where the largest group of voters potentially resides.”
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Henry and Ji-Hyang (2012, p.p. 36, 37) have noted that “in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
and Yemen, the Arab uprisings have indeed effected fundamental change in the toppling
of longstanding dictators. For many, seeing these dictatorial regimes fall was a cause for
joyful celebration. However, though authoritarian breakdown is necessary for a transition
to democracy, most authoritarian regimes historically have been replaced by other
authoritarian regimes; in the view of some scholars, this is the case of the current regime
in Egypt which, in a reversal from transitional democracy, returned to being an
authoritarian regime as it had been during the Mubarak era”.
Brownlee et al. (2015, p.p. 36, 37) has argued that only through a free, fair, and
competitive election, with all players accepting the results and all civil liberties afforded,
can a true transition to democracy take place. Within the context of the post-Arab Spring,
citizens of Tunisia and Egypt (immediately after revolution) did participate in a
competitive election process; however, only Tunisia maintained the complete transitional
definition.
Ahmed (2016, p.59) has reported that the term “Arab Exceptionalism” popularly
refers to the scarcity of democracy in the Arab world, having been excluded from the
third wave of democratization in the late 20th century. Indeed, some scholars labeled the
Arab Spring as the “fourth wave” of democratization, despite the historical lack of
conditions favorable to transitional democracy in the region. Gerard (2002, p.1149) has
asserted that the Arab world lacks the necessary components of democracy, namely equal
treatment under the law rather than authoritarian arbitrariness and favoritism. Some Arab
countries are ruled by absolute monarchies, while others are ruled by autocratic regimes,
and human rights organizations rebuke them for abuses.
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With regard to political incentives (politically moderate concessions) or economic
incentives (welfare programs), in order to contain demonstrations, petrol-oil Gulf
countries such as Saudi Arabia responded by offering welfare packages and deploying
their security forces in various cities as a public display of military might in order to
discourage the assembly of protesters. Resource-poor monarchies such Jordan and
Morocco employed a mix of moderate concessions and reforms that resulted in
convincing the protest organizers to stop demonstrations even though no fundamental
changes occurred within these monarchies.
Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Honduras, and Ecuador witnessed mass demonstrations
in the 1980s. These protests resulted in political change and the initiation of transitional
democracy in the form of the third waves of democratization that have taken place since
1970s that have been endorsed by a certain number of countries in the world. To this end,
Middle Eastern scholars such as Ahmed (2016) have argued that what happened in Latin
America in the 1980s is similar to the pro-democracy protests of the Arab world; thus, the
features and outcomes of the Arab Spring would not be different, and this could inspire
the reformers to appeal for regime change in North Africa and the Middle East.
By contrast, other scholars such as Henry Kissinger were pessimistic about the
outcomes of the demonstrations. Moreover, scholars such as Lewis (2005) have claimed
that the modern Arab world’s resistance to liberal democratic governance is a result of
“cultural beliefs and political Islam.” As to the question of “why transitional democracy
has mainly escaped Middle Eastern and Northern African countries”? Bellin (2004,
p.142) has explained that “it is not because of a lack of regional democratic forces, where
human rights groups, professional associations, and other civil associations operate.
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Instead, this scholar argued that repressive regimes impede the democratic process by
undermining democratic institutions and the work of progressive scholars and activists
who interpret Islam through a lens that recognizes democratic ideas and values. Some
Islamic theorists and most of the state elites work to vigorously resist these progressive
ideas”.
Coup-proofing militaries and coercive apparatus
During mostly peaceful and stable intervals, incumbent regimes employ a wide
range of strategies intended to stave off coups, first and foremost dissuading military
officers from engaging in politics (Holger, 2015).
The causes of the 2011 MENA region uprisings cannot be attributed to the actions
(or lack thereof) of military and security forces. Likewise, the role of the military cannot
predict significant patterns of regime change nor the potential for democratization. Mass
uprisings disrupted core political institutions (ruling parties), dissolved legal foundations
(constitutions), and dislodged elite alliances and leadership from executive office.
Without question, the authoritarian incumbencies in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and
Yemen were confronted with structural challenges that amount to “endgame scenarios” in
which “a government has exhausted most of its political capital or will to find a peaceful
resolution to a conflict” (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2010, p. 398). Military participation
was instrumental in shaping the subsequent chain of events once people took to the
streets (Barany, 2012; Bellin, 2012; Makara, 2013). Militaries have ousted long-time
leaders in Egypt (actively) and Tunisia (voiding support for President Ben Ali). In
Bahrain, internal and external armed forces (mostly from Saudi Arabia) quashed the mass
protests (Holger, 2015). According to Owen (2012; cited in Holgan 2015, p. 41), “Bashar
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al Assad regime’s military apparatuses was developed with Ba’thism political ideology,
combining nationalist, socialist, anti-feudal, egalitarian, pan-Arab and etatist notions.” In
consolidating power, the Assad regime fortified its position against other state political
institutions and endeavored to implement quasi-hereditary lines of power transfer (Owen,
2013).
When Bashar acceded to the presidency in June 2000 after the death of his father,
he was confronted with a strong and independent political syndicate. However, he
enjoyed military support and was endorsed by the Ba’th Party’s magnates as a candidate
of compromise for maintaining unity.
The Syrian uprising was met with a severe and forceful response by the security
forces, who opened fire on demonstrators. Nevertheless, the protests persisted, spreading
beyond the earliest demonstrations in the southern city of Dera’a to the Sunni heartland
around Homs, Hama, Deir al-Zur and Aleppo (Holger, 2015).
In response to the oppressive reaction of the security forces, the Free Syrian Army
(FSA) was established via pockets of militant resistance that emerged as early as June
2011, and also through the defection of numerous low-ranking officers. The country
descended into civil war during the regime’s military operations in the spring of 2012 and
the rebel attacks in Damascus and Aleppo soon afterward. The rebels were buoyed by
international support as well as by regime forces ceding control over expansive areas of
the country. Despite the high stakes and the documented vulnerability of the Syrian
regime in 2012, military officers have continued to demonstrate considerable loyalty to
Bashar al-Asad. Defections among officers were mostly limited to those in the lower
ranks, such as lieutenants (molazim), captains (naqeeb) and majors (ra’ed). Defections
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among higher ranking officers continued to be rare: on June 20, 2012, the pilot of a Mig21 fighter jet escaped to Jordan and requested political asylum; on June 24, a general, two
majors, a lieutenant and 33 soldiers crossed the border into Turkey; on October 6, former
prime minister Riad Hijab and 17 officers also fled the country (Holger 2015).
Military engagement has not often been implemented for capacity building, but
rather, as an instrument of patronage. The “new middle class” mindset that successfully
ushered in military coups in other Arab countries has not taken root in the Arabian
peninsula, where low-ranking officers typically remain obedient servants to individual
princes (Hertog, 2011, p. 401). According to Hertog (2011, p. 402) “GCC militaries are
neither vanguards nor ‘people’s armies,’ but rather large, passive, and dependent
clienteles of individual regime figures.”
Bellin (2004, p.143) reasserted Skocpol’s argument of the coercive apparatus:“If
the state's coercive apparatus remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular
disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy, ‘value incoherence,’ and even a
pervasive sense of relative deprivation among its subjects.” With regard to democratic
transition in the Middle East and North Africa, in explaining the difference between
cause (revolutions) and effect (transitional democracy), I argue that the main obstacle to
realizing the objectives of revolutions is the might of state’s military/police and how the
state could use its monopoly on employing coercion; this happened in many countries of
the region during the Arab Spring.
Democratic transition can be successful only if the state does not use force to
crack-down on protests, in other words, that military and police forces remain neutral in
the event of protests. However, if the coercive apparatus remains loyal to an incumbent
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and is opposed to changes aimed at initiating new political processes, democratic
transition will not be achieved. The state will remain intact, holding though, an
illegitimate status because citizens who have the sovereignty to award such status are
illegally deprived of their right to do so.
Brownlee et al. (2015, p.62) has explained that, “Arab regimes remained durable,
but their opponents, in some countries, were willing to take new risks to challenge them.”
Brownlee, et al has further explained that although dissidents took to the streets in
different Arab capitals and cities and appeared to take the lead, soldiers had the final say
in whether to endorse their political goals or to crackdown and forcibly crush the protests.
Conclusion
The literature review studied five major components: 1) Theories and conceptual
framework of social movements. 2) Arab Spring “protest and mass demonstrations.” 3)
transitional democracy as a result of the Arab Spring in the Arab World. 4) The patronage
of great powers. 5) Coercive apparatus. This section has shown that the Middle East and
North Africa have been in need of regime changes since the second wave of democracy
after World War II. However, the Arab Spring has been considered part of the third wave
of democracy for some scholars and part of a fourth wave for others. According to
Gunitsky (2018, p. 639), “the Arab Spring is the thirteenth wave of democracy since the
eighteenth century. Since the wave of decolonization in the 1950s, and the third wave of
democracy in the mid-1970s, there had been not any political shifts toward
democratization in the Arab world until the famous Arab Spring of December 2010”.
At the conclusion of the Literature Review, we move to Chapter 3, which
illustrates a historical overview of how Bahrain has exercised political governance and
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economic policies such as mismanagement of public offices and misappropriation of
public funds that have led majority of Bahraini Shiite citizens in the country to rebel
against their own governments.
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Chapter Three
Bahrain’s historical overview and political governance
Introduction
In this chapter, the study highlights a brief description of Bahrain and a historical
overview of how it gained independence from Great Britain. The chapter further
examines how the Sunni Islam al Khalifa ruling family represses a large portion of the
Bahraini community, especially the Shia Islam segment, excluding them from important
government positions such as intelligence, security, military, police, and other ministerial
portfolios. There is also a rivalry over sectarian leadership between the Islamic Republic
of Iran, which supports the Shia worldwide, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 8 (which
bears the Sunni Islam flag because of its two Holy Mosques in Makkah and Madinah).
Furthermore, the chapter looks into the United States’ relations with Bahrain and
how the U.S government considers Bahrain an important ally in the Gulf region. The
chapter also explores the Bahraini economy, an important factor that helps the al Khalifa
ruling family to strengthen its political position in the country by discriminating against
the Shia majority.
Finally, civil liberties and political rights were analyzed (using the findings of
Freedom House, 2020) revealing that the al Khalifa ruling family in Bahrain denies all
civil liberties and political rights to its fellow Shia citizens.

8

Saudi Arabia competes with other Muslim countries such as Egypt to leading Sunni Muslims in the world.
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The Bahrain historical overview
The Kingdom of Bahrain got independence 9 on August 15, 1971 from Great
Britain. Bahrain is an archipelago of 33 islands, and it is located on the western shores of
the Persian Gulf, 16 miles off the east coast of Saudi Arabia and connected to the Saudi
coastal city of Al Khobar by the King Fahad causeway, which opened for traffic in 1986.
Until 1783, Bahrain was under Persian control. The ruling Al Khalifa family, which
started governing Bahrain from that year onward, has its ancestral roots in Najd, in
central Saudi Arabia. The Al Khlifas are Sunni Muslims, while 70% of Bahrainis are
Shiites (Nuruzzaman 2013). The name “Bahrain” refers to the fact that the country
contains two sources of water, both fresh water and salt water in the surrounding seas.
The current population of Bahrain, at 1,728,122, comprises 0.02% of the total world
population, ranking 152 on the list of countries (and dependencies) by population.
Bahrain’s total land mass is 760 Km² (293 sq. miles) and 89.3% of the total population is
urban. (United Nations- Worldometer 2020). Bahrain has over twenty cities, according to
Al-Morshid (2011) Manama is its capital, and Muharraq is where the Bahrain
international airport is located.
According to Jordan and the World Atlas (2006), the location of Bahrain is
increasingly of strategic importance in the Arabian Gulf, a waterway which serves as an
easy path for trade between East Asia and Europe, historically making it the focus of
attention in trade and political rivalries. Britain once considered the Gulf to be a British
lake and an important link en route to its property in India. Britain was committed to

9

Al-Jazi, M. (2020, p. 347) said that Bahrain gained its independence in August 1971.

53

keeping Bahrain independent of surrounding countries, such Saudi Arabia. In 1859,
Britain informed Faisal bin Turki that it considered Bahrain an "independent emirate,"
and it sent a naval fleet to protect it. After several treaties between Britain and the rulers
of Bahrain, the Al Khalifa signed the British Protection Agreement in 1861, and Bahrain
remained a British protectorate until 1971 (Al-Jazi 2020). On August 15, 1971, Bahrain
declared itself fully independent from Great Britain. In 1971, the year of independence
for Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in addition to Bahrain, Iran was still a monarchy
governed by the Pahlavi dynasty; the Iranian Revolution was still eight years away. At
the time, unhappy with the move to create wealthy microstates in the Gulf, the Shah Reza
Pahlavi declared that the formation of new countries in its regional area of influence
amounted to an imperial plot to diminish Iranian power in the Gulf (Davidson 2008, p. 64
cited in Pinto 2014). Central to this argument was that Bahrain was actually part of Iran
since it had belonged to the Persian Empire. The matter was resolved when a United
Nations delegation was dispatched to Bahrain in 1970 to inquire about the population’s
national preferences. They declared themselves overwhelmingly as Bahraini, therefore
assuring independence (Pinto 2014).
Troubled by the “loss” of Bahrain, the Shah decided to occupy three small islands
that belonged to the UAE—Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs—in 1971, on the
eve of the country’s independence (Pinto, 2012b). Iran still holds on to these islands and
this has since become a rather thorny issue looming over bilateral relations (empirical
credibility).
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Bahrain’s current and future political perspective and region’s political shake-up
Divisions between Bahrain's majority Shia population and Sunni leadership 10
continue to engender political risks. Ongoing violence strengthens hardliners on sides,
perpetuating the conflict and increasing Bahrain's dependence on Saudi Arabia. Saudi
Arabia, wary of emboldening its own domestic Shia population, ensures that Bahrain's
government refrains from granting greater political rights to its own Shia citizens, a
necessity for resolving the ongoing violent unrest. Persistent internal rivalries between
King Hamad and the conservative Prime Minister Khalifa are unlikely to threaten
government stability. According to Jake and Meda (2017), the prospect of reconciliation
between the majority Shia population and the ruling Sunni Khalifa family over the
coming year is doubtful. A series of high-profile rulings against the main Shia opposition
group, Al-Wefaq, underscore the government's hardening stance against the opposition.
For example, an appeals court increased the jail sentence of Al-Wefaq's leader, Ali
Salman, from four to nine years in May 2016. Since the 2011 Bahraini mass
demonstrations demanding political reform, and the subsequent aggressive intervention
by security forces, the state has been reluctant to engage with the Shia, and has also
refused to acknowledge solidarity with a small faction of less affluent members of the
Sunni community. While there is evidence for only a fraction of such allegations, the
government has depicted all anti-government protests or democratization demands
involving its Shia citizens as Iranian-backed attempts to undermine and overthrow the
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Sunni GCC regime. Sympathetic Sunni were also ostracized, with prominent Sunni
activist leaders prosecuted alongside their Shia counterparts.
With internal security forces drawing heavily on prominent Sunni Bahraini tribes
and families, and state patronage prioritizing the Sunni population, the Al Khalifa
leadership has ensured continued support which disincentivizes

Sunni mobilization

against the state. However, government policy has had the unintended consequence of
increasing radicalization among the Sunni minority, including among security forces
tasked with squashing Shia unrest and tackling increasingly growing Shia militancy. It
has also made both King Hamad and his eldest son, Crown Prince Salman, who in the
past advocated for political reform and the failed National Dialogue process intended to
foster Sunni-Shia reconciliation in response to the 2011 mass protests, appear weak in the
face of a growing “Iranian-backed” threat. This situation is nevertheless working to the
advantage of other senior members of the ruling family, such as the long-serving and
powerful Prime Minster Khalifa bin Salman. This faction, which typically includes highranking members of the security and military services and state institutions, is much more
aligned with Saudi Arabia's hawkish leadership and considerably less tolerant of
conciliation towards the Shia and Iran.
The prime minister has strong conservative and Saudi support, as well as close
relations with the country's powerful business elite. He uses his wealth and influence
within the defense sector to protect his position. In the very dubious scenario of the
government losing Saudi support or in a currently unlikely change in Saudi policy
towards Iran and its own increasingly agitated Shia population , sectarian division and
related Sunni and Shia unrest is only prone to reaching politically destabilizing levels.
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Until then, the Al Khalifa monarchy will not likely face an existential threat, despite the
fundamental instability of its present political arrangement. Bahrain is financially
dependent on Saudi Arabia, which operates the Abu Safa oil field off Bahrain and
controls the amount of revenue allocated to Bahrain from its output (Jake & Meda 2017).
The Trump Administration’s foreign policy focused on expediting peace between
Arab nations and Israel, based on the precedent of the Camp David accords signed by
Egypt and Israel in 1979. Four decades later, other countries in the Middle East, prodded
by the U.S. government, have followed suit. Recent examples are the UAE and Bahrain,
and other countries such as Saudi Arabia are engaged in undercover negotiations fearing
that their citizens may take to the streets to demonstrate against a move that has been
initiated without considering Palestinian political positions and Israeli foreign policy
towards the Palestinian authority.
Power patronage, regional major powers’ ties and rivalries in Bahrain
Bahrain is a battlefield of sectarian leadership between Iran, which remains the
leading Shiite power in the Muslim world, and Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the
defender of the Sunni Muslims in and beyond the Middle East. Thus, Bahrain is and will
be an ongoing sectarian battleground between two regional powers, Saudi Arabia
supporting the incumbent ruling Bahraini family and Iran maintaining and sustaining its
ties with the Shiite opposition in Bahrain. The mass uprisings that took place in Bahrain
and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia 11 rang an alarm bell of serious proportions in
Riyadh; the Saudi government decided to intervene militarily in Bahrain to support the
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Bahraini government security forces against the Shiite opposition, which is considered a
close ally of Iran and a real threat to the ruling Al-Khalifa family.
A Saudi official candidly told The New York Times (March 17, 2011) soon after
the pro-democracy movements in Bahrain had erupted: ‘‘King Abdullah has been clear
that Saudi Arabia will never allow Shia rule in Bahrain – never.’’ This Saudi policy will
extend to other GCC states should a future Shiite or Sunni challenge threaten Saudi
economic interests, as in Bahrain, or challenge Saudi control over its vast oil resources.
Could Saudi Arabia intervene in other GCC States? The big question the Saudi
intervention in Bahrain raises is whether Saudi intervention in other GCC countries could
become a reality if a similar scenario of internal, pro-democracy forces were to arise.
Three important and interrelated factors strongly support the possibility of future Saudi
interventions in situations similar to that of Bahrain. The first factor is obviously the
overriding economic interests and associated politico-strategic considerations.
The two other, related factors are the very nature of the Saudi state and the Saudi
version of Islam, which is based on the interpretations of Muhammad Ibn Abd alWahhab, an eighteenth-century Muslim scholar and jurist. The threads that tie these three
factors together are the vast Saudi oil wealth and the use of oil revenues that promote a
symbiotic relationship between the Al-Saud-controlled Saudi state and the Wahhabi
religious establishment, with clear implications for domestic politics, regional
relationships, and external relations. With or without an Iranian link, the overthrow of the
Al Khalifa family by Shiite-led prodemocracy uprisings could present serious economic
and strategic risks for Saudi Arabia and the United States. A Shiite-dominated
government in Manama would likely bring Iran closer to Saudi Arabia with the potential
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to destabilize the Saudi Eastern Province, where Saudi Shiites are concentrated. There is
no proven, solid link between the Iranian, Bahraini, and Saudi Shiites, but the
development of a critical bond of Shiite solidarity during times of crisis or a bond of
solidarity reinforced by a possible Shiite victory in Bahrain is not out of the question. The
growing ties between the Iranian and Iraqi Shiites in the post–2003 period remain a case
at hand (Kemp 2005). This is what has haunted, and continues to haunt, the Saudi
government.
Understandably, a possible loss of control over the Saudi Eastern Province,
following the potential fall of Bahrain into Shiite hands, would severely weaken the
Saudi economy by depriving it of huge oil revenues. The spill-over effects would also
likely disturb the neighboring oil- and gas-rich countries of Kuwait (30% Shiites), Qatar
(10%), and the United Arab Emirates (16%), where the Shiites are a minority but
nevertheless comprise a significant percentage of the total population. For Saudi Arabia,
the ramifications would be numerous. First, there would be a possibility of a looming
breakdown of the royal family-controlled Saudi economy, with the oil lifeline under the
control of the rebellious Shiites who would likely receive support from their neighboring
brothers in Bahrain and Iran. Secondly, the loss of Saudi trade and investment relations
with Bahrain would further curtail Saudi economic prospects. Private Saudi investors
would stand to lose their investments in Bahrain with the government cut off from access
to investment avenues through the Bahraini financial district.
The Saudi government could make up its losses in the Dubai and Qatar financial
centers, but the loss of Bahrain from Saudi control would be difficult to forget. It would
likely also force the Saudi government to redefine and recast its relations with Shiite
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Bahrain and Iran – either a friendly posture towards these two countries or a policy of
maintaining distance, if not hostility, in collaboration with other GCC states. Any Saudi
departure from Bahrain and limits on its economic power would directly affect the
interests of The United States as well. Saudi Arabia is the third largest oil provider to the
United States after Venezuela and Mexico. America’s European and Asian allies
critically depend on Gulf oil; this also promulgates a close U.S. strategic relationship
with Saudi Arabia. In addition to the oil business, Saudi Arabia is also a major importer
of the United States arms and a major investor in the U.S. economy. The Saudi-United
States weapons deal finalized in late 2010 was worth $60 billion, supporting at least
75,000 jobs and helping the U.S. to revamp its declining economy. The two countries
reportedly struck another arms deal valued at $30 billion in December 2011 (The New
York Times, December 29, 2011).
The other GCC countries also buy most of their arms and ammunition from the
United States. Washington also has a booming non-military business relationship with the
GCC countries. The United States exports to the GCC countries, excluding arms and
military equipment, jumped from $10 billion in 2003 to over $31 billion in 2010. The
United States imports from the GCC countries also made a similar jump from $33 billion
in 2005 to approximately $40 billion in 2010 (US International Trade Commission 2011
as cited in Nuruzzaman 2013). This enormous business interest dictates that Washington
must do everything possible to keep the GCC states out of the Iranian sphere of influence.
“Certainly, the assertion of Shiite power in Bahrain and the Saudi Eastern Province has
the prospects of weakening U.S. economic health since an emboldened Iran would seek
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to restrict Washington’s ties to the GCC countries while enhancing its own”
(Nuruzzaman 2013, p. 372).
The objectives Iran may exploit from political change in Bahrain, which are
always on the minds of the Saudis and the U.S., include the following: first, expelling the
U.S. from Bahrain, thus obstructing Washington’s economic relations and military
strategy in the Gulf and Middle East region; and, second, pressuring Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf Arab states to accommodate Iranian economic and political interests.
Iran is mostly isolated from the economic dynamics in the Gulf sub-region due to
recent levels of increasing trade transactions and investments between the Gulf Arab
states themselves. Gradual Iranian access to and involvement in the Gulf Arab economies
would help Iran to successfully counter the consequences of U.S.-led sanctions. Finally,
Iran will gain an upper hand in international oil markets to determine oil production and
prices. Iran currently coordinates its oil policy with Venezuela, and it has the support of
another big oil producer – Iraq. Saudi cooperation, even if reluctant, would undoubtedly
enhance Tehran’s economic bargaining power at the regional and global levels. A
redefinition of the politics and economics of oil appears to be the minimum Iran will seek
in the new context. Historically, Iran and Saudi Arabia have pursued acrimonious oil
production and pricing policies. Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer, with a
total of 267 billion barrels of reserves. Iran is the third-largest oil producer among the
OPEC countries and has a total oil reserve of 136 billion barrels. Compared to Saudi
Arabia, Iran is under more economic stress due to economic sanctions and has much
fewer oil reserves. Iranian oil policy, as a result, seeks to maximize oil prices in order to
maintain sound fiscal health and create employment opportunities for its growing youth
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population. The Saudis, in contrast, have long rejected the Iranian short-term objectivesdriven oil policy, focusing instead on long-term benefits. Saudi oil policy has been
dictated traditionally by challenges from non-OPEC producers, such as Canada and the
Russian Federation, along with the possibility of Western industrialized countries
developing alternative sources of energy (Wehrey et al. 2009). Although an oil war
against Iran seems unrealistic, oil tensions undoubtedly largely define Iran’s relations
with Saudi Arabia and the United States (Nuruzzaman 2013).
U.S. military ties with Bahrain and Iranian policies towards Bahrain
Bahrain also carries significant military and strategic value in the Persian Gulf
sub-region. It hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet and a military base near Manama, the capital city.
Together with Qatar, which houses the U.S. Central Command, and Kuwait, the
launching pad of U.S. operations in Iraq, Bahrain comprises a key role in U.S. military
strategy and operations in the Middle East. Relying on its military relationships with the
GCC states, the U.S. ensures the free flow of oil, the lifeline of Western economies, from
the Persian Gulf to Europe, East Asia, and North America. The occasional Iranian threats
to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the
Indian Ocean, often destabilize international oil markets, pushing oil prices up. The U.S.
is unable to counter the Iranian threats without the support of the Gulf Arab states, whose
financial and fiscal health also depend on uninterrupted exports of oil to the outside world
(Nuruzzaman 2013).
Relations between Bahrain and Iran are rather heavily influenced by their
historical past and by the United States. The unofficial Iranian claim of sovereignty over
Bahrain, made by newspaper editors and opposition leaders from time to time, has
62

seriously strained their bilateral relations in the past. The Kayhan newspaper, published
in Tehran, claimed in July 2007 that Bahrain was an Iranian territory, which immediately
provoked anti-Iranian protests in Manama. Tensions between the two neighbors subsided
after the Iranian government officially disavowed the Kayhan story (Wherey et al. 2009,
p. 54). Tensions flared up again in February 2009 when an Iranian official remarked that
up until 1971, Bahrain had been the fourteenth province of Iran. This claim resulted in
the Bahraini government freezing diplomatic relations with Iran for several weeks;
diplomatic normalcy returned only after the Iranian official had revised his remark as
being reflective of eighteenth-century conditions12. Such poor political relations between
Manama and Tehran have hampered efforts to expand future economic and business ties
between them. The much-discussed natural gas deal for export of Iranian gas to Bahrain,
negotiations over which started in October 2008, has yet to make any real progress. In the
absence of mutually beneficial economic relations, the factor that predominantly
influences Bahrain-Iran relations is demographic -- a Shiite majority in Bahrain, though
Iran maintains no strong ties to Shiite Bahrainis.
Bahraini civil liberties and political rights
According to Freedom House (2020), the Bahraini government employs several
tactics to silence its opponents, such as revoking citizenship as political and criminal
punishment, even when if this leaves people stateless. In a recent key development in
2019, the King of Bahrain, under international pressure, restored citizenship to nearly
two-thirds of the people whose citizenship had been revoked over the past seven years. In
January, the country’s highest court upheld the sentence of life in prison given in 2018 to
12
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Ali Salman, leader of the disbanded opposition party, Al-Wefaq, for supposedly spying
for Qatar during the antigovernment protests of 2011. Bahrain carries out religious
discrimination against Shiites, and political prisoners face mistreatment while in custody.
Bahrain’s 2002 constitution gives the king power over the executive, legislative, and
judicial authorities. The monarch appoints and removes the prime minister and cabinet
officials, who are responsible to him rather than to the legislature. However, since
independence from Britain in 1971, the country has had only one prime minister, Khalifa
bin Salman al-Khalifa, the uncle of the current king, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa.
The king appoints the 40-member Consultative Council, the upper house of the
National Assembly. The lower house, or Council of Representatives, is comprised of 40
elected members serving four-year terms. Formal political parties are not permitted, but
members of “political societies” have participated in elections in practice. Lower house
elections were held in November, with a runoff in December 2018, but with bans on the
country’s main opposition groups, the exercise produced little meaningful competition. A
law passed several months before the elections prohibited the candidacy of anyone who
had belonged to discontinued political societies, had boycotted or been expelled from the
parliament, or had received a prison sentence of at least six months. Most seats were won
by independents, though small Sunni Islamist groups won several seats and a leftist group
was victorious in two. As in previous years, turnout figures were disputed amid a lack of
independent election monitoring (Freedom House 2020).
Bahrain’s electoral framework is unfair, with electoral districts deliberately
constructed to underrepresent Shiites, who represent a majority of the citizen population
but have never managed to achieve majority representation in the parliament. The
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government has also allegedly drawn district borders to place certain political societies,
including leftist and Sunni Islamist groups, at a disadvantage. The government directorate
responsible for supervising elections is headed by the justice minister, a member of the
royal family, and is not an independent body (Freedom House 2020).
Table: 3: Civil liberties and political rights in Bahrain
Freedom in the World 2020
Country
Score(s) [total]
Bahrain
11/%
Item(s)
Score(s)
Political
1/40
Rights
Civil
10/60
liberties
Status
NOT FREE

Observation(s)
Total score 11%
1 out of forty, very unfortunate score
10 out of sixty, very low score
The year 2020, the country scores
11%, meaning it is not free
The previous year [2019], Bahrain got
12% It wasn’t free too.

Source: Freedom House, 2020 13.
Political pluralism and participation
Formal political parties in Bahrain are illegal, and a 2005 law prohibits the
formation of political associations based on class, profession, or religion. A 2016
amendment bans practicing religious clerics from participating in political activity. The
law permits “political societies,” with some of the functions of a political party, to
operate after registering with the government; but the authorities have shuttered almost
all opposition political societies since 2016. The most popular, the Shiite Islamist society
Al-Wefaq, was forcibly disbanded that year for allegedly promoting violence. Bahrain’s
13
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second-largest opposition group, the secularist National Democratic Action Society
(Wa’ad), was banned in 2017 (Freedom House 2020).
Inclusiveness, political rights, and electoral opportunities
Although Shiites comprise a majority of Bahrain’s citizens, they have historically
been underrepresented in both chambers of the National Assembly and in the cabinet.
One of the main grievances of the Shiite community is the universal view that its
members are considered second-class citizens, both politically and economically. The
regime, dominated by a Sunni ruling family, steadfastly prevents Shiites from organizing
independently to further their political interests, though it does ensure that at least some
pro-government Shiites and members of religious minorities are placed into the
legislature and cabinet. The dominant role of the monarchy means that even Sunnis face
restrictions on their ability to take part in independent political activity (Freedom House
2020).
Functioning of government and corruption
Bahrain’s king and other unelected officials have jurisdiction over the
development and implementation of the country’s laws and policies. Most major cabinet
posts are occupied by members of the ruling family. The National Assembly has the right
to propose legislation to the government, but the government drafts and submits bills for
the legislature to consider. The main opposition groups no longer have representation in
the National Assembly following a series of boycotts and legal bans; thus, the body has
fallen silent on politically sensitive topics, even if it does sometimes debate economic
reforms, austerity measures, and public services. Some laws are in place to combat
corruption, but enforcement is weak, and high-ranking officials or members of the royal
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family suspected of corruption rarely receive punishment. The media does not enjoy
sufficient freedom to independently report allegations of corruption against such figures.
Likewise, civil society anticorruption efforts face restrictions; the current and former
chairs of the Bahrain Transparency Society have routinely been prohibited from travel.
The proceedings of the parliament are public, and it is entitled to examine the
government budget, but in practice orders and laws are issued without providing insight
or allowing meaningful public debate on their creation or implementation (Freedom
House 2020).
Freedom of association, CSOs and rights of organizations
A permit is required to hold demonstrations, and a number of burdensome
restrictions make it next to impossible to organize a legal gathering. Police frequently
utilize force to break up political protests, most of which take place in Shiite villages.
Participants can face long jail sentences, especially if the demonstrations include clashes
with security personnel. In July 2019, police used tear gas to forcibly disperse protests
that followed the execution of two Shiite activists (Freedom House 2020).
Rule of law, individual rights
The king appoints all judges and presides over the Supreme Judicial Council,
which administers the courts and puts forward judicial nominees. The courts are subject
to government pressure. The country’s judicial system is viewed as corrupt and biased in
favor of the royal family and its allies, especially in politically sensitive cases. Once
announced, judicial decisions are typically enforced. Law enforcement officers
purportedly violate due process during arrests and detention, partly by obstructing
detainees’ access to legal representation. Detainees are sometimes held incommunicado.
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Judicial proceedings frequently put defendants at a disadvantage; judges often deny bail
requests or restrict defense attorneys from attending (Freedom House 2020).
Bahrain’s economy
Economic policy reform has produced wide-ranging consequences, even in the
Middle East where unorthodox reform strategies dominate, and the Washington
Consensus has a weak foothold (Heydemann, 2004, p. 6).
Despite being a small island state, Bahrain’s economic and financial clout affords
it global significance. A leading financial hub in the Middle East, Bahrain has offered
foreign firms and banks a safe haven since 1975. It rose to prominence after the collapse
of the Beirut financial hub that resulted from the Lebanese civil war of 1975 to 1990. By
2001, Bahrain had become firmly established as a prominent business center and has
been effectively competing against other emerging Gulf financial hubs in Dubai and
Qatar. Until the political uprisings in early March 2011, over 370 offshore banking units
and representative offices operated in the Bahrain financial district, including some 65
American and 34 Saudi businesses. The political protests, however, scared numerous
international investors, business firms, and banks, such as BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole,
Robeco, Nomura, Citigroup, Société Générale, and Standard Chartered away from
Bahrain to Dubai (Financial Times, February 22, 2012).
Between 2000 and 2009 Bahrain enjoyed a robust GDP growth rate of 6.1%, and
its total bank assets increased from $108 billion in 2009 to $241 billion in 2010 (ISI
Emerging Markets Blog 2011). The Heritage Foundation, in its 2011 Index of Economic
Freedom, ranked Bahrain tenth out of 183 countries in the world. As a result, global
banks and business firms put a great deal of trust in the Bahraini financial system.
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Bahrain continued to thrive even after Dubai endured a growing financial crisis by the
end of 2009. Without a doubt, the pro-democracy movements caused serious
consternation that affected the economic base and financial backbone of Bahrain. During
and in the aftermath of the protest movements, the stock markets lost 6–10%, hotel
occupancy rates fell below 30%, and a 1.4% and 1.7% deficit in GDP was projected for
2011 and 2012, respectively (cited in Ameinfo.com 2011).
Bahrain’s economic strength also derives from regional oil wealth, though it is not
a significant oil-producing country or a member of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). It does, however, host one of the largest oil refineries in the
world – the BAPCO Sitrah Refinery, with a processing capacity of 267,000 barrels of
crude oil per day. Only about one-sixth of the crude oil processed at this refinery
originates from Bahrain; the rest comes from Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the
world. An oil pipeline of 54 kilometers in length connects Bahrain to the Saudi offshore
oil facility of Abu Saafa in the Persian Gulf. Most of the crude oil Bahrain receives from
Abu Saafa is processed and then re-exported to Asian and North American markets.
Beyond oil, Saudi Arabia is Bahrain’s largest trading partner. According to the
U.S. State Department report, in 2009 Bahrain conducted 26.7% import trade and 3.4%
export trade with Saudi Arabia (U.S. Department of State 2012). It is worth noting that
similar economies with a dominant oil sector tend to restrict the promotion of trade and
integration among GCC countries, but, in recent years, trade volumes have been on the
rise. In 1980, for example, intra-GCC trade flows amounted to just $8 billion; by 2008,
the figure rose to $67 billion, a share of 6% of the GCC’s total world trade. Of the GCC
member states, Bahrain and Oman have more intra-GCC trade orientations. In 2008, they
69

had 18.34% and 20.1% GCC import-export trade flows, respectively, while Saudi Arabia
had a share of only 3.8%. At the bilateral import-export trade level, Bahrain and Oman
again have heavily depended on GCC markets. Bahrain, in particular, conducts a large
percentage of its trade with Saudi Arabia. In 2008, more than 85% of Bahrain’s intraGCC imports originated from Saudi Arabia, while it exported 45% of its products to
Saudi Arabia in 2005. Saudi imports from Bahrain in 2008, in contrast, were 20.1% and
exports to Bahrain were 39% of total Saudi GCC trade (Nechi 2010, 163–168). Overall,
Bahrain holds the first position in terms of Saudi export trade (39%) and the second
position (Bahrain’s share is 20.1%) after the United Arab Emirates (55%) in terms of
Saudi import trade.
Saudi investments in Bahrain’s tourism, construction, and other development
projects top $1 billion annually. Major Bahraini industries, such as the Gulf
Petrochemical Industries Company and Aluminum Bahrain, are dependent on Saudi
investments. Until the violent pro-democracy movements erupted in February 2011,
Saudi companies had invested massive amounts in Bahrain’s huge development projects,
such as Amwaj Island, Durrat Al Bahrain, and Al Areen. In addition, Bahrain has been a
tourist attraction for Saudi citizens. Saudi visitors to Bahrain have accounted for 70% of
the roughly six million tourists who visit the island state annually (cited in Trade Arabia
2011).
Equally significant has been the use of Bahrain’s excellent financial services networks to
channel Saudi oil revenues into regional and global investments. Statistics on Saudi
investments abroad funneled through Bahraini financial districts are not available, but the
significance is well asserted by Raj Madha, an analyst with the Rajmala Investment
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Bank, which conducts major operations in Bahrain. According to Madha, “Bahrain is still
a major offshore banking market, and a lot of Saudi money goes through Bahrain to their
ultimate destinations” (cited in Ameinfo.com, 2011). This means that Bahrain plays a
significant role in Saudi economic expansion and is economically too significant for the
Saudis to be forgotten.
Iran, in contrast, has limited economic, trade, and banking relations with Bahrain.
According to one estimate, Bahrain conducts less than 1% of its total trade with Iran. The
net value of Bahrain-Iran bilateral trade amounted to just $33.7 million in 2004 before
jumping to $108 million in 2007. Still, it remained a one-way trade relationship; until
2007, Bahrain exported petroleum and mining products as well as financial services to
Iran, while Bahraini imports from Iran were insignificant. Bahrain’s actions after 2007 to
implement U.S.-led sanctions against Iran have further reduced financial relations with
Tehran. In 2007, the Central Bank of Bahrain forced Ahli United Bank, Bahrain’s largest
lender, to suspend joint banking and financial transactions with Iran’s Bank Melli and
Bank Saderat. The three banks had formed a Bahrain-based joint venture called Future
Bank BSC back in 2004. The government of Bahrain took control of the Future Bank
(The Guardian, February 15, 2011), and Iran was thus isolated from Bahrain’s
comprehensive financial networks.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that Bahrain, has long endured dictatorship and
that the Bahraini citizens have been repressed and subjected to human rights abuse.
Examining the political history of the Kingdom of Bahrain as its sister countries
in the Persian Gulf, I have found that it missed opportunities to ride various waves of
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democracy, whereas some countries in Latin America and in Africa had at least initiated
democratic processes, especially in the 1990s.
In Bahrain, the political situation remains tense, with the Sunni Muslim minority
(al-Khalifa family) controlling the Shia Muslim majority in order to limit their direct
influence in Bahraini society; the reforms Bahrain must undertake should involve the
Shia majority in the key government leadership roles. But as Bahrain and other Gulf
countries fear Iranian influence through Shia communities in the region, Bahrain has
chosen to politically silence its Shia population instead of including them in power
sharing in the key sectors such as intelligence, security, and economy.
At the conclusion of this chapter, I move to Chapter 4, which will illustrate a
historical overview of how Syria has exercised political governance and economic
policies such as mismanagement of public offices and misappropriation of public funds
that have led majority of Syrian Sunni citizens in the country to rebel against their own
governments.
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Chapter Four
Syria’s historical political governance
Introduction
The primary challenge faced by the Syrian regime before and after independence
was its ethnically, religiously, and socially heterogeneous composition. Syrian society
consists of different communities with diverse religious beliefs: Sunni Muslims, who are
the majority of the population, along with a minority of Alawite, Druze, Turkmen,
Assyrians, and Christians. This chapter analyzes the authoritarian system that was
strengthened under the Ba’ath Party in the early 1960s and thereafter, when the Assad
family descended to power. Dictatorship is the only word to describe its regime. As with
many countries of the Middle East and North Africa that fell into the Arab Spring, the
Syrian economic crisis caused by the Assad regime’s policies was among the root causes
of the uprising, as we shall see in the chapter six. This chapter finally looks into the
research results of Freedom House (2020), in which the Syrian regime failed to cope with
its citizens’ grievances and claims; instead, the Syrian government persecuted its people
by denying them civil liberties and political rights, especially the Sunni majority. As a
result, when the Arab Spring began at the end of 2010 and early 2011, Syrians took to the
streets to protest against the Assad regime.
Syrian historical overview
The Syrian Arab Republic is a country in the Middle East, bordered by the
Mediterranean Sea to the north-West, Lebanon to the West, Turkey to the North, Iraq to
the South-East, and Israel to the South-West (World Map 2020).
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According to the United Nations, the population of Syria is 17,693,370
(Worldometer 2020). Syria’s population comprises 0.22% of the total world population.
It ranks number 68 in the list of countries (and dependencies) by population. Syrian total
land area is 183,630 km² (70,900 sq. miles), and 60.0% of its population is urban. Syria
got independence 14: October 24th, 1945.
First World War, the Stance of the Ottoman Empire and, Subsequently,
the Partition of the Region between the Great Powers of the Time under Colonialism.
In the First World War, the Ottoman Empire took the side of the
Germans. Even before the war had ended, England and France, with the approval of
Russia, were secretly negotiating to break up the Ottoman Empire (Ullah and Khan
2017). In November 1915, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Francois George-Picot of
France met to divide Ottoman Syria between their respective countries. Syria had been a
part of the Ottoman Empire for around 400 years by the end of the 19th century
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017). The men simply drew lines on a map to create new
states without any regard for religions, ethnicities, tribes, cultures, or histories of the
people; these same types of divisions were carried out by the major world powers of the
era in different continents, including Africa and other parts of the world. This essentially
represents the root cause of the emergence of the present-day fault lines in the Middle
East, including Syria. The negotiations led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement in May 1916
(Sykes 1916). Through the agreement, Britain was promised Iraq and Palestine (which
includes present-day Israel and Jordan) and France was promised Syria and Lebanon.

14

Ullah and Khan (2017, p. 560).
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Subsequently, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) formally validated the secret arrangement
through the creation of the League of Nations and its Mandate System (Versailles 1919).
A mandate was an authorization granted to member states of the League of Nations to
govern a former German or Turkish colony (Chauhan 2010). The typical imperial
justification was that the people in question were not yet ready for self-government.
Therefore, France was granted the mandate over Syria and Lebanon.
Sunni and Shia Alawite rivalries
Due to their beliefs and religious practices, the Alawites, which constitute
approximately 12% of the overall Syrian population, have been considered ghulat
(extremists) and periodically subjected to persecution by their Sunni counterparts due to
their beliefs (Talhamy 2010). In addition, impoverished Alawites living in one of Syria’s
most isolated regions, an area known as Alawite mountains, have worked as peasants on
the farms of wealthy Sunni and Christians (Tekdal 2012). During the French Mandate
period in Syria, to prevent the formation of a united Arab nationalist movement, France
formed military units called “Troupes Spéciales du Levant,” making especially sure to
include minorities in these units in order to separate them from the Sunni majority. The
Alawites viewed these military units as means of securing economic opportunities for
themselves and an opportunity to enter into a career, flocking en mass to the military
units (Faksh, 1984). The urban Sunnis, on the other hand, saw the military as a means of
French imperialism in Syria, so they considered joining the military to be contrary to
their ideologies (Hof and Simon 2013). Therefore, the Sunnis paid fees in the hopes of
exempting their sons from military service (Faksh, 1984). However, the Sunni elites’
approach to the military was an historical mistake (Tekdal 2012). When Syria became
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independent, 25% of these units consisted of Alawites, and these units were transformed
into the regular Syrian army (Maoz 1991). Because the Sunnis did not recognize the
importance of the army at its outset, the majority of the military was comprised of
Alawites, which meant that the balance of power in Syrian politics shifted away from the
Sunnis and toward the Alawites (Tekdal 2012). Further, the Ba’ath Party, founded in
1947, embraced a secular and socialist stance that did not place emphasis on Islam and
thus defended social equality. Further, the party’s stance regarding Arab nationalism
caused minority groups such as the Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, and Christians to take
greater interest in the party (Şenzeybek 2013), which led these groups to become party
members.
While the Sunnis were predominant in state government, in-party conflicts
between them brought about numerous military coups, and each new coup caused the
Sunnis to gradually be purged from the upper government ranks, which allowed for the
Alawites to climb the ladder of state government (Pipes 1989); thereafter, the Alawites
remained at the helm of Syrian political power.
When Hafez al-Assad initiated a bloodless coup and defeated his rival, Salah
Jadid, an Alawite like himself, Syria, for the first time in its history, was governed by an
Alawite president. Hafez al-Assad, who had learned from the lessons of the past, firmly
established his regime by placing people from his own sect in the state’s high-level
government and military ranks. This served to support the claims that the Alawites had
greater voices among the military and administrative units. However, it is necessary to
note that the regime in Syria was not an Alawite regime, but rather a patrimonial
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dictatorship, and the Alawites made up just one of the pillars that served to keep the
regime in power (Goldsmith 2011).
Syrian post independence era
According to Heydemann (2013, p. 60) it is possible that the authoritarian system
of rule initiated by the Ba'ath Party in the early 1960s, later captured by the Assad family
and its clients, will yet be “annihilated” as a result of the protracted civil war.
The fundamental problem faced by the new state was its ethnically, religiously,
and socially heterogeneous makeup. It consisted of a majority of Sunni Muslims (70
percent) along with a minority of Alawites, Druze, Turkmen, Assyrians, and Christians.
Apart from that, Syrian society had been starkly divided into the rich townsmen on the
one hand and the poor peasants and nomads on the other side. In the initial period after
independence, the Sunnis were in power. The country faced a series of coups that
ultimately led to a Baathist Coup in March 1963. Later, in 1970, General Hafez al-Assad,
an Alawite, seized power and was sworn in as president on March 14, 1971. Hafez alAssad was an astute and clever statesman. In the years that followed, he shaped the
nature of the Syrian polity. Throughout his regime, he was popular because he advocated
for economic development, the promotion of education, strengthening of the military, and
vehement opposition to Israel. However, a bond emerged between the Ba’ath Party, the
military, and the bureaucracy, which repressed all opposition with ruthless brutality
through a vast intelligence apparatus. The majority but subjugated Sunnis came to resent
their oppression by a minority Alawite ruling elite (Heydemann 2013).
These feelings of resentment resurfaced during the antigovernment protests of the
Arab Spring. The reminder of the years of subjugation under the Alawites strengthened
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the resolve of the rebels -- mainly Sunni -- to confront the government. After the death of
Hafez al-Assad in 2000, his son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed power. However, he
maintained his father’s policies and did not liberalize the government. Moreover, he was
not shrewd enough to remain a part of the rich, powerful, and luxurious elite -- as his
father was -- while still commanding the loyalty of his people. Furthermore, he was
financially corrupt, unlike his father. The luxurious lifestyle of the rich elite pitted the
poor, unemployed, and suppressed citizenry against the governing elite. These feelings
had reached their apex by the time the Arab Spring had arrived. This brings the
discussion to the protests in Syria and how the revolution has transformed into civil war.
The revolution and contemporary civil war will be discussed in Chapter 6.
According to Aksu (2018) when Bashar al-Assad first came to power in Syria in
2000, he pledged that the government would employ democratic strategies and that the
economy, education, and administration of the state would be modernized based on the
needs of the time. Throughout this period, which has been termed the “Damascus
Spring,” the academic and intellectual segments of society, which enjoyed a relatively
free political environment, created forums to determine and outline favorable conditions
in an attempt to convince the regime to carry out needed reforms (Lundgren-Jörum
2012).
In October 2005, opposition groups in Syria published a manifesto known as the
“Damascus Declaration.” This was an important document because it was signed by both
Arab and Kurdish parties, including those who had been banned by the regime (Wikas
2007). In May 2006, 250 members of the opposition signed the “Beirut-Damascus
Declaration,” which not only called upon the government to initiate reforms, but also
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criticized the government’s policies toward Lebanon (Wikas 2007). Soon after, the
regime concluded that these declarations served American and Israel conspiracies
regarding Syria. As a result, 12 people who had signed the Damascus Declaration were
arrested and sentenced to between 3 and 6 years in prison (Ulutaş 2011). In sum, Bashar
al-Assad pledged reform when he first seized power in Syria, but he took no meaningful
steps to overturn existing policies and procedures, which suggested to the people that he
was no different than his father (Salık 2011).
Bashar al-Assad’s neo-liberal economic policies benefitted very few while
pushing the majority into poverty. The fall of the once-important agricultural sector due
to government neglect and poor planning with regard to severe drought, the migration of
people from the countryside to the cities when they could no longer depend on the
agricultural sector to sustain them, and rising real estate prices resulting from increased
demands for housing due to the presence of Iraqi refugees who had fled the war in 2003
all served to negatively affect poor and low-income citizens. In addition, increased food
prices and reduced subsidies negatively impacted their purchasing power and quality of
life. Beyond these economic factors, the regime’s use of fear and repression to control the
people, and its lack of tolerance for any opposition, served as social factors that
contributed to the war. Dating back to the period of Hafez al-Assad, the suppression of
the most effective opposition movement of the time via violence had left a deep imprint
in the memory of the Syrian people, which prevented the formation of an effective
opposition movement against the regime. In contrast with his father, when Bashar alAssad first assumed power in Syria, he promised that he would implement economic and
political reforms; however, after a few ostensibly democratic acts, he, like his father,
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decided to rule via repression and intimidation with the aim of protecting his regime
(Aksu 2018).
The reasons for the Syrian uprising and civil war
Was the Syrian economic crisis the cause of the Syrian civil war? Are socioeconomic
grievances the root cause of the Syrian uprising?
Without question, the country’s persistent economic problems served to
precipitate Syria’s civil war. Since coming to power in 2000, Bashar al-Assad began
taking steps to shift the country from a statist economy to a free-market economy
(Abboud and Arslanian 2008). In taking this free market approach to galvanize
liberalization, privatization, and foreign investment, Bashar al-Assad believed that the
dynamism the Syrian economy lacked, because it had been stagnant for some time, could
be created. To implement this economic program, Assad turned to the Chinese economic
model. According to this model, the regime was seeking both to develop and modernize
the country via economic reforms while also assuming control of the masses (Lust-Okar
2006). In other words, this model, which promotes economic liberalization, does not
allow for similar political liberalization (Abboud & Arslanian, 2008). To implement the
model, Bashar al-Assad enacted several laws. For instance, private banks were permitted
to operate in Syria, public goods were privatized, and the ban on carrying foreign
currency was rescinded (Sandıklı and Çakmak 2014). These steps, which were taken to
revive the Syrian economy, did indeed create the expected economic boost, but they also
brought about numerous problems.
In an interview conducted by Aksu Kargin with Professor James L. Gelvin, an
American scholar of Middle Eastern history at the University of California Los Angeles
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(UCLA), Dr. Gelvin had this to say: “All regimes in the Middle East are [isomorphic]”.
He continued to say, “I do not care whether they are kingdoms or Republics”. “They are
all isomorphic; they are all the same” (2018, p. 37). The professor confirmed that due to
various factors, regimes in the MENA region are vulnerable to uprisings. He noted that
among these factors was that the government had violated the rule of compliance. From
the inception of the states during the period of decolonization to approximately the 1970s,
there was a bargain that the governments made with their populations – a promise they
made – which had to do with the “benefits of compliance.” In other words, “sit down and
shut up and we will take care of you.” But beginning in the 1970s, with the introduction
of neoliberal economic policies worldwide, governments began to backtrack from the
promises that they had made. Populations that had been accustomed to free education,
free medical care, and subsidized food and fuel, were now not getting what they believed
they were supposed to be getting, for example, the kinds of jobs that they used to have
before privatization began taking place. And Syria was at the forefront of many of these
problems. As Professor Gelvin went on to contend, the neo-liberalization and
privatization policies that Bashar al-Assad pursued, prompted cuts to aid (namely,
subsidies) that previous governments made available to the majority of the people,
bringing about resentment on the part of those who had previously benefited from this aid
(Aksu 2018).
Syrian civil liberties and political rights
Political rights and civil liberties in Syria have been critically undermined by one
of the world’s most repressive regimes and by other antagonistic forces in an ongoing
civil war. The regime prohibits genuine political opposition and harshly suppresses
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freedoms of speech and assembly. Corruption, enforced disappearances, military trials,
and torture are widespread in government-controlled areas. Residents of contested
regions or territory held by nonstate actors are subject to additional abuses, including
intense and indiscriminate combat, sieges and interruptions of humanitarian aid, and mass
displacement.
Table 4: Civil liberties and political rights in Syria
Freedom in the World 2020
Country
Score(s) [total]
Syria
0/%
Item(s)
Score(s)
Political
-3/40
Rights
Civil
3/60
liberties
Status
NOT FREE

Observation(s)
Total score 0%
-3 out of forty, good score
3 out of sixty, good score
The year 2020, the country scores 0%
that means it is not free
The previous year [2019], Syria
received 0% It was very sad, not free
too.

Source: Freedom House, 2020 15.
Functioning of government
De facto authority in government-controlled Syria is held by the president—who
is not freely elected—and by his political, security, and business allies rather than in
formal institutions such as the cabinet and parliament. Foreign powers like Iran and
Russia also exert considerable influence over state policy, and both opposition forces and
Kurdish-led fighters have held large expanses of territory aided by countries such as
Turkey and the United States (Freedom House 2020).
15

https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahrain/freedom-world/2020
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Transparency, freedom, and fairness of elections
When President Bashar al-Assad was elected for a third seven-year term in 2014,
the government claimed he had won 88.7 percent of the vote. However, the balloting was
conducted only in government-controlled areas during wartime and under conditions of
severe repression. Major democratic states decried the legitimacy of the election. As for
the parliament, elections were held in 2016 for the 250-seat People’s Council, but only in
government-controlled territories. Several opposition groups that were traditionally
tolerated by the authorities boycotted the election, and state workers were reportedly
pressured to vote. Members of the military were permitted to participate in the elections
for the first time. The ruling Ba’ath Party and its allies won 200 of the 250 seats, with the
remainder going to nominal independents (Freedom House 2020).
Political pluralism and participation
A 2011 decree permitted the registration of new political parties but also
established significant roadblocks to party formation, prohibiting parties based on
religion, regional affiliation, and other criteria. In reality, all legal political groups and
independents are either part of, allied with, or heavily vetted by the regime. The Ba’ath
Party has controlled Syria continuously since the 1960s, led by Assad or his late father
for nearly all of that time. The 2011 decree and 2012 constitutional reforms formally
relaxed rules regarding the participation of non-Ba’athist parties. However, the
government maintains a powerful intelligence and security apparatus to monitor and
punish any opposition movements that might come to the fore as serious challengers to
the Assad regime (Freedom House 2020).
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Freedom of association and freedom of expression
Freedom of assembly is heavily restricted throughout Syria. Opposition protests
in government-held areas are typically met with gunfire, mass arrests, and the torture of
those who are arrested. Jihadist groups, the PYD, and some rebel factions have also
employed force to stifle public dissent and demonstrations. The constitution ostensibly
guarantees freedom of speech and the press, but in reality, freedom of expression is
heavily restricted in government-held areas; journalists and ordinary citizens who
criticize the state endure censorship, detention, torture, and death in custody (Freedom
House 2020).
Rule of Law
The constitution prohibits government interference in the civil judicial system, but
judges and prosecutors are, for all intents and purposes, required to belong to the Ba’ath
Party and are in practice duty-bound to the political leadership (Freedom House 2020).
Conclusion
The chapter illustrated a historical overview of how Syria has exercised political
governance and economic policies such as mismanagement of public offices and
misappropriation of public funds that have led majority of Syrian Sunni citizens in the
country to rebel against their own governments.
The Syrian case is the very worst among the MENA cases as it has attracted the
attention of not only the region of the Middle East but also the international community,
including the United States, Russia, China, and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and Iran, etc. The Syrian case has clearly revealed the importance of the region.
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At the conclusion of this chapter, I move to chapter 5, which will illustrate a
historical overview of how Tunisia has exercised political governance and economic
policies such as mismanagement of public offices and misappropriation of public funds
that have led the unsatisfied Tunisian citizens in the country to take to the streets
protesting against their own governments.
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Chapter Five
Tunisia’s historical political governance
Introduction
The chapter explored the Tunisian political history especially under Ben Ali’s
regime. It further analyzed security challenges that Tunisia faced in different periods.
Because Ben Ali’s regime was tough against Islamist ideologies that led to imprison most
of Islamist opposition’s members while others fled the country.

Ben Ali’s regime

adopted unreasonable measures to limit fundamental freedoms including freedom of
association and freedom of expression; this also added more claims to the citizens’
grievances who wanted to express their opinions against the regime. Among the
oppressed people in Tunisia, were the members of Salafist movement, even though this
religious movement represents a small number [10,000 population] compared with the
overall population number of Tunisia [11,000,000] Wolf (2013), it has a strong impact in
the Tunisian society.
The chapter shows how in the 1980s and early 1990s the Islamist movements
were divided on how to deal with the regime in place. There were revolutionists and
reformists, the former called for total regime change, and the latter wanted reconciliation
with the regime, to just adopt some agreed changes. The puzzle game now is in the hands
of Ennahda Party which debates on how to implement Islamic Sharia law in the modern
Tunisia’s politics.
The chapter further analyzed the Tunisia’s economy, and it also showed how in
the perspective of Tunisian regime’s cronies [main big industries] worked hard to
strengthen their ties with the government in offering an unconditional assistance to help
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re-elect the incumbent with the purpose of keeping their businesses intact and remaining
friendly with the regime. This part of the study finally explored how civil liberties and
political rights of Tunisia’s post Arab Spring are respected; and the findings revealed that
these freedoms were respected with enough score of 70%, Freedom House (2020).
However, a contentious counterterrorism law which was adopted in 2015, and successive
measures adopted as states of emergency in response to the security issues are hampering
the freedom of association to enable citizens convey their messages through the protests.
Historical overview
The Republic of Tunisia is located in Northern Africa, bordered by the
Mediterranean Sea to the north and Algeria to the west. It is bordered by Libya to the
southeast and the Sahara to the southwest (Map of the World 2020). According to the
United Nations, the population of Tunisia is 11,875,373.

Tunisia’s population

comprises 0.15% of the total world population, ranking number 79 in the list of countries
(and dependencies) by population. Tunisian total land area is 155,360 km² (59,985 sq.
miles) and 70.1% of its population is urban (Worldometer 2020). Tunis is the capital of
the Republic of Tunisia. According to Ali and Abdelwahab (2003, p.105) Tunisia gained
its independence on March 20, 1956.
Radicalization that occurred in between the 1980s and 2000s
Wolf (2013) questioned whether Tunisia’s Islamist opposition was actually aligned with
radicalism and possibly terrorism. From its very beginning, the Islamist movement in
Tunisia had a heterogeneous membership encompassing different variations and
interpretations of Islam. According to Habib Ellouze, the primary division inside Jamaa
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Islamiyya, the most important Islamist organization at that time, “was between
‘reformists’ and ‘revolutionists’ who looked to the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a model.”
This split came to the surface after the regime’s discovery of the organization in
1980. “We were divided on our strategy vis-à-vis the government,” remembered Habib
Ellouze, who considers himself among Jamaa Islamiyya’s most revolutionist members.
“The reformists wanted to apply for a license to continue our activities legally while the
revolutionists preferred to simply declare our existence officially without asking for
government approval,” he explained. This vacillation between compromise and
confrontation would define the movement throughout its existence, with at times one
faction dominating over the other, depending on the Islamist leadership, as well as the
regime’s approach to it. For example, in 1980 a group of armed Tunisian dissidents
occupied the city of Gafsa, to confront the government of Bourguiba. In response, the
leadership of Jamaa Islamiyya released a press communiqué´ condemning the incident,
while its student wing, composed of rather determined “revolutionists,” openly supported
the attack. Jamaa Islamiyya’s quick public condemnation could cause us to believe that
the organization was moderate at that time, but Ajmi Ourimi, then a member of the
student wing, asserted that, “Upon the attack one person quickly sent the press release,
but actually the leadership of the organization was itself divided on the issue.” Despite
internal leadership divisions, it was the divide between the organization and its more
radical student wing that was most notable at that time. In 1981, for example, Islamist
students occupied a science faculty building and held its dean hostage, which gave the
regime an excuse to embark on a major operation of arrests and prosecutions of the entire
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Islamist organization, by then re-named the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) Hamidi
(1998, p. 44).
Regardless of Bourguiba’s insistence on the MTI’s “radical nature” and its
“revolutionist” wing, the Islamist movement’s strategy towards the government was in
the beginning mainly one of common consent and participation. With Mohammed Mzali
as prime minister, the government opened a dialogue with the Islamist movement
between 1984 and 1985. This offered hope to the MTI and amplified the role of some of
the movement’s more “reformist” figures known for their position of compromise
towards the regime, such as its co-founder Abdelfattah Mourou. “I of course thought that
it would be possible for us to integrate the movement into the political sphere,” he
insisted. “We had discussions with politicians and the trade union; we thought we were
not alone with this hope.” This attitude of reconciliation toward the regime was further
promoted by voices inside the MTI declaring it essential that a specific “Tunisian Islam”
compatible with democratic principles be developed. For his part, Rachid Ghannouchi
stated that the Islamic concept of shura (consultation) “legitimizes multi-party politics,
alternation in power and the protection of human rights” (Maddy-Weitzman 1996). The
movement’s hope of joining the political process suffered bitter disappointment,
however, when the Mzali government fell in 1986. The bombing of hotels in the coastal
cities of Sousse and Monastir, for which a radical group called Islamic Jihad claimed
responsibility (Regional Surveys of the World Series 2004, 1072 as cited in Willis
(2012), “gave Bourguiba an excuse to engage in another major wave of arrests and
prosecutions of the Islamists in 1987, attempting to execute its leadership, just a few
months before his own deposition” (Willis 2012, p.165).
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Having eagerly anticipated political inclusion for years, the Islamist movement,
renamed in 1989 as “Ennahda” (“Renaissance Movement”) was anxious to join the
political game once Ben Ali came to power. But his harsh repression of the Islamists
following their success in the 1989 elections, resulted in many members changing their
stance and strategy toward the regime.
Believing they had been deceived too often by the regime, some Ennahda
members developed a more radical stance. While a secret wing of the movement
composed of its most militant members had purportedly already formed years before,
(Pargeter 2012), it now came to exercise control over certain aspects of Ennahda’s
strategies and actions. This reached its apex in 1991, when three Islamists burned down a
Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) office in Bab Souika, downtown Tunis leading to
the death of a guard there. “This is part of our history, there are some events, some
accidents,” acknowledged Rachid Ghannouchi in an interview with the author. Ennahda,
however, still does not take a firm position on these events and the degree of its
involvement. “I think there is a certain responsibility of some leaders, who were well
aware of the event and let it happen,” affirmed Abdelfattah Mourou, who split from the
movement in 1991 after the incident. One should bear in mind, however, that most of
Ennahda’s traditional leaders, such as Rachid Ghannouchi, were either in prison or in
exile at that time, leaving the movement to its own dynamics and struggles with the
regime. While this is the only violent incident that can be blamed on members of the
movement, it gave the government a pretext for launching an unprecedented nationwide
crackdown on the Islamists, leading many observers inside and outside Tunisia to declare
Ennahda “dead” until the fall of the Ben Ali regime during the 2011 revolution. With
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most Ennahda members either in exile or imprisoned since the 1990s, some conservative
Muslims explored different avenues for expressing their religiousness, joining more
radical and extremist movements that were growing throughout the region at that time.
While Tunisia’s experience in Afghanistan was much less significant than the
experiences of Algeria or Libya, some Tunisian volunteers did join the fight against the
Soviets in the late-1980s. Several factors help to explain the minimal number of recruits
from Tunisia: “little support from Saudi Arabia, which was often necessary to reach
Afghanistan; the lack of any official Afghan policy on the part of the Tunisian regime,
and the difficulty of returning to Tunisia after having joined jihadi call abroad” (Pargeter
2012, p. 76).
Overall, the 1990s were relatively quiet in Tunisia, with the regime praising the
success of its struggle against “terrorists.” Things changed, however, when the events of
September 11, 2001 launched yet another wave of militancy throughout the region. In
2002, the synagogue of Djerba in southern Tunisia was bombed by a young Tunisian, and
19 people were killed. This attack, reportedly by al-Qaeda, led the Tunisian government
in 2003 to enact a set of comprehensive anti-terror laws (Pargeter 2012).
In the past several years, however, there has been a greater tendency16 to sign up
for “jihad” in Tunisia (US Embassy-Tunis, 2008). This development was most apparent
in 2006, when a small group of five Tunisians and a Mauritanian, trained by the Salafist
Group for Preaching and Combat, later to become al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
entered Tunisia from Algeria to wage jihad in the country. While two members of the
16

US Embassy-Tunis. (2008). as cited in Wolf, A. (2013). Cable to State Department,
08TUNIS975,“Tunisia: Nineteen Convicted in Terrorism Trials,” Secret//Noforn, September 2, 2008.

91

group were quickly arrested by police, the remaining four, armed with six Kalashnikov
rifles, some magazines, and a few grenades, planned to realize their jihadist mission by
launching attacks against key infrastructure, foreign interests, symbolic targets, and
Tunisian and foreign figures. Calling themselves the Soldiers of Asad Bin al-Furhat or
Jund Asad Bin al-Furats, after a Tunisian who had led an army against Sicily in 827, they
aspired to create a jihadist network throughout the country. “The four Tunisians managed
to recruit many members from universities and quickly radicalized them, often by a few
highly committed militants within the group” (Pargeter 2012, p. 85, 87).
However, government forces crushed members of the group in the town of
Suleiman, south of Tunis, destroying the entire organization. Although membership was
low, with only around 30 militants directly involved in the “Suleiman Group,” it is
striking that, within a period of six weeks, the initial group of just four people had
managed to recruit 40 at its height. Indeed, the 2000s saw an unparalleled movement of
Tunisians to jihadist ideology, so much so that “Tunisian leftists, communists and
Baathists [found] their own children [were] enthralled with al-Qaeda,” US diplomat
reported at the time. “Even when raised by the most secular families, Tunisian youth
[appeared] to be increasingly supportive of extremist ideology,” he added. A lawyer who
defended the members of the Suleiman Group in court explained the group’s emergence
to a United States diplomat in 2008 in as follows: “The top motivation for their actions
was the war in Iraq. Several had aspired to join the ‘resistance’ there. Because of the
logistical difficulties of doing so, they opted for ‘jihad’ in Tunisia instead.” Furthermore,
“all [members] harbored grievances against the Tunisian state and its repressive security
regime,” the lawyer added. Concerned about the possible continued growth of jihadist
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groups following the Suleiman incident, the Tunisian government instituted a sweeping
arrest campaign, targeting many more people somehow affiliated with the incident. The
arrests were often unjustified. As Samir Ben Amor, who was the lawyer for several of the
defendants, explained: “When police [arrested] one suspect, they then [reviewed] all
incoming and outgoing calls to his cell phone and [swept] up everyone with whom the
suspect had been in contact. Family members were often considered guilty by
association” (Wolf 2013). In the government’s war against “terrorists,” all conservative
Muslims, including their friends and family members, were considered suspects, even if
they were moderate Islamists or Salafists. Indeed, Ben Ali was determined to erase any
distinctions between the former and the latter, arguing that they all posed a threat to the
state’s modernization project.
In the aftermath of the protests, “the influx of weapons and militants from Libya
has adversely affected several north African countries, including Tunisia” (Paraschos
2017, p. 18). However, can Ennahda, in post-revolutionary Tunisia, truly be linked to
religious conservatism, which is commonly understood to be opposed to modernization?
And what is the nature of its relationship with the Salafists?
Tunisia’s security challenges and issues
Terrorism is a dilemma for CSOs. Violence has continued in Tunisia since 2015,
mostly on the border. Some of the violence has targeted tourists. In 2018, a suicide
bombing in central Tunis injured at least nine people (Guardian 2018). Terrorism, of
course, has a direct detrimental effect, but it is also used to justify repression. Indeed, in a
clear violation of the 88/2011 law, the government has recently suspended hundreds of
organizations for alleged links to terrorism. A recent extension of a state of emergency in
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Tunisia permitted authorities to implement arbitrary and prohibitive measures to limit
fundamental freedoms, such as suppressing social protests or undermining the freedom of
expression, which may have negatively impacted the effectiveness of the social dialogue.
Additionally, the Constitutional Court, years after its creation in the new constitution, is
still looking for its posts to be filled in order to commence its role. The most worrisome
challenge has been the National Constituent Assembly’s refusal to constitutionalize the
Social Pact, which was viewed as a way to institute social democracy and the right to
collective bargaining. The refusal came in reaction to the flood of labor strikes. As
employers have lost total control over workers, there has been a sharp increase in the
number of strikes, detrimental to the competiveness of the economy (Baccouche 2016).
These challenges, though expected in a fledgling democracy, have indeed significantly
impacted the current economic performance of the country.
Determined to create a new, even if contrived, Muslim identity to boost his own
legitimacy, Ben Ali was nevertheless careful when countering elements he considered too
religiously conservative (Wolf, 2013). Though the Islamist opposition was either in
prison or in exile, the increasing emergence of Islamic symbols and signs among the
population was highly visible in the 1990s. “Many Tunisians are increasingly
demonstrating their religious beliefs, while calling into question the historically secular
nature of Tunisian society,” noted a cable from the US Embassy in Tunis 17 at the time.
Religious symbols the president considered too antiquated, such as headscarves or
beards, were therefore countered. “There are many anecdotes about [government]
harassment of veiled women or men with beards, including stories that police have torn
17

US Embassy, (Tunis) (2005). Cable to the US State Department as cited in Wolf (2013).
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off women’s veils, manhandled veiled women in the markets and arrested or interrogated
bearded men or women,” according to the same Embassy cable.
Pawns used to enforce the government’s anti-veil policies even included some
secular women’s organizations, which were highly visible under Ben Ali. In 2006, for
example, in a major public meeting of a pro-government women’s rights organization, all
participating women were demanded to remove their veils. This was done by “whispering
in their ears to tugging at veils and verbally abusing the women,” according to a US
diplomat who was present at the meeting. “When [the President of the organization]
arrived she proceeded straight to the podium and began to berate veiled members of the
audience,” he added. Such anti-Islamic initiatives were justified in the eyes of the
government because of the so-called terrorist threat attached to conservative
interpretations of Islam (Wolf 2013).
The Salafist issues in Tunisia’s politics
Having been severely suppressed under the Ben Ali regime, Salafists have attained a
public presence in post-revolutionary Tunisia. They represent at least 10,000 in a
population of approximately 11 million, but their visibility and impact go far beyond
what this relatively low number might suggest. Ultra-conservative Muslims now control
several hundred of the 5000 mosques in Tunisia, including important sites such as the
Great Mosque of Msaken close to the coastal city of Sousse 18. Salafists have also
organized numerous demonstrations and sit-ins throughout the county, challenged dresscode regulations in universities, and have taken the dean of the Manouba University in
Tunis hostage. To the dismay of many Tunisians and the government, Salafists have
18

Wolf, Anne’s interview with Ferid Beji of Mosaique FM, on, 6 May 2013 [Ferid Beji is the president of
the Dar el Hadith association, he claimed that over 500 mosques are controlled by Salafists (Wolf, A. 2013)
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acquired arms and have clashed with security forces throughout Tunisia. In May 2012,
ultra-conservative Muslims in the governorate of El Kef attacked a police station and
places selling alcohol. One month later, they firebombed the offices of Tunisia’s largest
trade union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail in Bousalam, Bengarden, and
Jendouba. According to Tarek and Noueihed (2012), the aforementioned Salafist attack
on the arts exhibition in La Marsa caused one death, 65 injuries of policemen, and the
arrest of over 160 19. In September 2012, violent Salafist mobs took to the streets to
protest an American film that ridiculed the Prophet Mohamed and stormed the U.S.
Embassy in Tunis and an American school, leaving three dead and causing the U.S.
Embassy to recall its nonessential staff. Mohammed Khouja the leader of Jabhat alIslah, which constitutes a minority, originated from the Tunisian Islamic Front, a radical
wing of the MTI that split from the movement in 1988 but whose influence remained
rather limited under the former regime. Since the beginning of the Tunisian revolution,
however, Khouja and other radical militants of the Tunisian Islamic Front have joined the
peaceful “scientific” Salafists and formed a political party in order to participate in
politics, despite their objection to the Western model of liberal democracy.
According to Wolf (2013), Mohammed Khouja maintained that “In Europe,
democracy gives sovereignty to the people, but in Muslim countries, we prefer to
emphasize the sovereignty of Islamic legislation,” adding that, for him, “the job of the
lawmaker is to distinguish the haram (illicit) from what is halal (licit) according to
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Amara, Tarek, and Lin Noueihed. 2012. As cited Wolf (2013). “Tunisian Salafi Islamists Riot

over ‘Insulting’ Art.” Reuters, June 12.
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Islamic law.” Such ultraconservative beliefs suggest that the party is clearly in conflict
with internationally recognized human rights standards, such as women’s rights. “Men
can have up to four wives,” stated Mohammed Khouja when asked about his stance on
polygamy (Wolf 2012). This discussion reflects the agenda of another licensed ultraconservative party, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which is part of a wider international organization of
the same name. Both Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Jabhat al-Islah have as their primary goal the
implementation of Islamic law, with Hizb-ut-Tahrir advocating an international Islamic
Revolution to establish the Caliphate. “Such a revolution can either take place through a
popular uprising similar to Iran’s in 1979, through a vote, or by staging a coup d’e´tat,”
explained Moncef Manai, a militant of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Jendouba. Jabhat al-Islah, on the
other hand, favors a more gradual and national approach, which makes it unattractive in
the eyes of many Tunisian Salafists, with many suggesting that its members are “not true
Salafists” (Wolf 2013).
Ennahda gained power with its Islamist moderation stance
When Ennahda came to power as a result of its landslide victory in the October
2011 Constituent Assembly elections, many inside and outside Tunisia found it
disconcerting that 55 years of secular rule had come to an end. The use of the terms
“extremists” and “terrorists” by Bourguiba and Ben Ali to denounce the Islamist
movement for decades undoubtedly contributed to the apprehension with the new ruling
party. Statements by senior members of Ennahda such as Said Ferjani announcing that it
would “protect both the bikini20 and the burka” could not placate the country’s
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BBC News, “Tunisia Will Protect ‘Burqa or Bikini’ Choice,” (March 12, 2012 as cited in Wolf, A.
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secularists; they were troubled by the sharp increase in the role of religion in postrevolutionary Tunisia (BBC News, March 12, 2012). Such declarations, however, were
also worrisome to Tunisia’s most conservative Muslims, who vigorously object

to

secular and Western symbols in the country. Adding to this complexity, Rachid
Ghannouchi mentioned numerous times that Salafists are the children of Tunisia and that
they reminded him of his own youth. This led many to conclude that Ennahda was
pursuing a “double strategy.” The ruling party attempted to justify its apparently
ambiguous stance by stating that it strived to reconcile Islam with modernity, not in the
secular and autocratic way of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, but in a way that would show
consideration for particularities of Tunisian culture and Islamic identity, while
maintaining modern principles like democracy (Wolf 2013).
Ennahda’s seemingly dubious policies are not just because of its attempt to take a
centrist position between the Salafist and the secularists. They are also the result of its
dependence on the Salafist vote and two different and sometimes contradictory
tendencies within the movement itself. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Islamists were
divided on their respective strategies towards the regime. The “revolutionists” called for
confrontation, while the “reformists” supported reconciliation. Nowadays, the split within
Ennahda is the debate about the method of implementing Islamic Sharia law.
Ennahda’s “pragmatics,” such as Rachid Ghannouchi and former Prime Minister
Hamadi Jebali, favor compromise and a step-by-step approach towards Islamic principles
and practices. Conversely, the party’s “doctrinal wing,” which includes Habib Ellouze
and Sadok Chourou, aligns more with the Salafists in stressing the supremacy of Islamic
law and calling for its immediate implementation. The deep division inside Ennahda
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along the lines of these two tendencies is best exemplified by Sadok Chourou being
ranked by Islamist militants as the number one choice for Ennahda’s Shura Council
during its Congress, whereas Rachid Ghannouchi was reappointed as the head of the
movement at the same time. When in March 2012 Ennahda elected not to endorse a
specific reference to Sharia as a foundation of law in Tunisia’s new Constitution 21, this
decision thus did not garner consensus among its members (Reuters, March 26, 2012). In
fact, the decision even led some senior militants, like Sadok Chourou, who had been
imprisoned for 18 years under the former regime, to repeatedly and indignantly object
before Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly, a highly acclaimed action applauded by
Ennahda’s doctrinal wing, as well as the country’s Salafists. Many ultra-conservative
Muslims undeniably deeply respect Ennahda’s most militant members, having sometimes
spent years in prison together under the former regime. “There was always sympathy and
brotherhood between Salafists and members of Enahda in jail,” explained Ajmi Ourimi,
who was imprisoned for more than 17 years for being an Ennahda militant, much of it in
solitary confinement22. Although many Ennahda members were in reality released before
a wave of Salafists were imprisoned in the 2000s, a sense of brotherhood and goodwill
among Islamists and ultra-conservatives can still be explained by this common
experience. When Ennahda decided against a specific reference to Islamic law in the
Constitution, the frustration and disappointment among its doctrinal wing and Tunisia’s
Salafists became very apparent.
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Tunisia’s youth wing was especially disenchanted by the decision, causing some
young Islamists to abandon the movement to join more conservative camps (Wolf
2013a). The decision not to refer to Sharia was made primarily because of the influence
of “pragmatists” among Ennahda leaders such as Ghannouchi and former prime minister
Hamadi Jebali. In 2006, just after being released from prison, Hamadi Jebali emphasized
in a discussion with an American diplomat that Ennahda does not intend to create an
Islamic Republic, stressing that “in the social and political world, [it is] just one party like
the others.” He clearly distanced himself from other Islamic parties where, according to
him “everyone believes they have the divine truth, and no one accepts criticism”. Such
rhetoric reflects the pragmatism of Ennahda leader Ghannouchi, whose moderate position
on issues such as Sharia law and women’s rights has profoundly shaped the entire
movement. In an interview with the author, Ghannouchi explained that, contrary to the
widespread belief that Islamic law is about “punishment,” for him Sharia represents “a set
of values to be understood and translated into society. These values are justice, liberty,
mercy and brotherhood.” This implies that “Tunisia is now not outside of Sharia, but
inside it. Every time justice is implemented, Tunisia comes closer to Sharia.” In contrast
with the Salafists and Ennahda’s doctrinal wing, Ghannouchi opposes enacting Islamic
law on a society in which “many people do not understand it.” He insisted that “in a
democratic state, the parliament has to reflect the society,” stressing that “Ennahda does
not want Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s top-down approach of imposing their ideology and
strategy on the Tunisian people.” Ennahda’s willingness to broaden its interpretation of
Islam to reflect Tunisian reality, as well as its internal contradictions between the
pragmatic and doctrinal wing, is also evident in other topics, such as the role of women in
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society. Eager to demonstrate a modern vision of gender politics, Ennahda’s leaders have
encouraged more and more women to join the party and to run for office. Ennahda has
even appointed Mehrezia Labidi as the vice-president of the Constituent Assembly, the
highest government position held by any woman in the entire Arab world.
On the other hand, some male Ennahda members have criticized Labidi for
shaking the hand of a man during plenary sessions and have also opposed parts of
Tunisia’s pioneering Personal Status Code, causing many secular Tunisians to question
the party’s commitment to women’s rights. This became apparent when Al-Ennahda
proposed a constitutional reference to the “complementary” nature of gender roles, rather
than equality, a clause that was later removed due because of fierce protest by the
political opposition and in civil society. Within Al-Ennahda, the reference was supported
by the majority of men and women alike. Yusra Ghannouchi, who opposed the clause due
to its ambiguity, confirmed that she found herself in the minority within the ruling party.
While under the Ennahda government secular women have feared infringement of
their basic rights, many Islamist women have felt that for the first time their rights are
being respected. In an interview with the author, Amel Azzouz, vice-president of
Ennahda’s Parliamentary Block, explained that, for her, Ben Ali’s modernization policies
were a double-edged sword that prevented her, in the name of women’s rights, from
expressing her religious convictions by, for example, wearing the veil. Amel Azzouz
explained that “in Islamic law, the position of women as human beings is equal to that of
men: they enjoy the same rights.” While this, according to her, “does not mean full
equality in every field of life,” but rather complementary gender roles, (Wolf 2013, p.), it
nevertheless differentiates Ennahda from the more conservative Salafist view calling for
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total gender segregation in everyday life. However, despite its often ambiguous
relationship with the Salafists, Ennahda is still very cautious to differentiate itself, for
ideological and strategic reasons, from Tunisia’s more conservative Muslims. When
Salafists attacked an arts exhibition in La Marsa in June 2012, Ennahda called the
incident a “terrorist attack” and threatened to employ live ammunition in any future,
similar cases. However, despite the increase this type of religiously motivated unrest in
the country, Tunisia’s moderate Islamists reassert that ultra-conservatives constitute only
a “tiny minority” within Tunisian society. They note that Salafism emerged in the 1990s
when Ennahda members were either in exile or imprisoned, pushing conservative
Muslims to look for other ways to express their religious devotion. In an interview with
the author, Ghannouchi insisted that there is no place in Tunisia for religious extremism.
According to Ennahda’s leader, Tunisia features a specifically moderate Islamic legacy
that reconciles Islam with modernity, in contrast with the global and sometimes violent
approach of many Salafists (Wolf 2013). By inferring that Salafism is an anomaly foreign
to the country with little social base comprising it, Ghannouchi argues that Ennahda is the
true heir to Tunisian Islam.
But does this hold true in post-revolutionary Tunisia, where the Salafist
movement is rapidly increasing its numbers and its voice? And does the increase in
Salafists jeopardize Ennahda’s plan to reconcile Islam with modernization?
Tunisia’s economy
Tunisia’s economic development remained flat and the economy stagnant after a
decade of the Ben Ali honeymoon (Murphy (1999). Cronies working to strengthen ties
with the dictatorial government(s), cronies’ deliverables to the regime. Elections in the
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patrimonial dictatorial regimes such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia served to lend an air
of legitimacy to the governments that distribute rent-seeking benefits to key supporters
(Blaydes 2011). Cronies have played a large role in providing political support to
Tunisia, just as in other countries. Businessmen in Egypt bought votes (often literally) in
exchange for government favors to keep the regime in power in the pseudo-democracy.
In the 2010 elections, Ahmed Ezz and other prominent businessmen in Egypt hired
intimidating thugs to harass ordinary people and discourage them from voting. Ezz
bussed thousands of his steel factory employees (EZDK) and lined up the bussing of
government employees from other state and semi-state institutions and ministries to vote
for the regime. In Morocco, politically connected enterprises are known to implicitly
order their employees to vote for the ruling party (Kubinec 2018). Even in rural areas,
local elites and large landowners work with the intelligence body (Caid) and the police to
depoliticize the rural population and prevent it from presenting a threat to the monarchy
(Bergh & Rossi-Doria 2015; Bergh 2008). In Tunisia, the National Council of the
Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts (UTICA) closely supported the
president in elections. In 2010, it issued a statement calling on him to run for re-election
in 2014 (Sadiki 2010).
The growth of disadvantaged social groups
In all three of these countries [Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia], public sector
employees are the second most privileged group. They enjoy lifetime job security, social
protection, annual public sector wage raises, several allowances, and various consumer
subsidies and social services, though these latter two have been decreasing. The average
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government salary in Tunisia in 2007 was 67% above the national average (Mahjoub
2010).
Nevertheless, the potential for a favorable transformation exists in Tunisia. The
assets of Tunisia’s former cronies have been confiscated, although the new political
environment has not resulted in the complete restructuring of that group. According to
El-Haddad (2019), new policies have not yet been completely developed or implemented,
but a serious social dialogue has been blossoming that will eventually shape the
relationship between the state and the numerous social groups. Thus, a better social
contract may be evolving. For example, immediately following the revolution, two
Industrial Policies [IPs] measures were instituted in response to the grievances of
disadvantaged social groups. Moreover, Tunisia’s social contract is likely to sustain
improvements that may well lead to stability in the coming years.
In response to Tunisia’s newly relaxed regulations, there has been massive
expansion in the CSO, creating active social and political spaces. Following a 10-month
National Dialogue, in January 2013 the government, the secretary general of UGTT 23, the
President of the employers’ association, UTICA 24, the Tunisian Human Rights League
(LADH) and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers have all signed a joint Social Pact to explore
new ways to develop industrial relations. In the past, business associations were only
mechanisms for promoting state policy to the private sector. Ben Ali’s clan dominated
UTICA through its president Hedi Djilani, a close ally of Ben Ali since 1988; Djilani was
forced to step down after the uprisings. The Pact recognizes the value of social dialogue
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as a reilable backbone of an economic development model focused on targeted
employment and greater social justice (Jemail 2015).
Laws related to Commerce and international partners
Tunisia introduced a new legislative structure that partially cleared away the
ambiguity in laws that had catalyzed opportunities for rent and corruption. The new laws
for investment (#71/2016), fiscal incentives (#8/2017) and financial incentives
(#389/2017) established strong requirements to market access in terms of the
administrative guidelines and procedures. The laws also established equality between
Tunisian and foreign investors, expanded international transfer of funds and set clear
guarantees and obligations for investors (El-Haddad 2019).
The success of these reforms, however, relies on reforming the financial and
banking sectors. The large state-owned banks that prominently comprise the banking
sector have no expertise in risk selection. The sector was weakened because the private
interests of the clans of the previous regime received credit based on a different set of
criteria, saddling the sector with a high number of non-performing loans (OECD, 2015).
Conscious efforts have been made to address the problem of duality: the segregation of
offshore/onshore sectors due to substantial restrictions to entry to the degree that it had
become easier to export to France than it was to the onshore sector (World Bank 2014).
For example, the government has raised corporate tax rates on exporting firms from 0%
to 10% and reduced the rate from 35% to 25% for non-exporting firms (Oxford Business
Group 2016).
Tunisia is also allowing close cooperation with international multilaterals. For
example, the value chain development platform is part of a World Bank-supported pilot
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project whose purpose is to institutionalize an integrated, analytical, participatory, and
market-oriented approach to value chain development in order to safeguard against risks
of capture. Remarkably, this initiative is supported several relevant ministries and is not
just in the hands of the ministry of industry in cooperation with small and medium
enterprise support agencies (APIA, APII, and CEPEX) and a couple of regional
development ones (ODNO and ODCO). Among the pilot sectors were pharmaceuticals,
with the following results:: 1) the reduction of delays in medical appraisal reviews to
bring products to the market, from 2.5 to 3 years in 2013 to just 6–9 months in 2017; 2) a
decree in 2014 modernizing the regulatory framework of clinical trials; and 3) achieving
consensus between ministries of trade, health, and social affairs on the guidelines for
medical pricing. These agreements were reached in a transparent, efficient, and
participatory manner (El-Haddad 2019).
Tunisia’s social contract
Social contract with support base rooted in the elite rather than the masses: The
“‘unsocial’ social contract,’” 1980–2010. The economic reforms established to remedy
the crisis of the old development model hastened the end of the populist social contract.
As the rents which funded this model dried up, a power struggle ensued, with crony
capitalists capturing the remaining and emerging rents rather than the middle classes,
creating an “unsocial” social contract. The term unsocial here refers to the fact that a
growing number of societal groups were excluded from negotiating or benefitting from
the contract, ultimately leading to the uprisings in 2010–2011.
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Figure 3: Social Contract

Source: Adapted from El-Haddad (2019).
Tunisia’s program has been praised as a success story by the international
community and a role model for other MENA and African countries in light of the
significant and sustainable rise in exports, steady growth, and flourishing industrial
production (Altenburg 2011; Erdle 2011; Murphy 2006). Tunisia followed a dual model
in which the export-oriented offshore sector was accessible to free competition and
distinctly represented the competitive side of its economy (Achy 2012).
Tunisia is progressing toward an even more inclusive development model, but the
country is still struggling for consensus on a clear direction for economic policy and
remains threatened by extremism. International efforts to support democratic
development in countries like Tunisia need to be conditioned on the diverse nature of the
ongoing transitions in the social contract (El-Haddad 2019).
Over 50 percent of the Tunisian economy is subject to full or partial entry
restrictions, equivalent to a tax on revenue of 13 percent (Rijkers et al., 2014; World
Bank, 2014). These restrictions include the number of firms allowed in the market in
specific sectors, such as road transport, railways, fisheries, tourism (travel agencies),
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advertising, health, real estate, agricultural extension services, vocational and
professional training, telecoms, and education.
There are also legal monopolies which are mostly but not exclusively found in
utilities such as the tobacco supply chain, water, gas, electricity, road transport, and air
transport. Laws such as the Investment Incentive Code (Law No. 93-120, 1993 amended
in 2009), the Commerce Code, and even the Competition Law often solidify these
barriers. These regulations can also take the form of district legislation, particularly in
services. The laws have bolstered Tunisia’s dual system in a way that has created
opportunities for rents for the onshore sector. The investment law grants the offshore
export-oriented sector investment incentives. But the very same law has subjected the
onshore sector, where the majority of Ben Ali’s and Tarabelsi businesses have operated,
to various entry restrictions. Offshore firms find it difficult to compete in domestic
onshore markets. Around 40 percent of the sectors with at least one Ben Ali firm require
previous authorization from the Investment Commission (Schiffbauer et al., 2014)
suggesting regulatory capture where the regulator favors particular firms (Rijkers 2013).
In 2011, the estimated total value of clan-confiscated assets amounted to a quarter
of Tunisia’s GDP. There have also been cases of outright closures of businesses that
directly compete with those of Ben Ali’s, such as the Bouebdelli School, and the
restriction on the entry of McDonald’s (Rijkers et al., 2014). Tunisia maintained
monopolies even in segments of transport and telecom that have been long-identified as
typically subject to competition (World Bank, 2014). As a result, the protected firms have
accumulated substantial profits, which, in turn, have led the state-dominated banking
system to favor them with loans. They have received close to 2.5 percent of GDP in bank
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loans, around a third of which were granted without a guarantee (ibid.). Constraints to
competition have limited private sector growth and job creation in the onshore sector and
have damaged the competitiveness of the offshore sector, thereby limiting Tunisia’s
counterfactual growth (in manufacturing) and high value-added job creation. Industrial
policy has, therefore, been captured by cronies.
Tunisian civil liberties and political rights
Tunisia began transitioning to democracy after ousting a longtime autocrat from power in
2011. Tunisian citizens now enjoy groundbreaking political rights and civil liberties.
However, widespread corruption, economic challenges, security threats, and ongoing
unresolved issues pertaining to gender equality and transitional justice continue to pose
roadblocks to the full establishment of democracy.
Recent political developments in Tunisia
After President Beji Caid Essebsi’s death in July 2019, Tunisia held a special
presidential election in September and October of that same year. A political outsider,
Kais Saied, was victorious in the runoff, defeating television station owner Nabil Karoui
by a wide margin. The Ennahda party placed first in the parliamentary elections held in
October, but was still working to form a coalition government as the year was ending.
Both the presidential and parliamentary elections were well conducted overall, and
stakeholders gave credence to the results (Freedom House 2020).
Quite possibly the most cherished accomplishment in the years following the
Tunisian uprisings has been the realization of freedom of speech and assembly. However,
not all forms of assembly and speech are permitted, or even protected, in Tunisia’s postBen Ali environment. Tunisians continue to decry the same frustrations they voiced in
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2010-2011, mainly demands for social and economic justice: issues such as corruption,
unemployment, and a decent standard of living. With some noteworthy exceptions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been free to take on the role of watchdog over
the electoral and civil liberties aspects of Tunisia’s foray into democracy. However,
recent leftist and land/labor demonstrations aimed towards issues of economic and social
justice have encountered repressive responses (Gordner 2019).
Table 5: Civil Liberties and Political Rights in Tunisia
Freedom in the World 2020
Country
Score(s) [total]
Tunisia
70/%
Item(s)
Score(s)
Political
32/40
Rights
Civil
38/60
liberties
Status
FREE

Observation(s)
Total score 70%
32 out of forty, good score
38 out of sixty, good score
In 2020, the country scored 70%,
meaning it is free
The previous year [2019], Tunisia
scored 69% , also indicating it was
free.

Source: Freedom House 2020 25.
Political processes in the Tunisia’s post-Arab Spring
The 2014 constitution codifies a semi-presidential system 26 in which a popularly
elected president serves as head of state and exercises predefined powers, while the
majority party in the parliament chooses a prime minister who serves as head of
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Semi-Presidential System is known to be exercised by France as a former great power and colonizer of
Tunisia.
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government, following parliamentary elections. The president is directly elected for up to
two five-year terms (Freedom House 2020).
Functioning of government
The expulsion of the autocrat Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his close relatives and
associates in 2011 paved the way for the formation of a representative government
accountable to voters. However, the late president Essebsi had manipulated the national
budget in such a way as to leave the legislative branch significantly underfunded, leaving
it with a limited capacity and resources to draw up legislation on its own. As a result,
lawmaking has become primarily a function of the executive branch (Freedom House
2020).
Rule of law
Although a robust and independent judiciary is a requirement spelled out in the
constitution, judicial reform has progressed slowly since the 2011 revolution, with
several Ben Ali–era judges still seated on the bench and successive governments
regularly pushing to influence the courts. Legislation passed in 2016 established the
Supreme Judicial Council, a body tasked with ensuring the independence of the judiciary
and appointing Constitutional Court judges. Council members were elected in 2016 by
thousands of legal professionals. However, as of 2019, the Constitutional Court, which is
intended to evaluate the constitutionality of decrees and laws, had not yet been
established, with no members formally appointed as of yet (Freedom House 2020).
Transparency, freedom, and fairness of elections
Tunisia’s 2014 constitution established a unicameral legislature, the Assembly of
the Representatives of the People (ARP), which comprises 217 representatives serving
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five-year terms, with members elected on party lists in 33 multimember constituencies.
International and national observers deemed the legislative elections held in October
2019 to be generally competitive and fair. Ennahda placed first with 52 seats, and the
party’s prime-minister designate, former junior agriculture minister Habib Jemli, was
engaged in forming a coalition government by year’s end. Karoui’s new Qalb Tounes
(Heart of Tunisia) party won 38 seats, the progressive Democratic Current took 22, the
Al-Karama (Dignity) Coalition won 21, and the remaining seats were divided among 11
other parties and 17 independent candidates (Freedom House 2020).
Political pluralism and participation
Tunisia’s numerous political parties span a broad range of ideologies and political
ideals, and they are generally free to organize and operate. The 2019 parliamentary
elections saw robust competition between political parties and independent candidates
within electoral processes that were considered to be largely free and fair by both local
and international observers (Freedom House 2020).
Freedom of association
The constitution guarantees the rights to assembly and peaceful protest. Public
demonstrations on political, social, and economic issues periodically occur. However, a
controversial counterterrorism law was adopted in 2015, and successive states of
emergency were declared in response to political and security issues, causing significant
limitations on public demonstrations. The latest state of emergency, which was renewed
in August 2019 through the end of that year, permitted security forces to ban strikes,
meetings, and large gatherings if they were likely to foment unrest. Although the
government argues that the continued state of emergency is necessary due to security
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concerns, many analysts claim that it remains in place primarily as a political tool to quell
dissent (Freedom House 2020).
Conclusion
Tunisia is the only country in the Arab world that has endorsed the principles of
democratic governance despite having parties that are affiliated with political Islam.
The current political situation in Tunisia is regarded as a good model to follow in the
MENA region. Freedom House (2020), an American research institution that promotes
democracy and human rights, found that Tunisians are free to exercise political rights and
civil liberties. This does not mean that Tunisia has reached a requisite level in these
freedoms and liberties; there are still allegations that under the pretext of security issues,
the current Tunisian government has restricted the freedom of association.
The following chapter takes us to our final assessment of this study, which
examines how, why, and when protests in these countries started and ended, and where
they currently stand.
Chapter 6 discusses the Arab Spring and its outcomes, how and why social
movements erupted in Tunisia, and how soon after, the protests spread in the Arab world.
As further explained in Chapter 6, the Arab Spring caused different outcomes ranging
from successful protests and regime change to mass demonstrations that transformed into
civil war.
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Chapter Six
The Arab Spring: failed and successful revolutions and the path to the transitional
democracy
Introduction
The literature of contentious politics centers on a wide range of arguments to
explain events such as protests, rebellions, civil wars, revolutions, and terrorism, among
others. However, most of these factors are categorized in two categories: grievances and
opportunities. Earlier literature emphasized the role of underlying grievances as the core
reason for rebellion. This classical model, also known as the relative deprivation model,
argues that people make the decision to rebel because of the grievances against the target
group, mostly the authority. For this model, there is an objective aspect -- conditions or
strains originating from society or the state which can affect individuals. There is also a
subjective aspect that considers the psychological impact of these objective factors on
individuals. The motivation to participate in social movements, therefore, comes from the
need to change the conditions that create a disruptive psychological state ( Kilavuz 2020).
Many analyses of the social drivers of protest in the Arab Spring have stressed the
bottom-up factors driving Middle Eastern discontent. Examining the participants
involved in mass street demonstrations and their specific grievances, these interpretations
have indicated that “unrest in the MENA region is most closely tied to socioeconomic
inequality, perceived official corruption, a large youth bulge, and the widespread use of
modern communications technologies” (Hess 2013, p.255). The reasons that underlined
these demonstrations are the same as in other Arab countries: “better living conditions,
the expansion of political rights while limiting the power of the ruling family, and an end
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to the perceived anti-Shiite policies of the Bahraini government” (Davidson 2012, p.p.
205, 208). “They all involved the eruption of nonviolent mass protests over multiple
days, the spread of protest to multiple geographic sites, and the seizure and control of
public spaces by protesters (Tunisia: Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis, Tahrir Square in
Cairo, Egypt, the ‘Pear Roundabout’ [Dawwār Al-lu’lu’ah] of Manama in Bahrain)”
Brownlee (2015, p. 20).
The adaptation of Middle Eastern authoritarianism to the challenges posed by the
renewal of mass politics: As waves of protest spread across the region at the end of 2010
and early 2011, authoritarian regimes seemed to be more vulnerable than at any time in
the modern history of the Middle East. Protest movements exposed the failure of Arab
autocrats to address deep-seated economic, social, and political grievances, challenging
the idea that authoritarian regimes are adaptive and able to adjust their strategies and
tactics to evolving conditions. These movements, in their respective working mass
demonstrations, have helped to “topple four longtime rulers - in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
and Yemen- while threatening the stability of others” (Heydemann 2013, p.61). In terms
of the interests of great powers, the MENA region lacks the international pressure
necessary to democratize the Arab world’s political and other governmental institutions
(which constitutes what scholars call “unconstrained security states”), especially in
comparison to regimes that fell during the third wave of democracy (Bellin 2004;
Skocpol 1979). When uprisings threatened pro-U.S. autocracies, according to Brownlee,
et al. (2015, p.70), the White House preferred a “wait and see” approach, reserving strong
support until after the opposition had overthrown the despot”. This approach in the Arab
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Spring cases such as Tunisia and Egypt helped ensure that local militaries, not foreign
patrons, remained the catalysts of protests.
Causes of revolutions and protests in the MENA
The Middle East and North Africa have fascinated social scientists because
almost all of the region’s regimes survived the third wave of democratization, and those
few that fell were replaced by new autocracies (Huntington 1991). In the 2000s,
comparativists revisited the question of Middle Eastern exceptionalism (Berman 2002;
Fish 2002; Stepan and Robertson 2003). Some scholars wonder if there was something
about the region’s history, culture, or dominant religion (Islam) that exacerbated
authoritarianism.
Political experts of the region responded that while the MENA autocracies were
more durable than their counterparts elsewhere, the causes of robust of authoritarianism
were inherently political (Posusney 2004; Posusney and Angrist 2005). Consequently, the
MENA regimes were not exceptions to the relationships social scientists had observed
between institutions or economics, on the one hand, and political outcomes on the other.
Instead, these enduring autocracies exhibited new levels of variance for those explanatory
and dependent variables. In particular, regimes from Morocco to the Persian Gulf relied
on high levels of domestic repression and a general lack of international pressure (this
constitutes what scholars call “unconstrained security states”), especially when compared
to regimes that fell during the third wave (Bellin 2004; Brownlee 2002; Snyder 1991;
Skocpol 1979).
Some scholars have gone on to say that these common conditions present a
contrast to the nature of authoritarianism in other regions; however, with regard to the
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lack of international pressure on countries in other regions, everything depends on the
interests of great powers in a given region. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, a
significant number of countries use domestic repression at the same or greater level than
Arab countries do, without facing any pressure from international community.
Protests in Tunisia
In the case of grievances, Hoffman and Jamal (2014) found that higher religiosity
had an impact on participation in protests in both Tunisia and Egypt. Delving deeper into
the issue, they argued that religiosity also played a significant role in predicting religious
motivations (which they have considered under the label of grievances) and not religious
resources (opportunities). Beissinger et al. (2015) as cited in Kilavuz (2020) examined
the same cases to explain the differences in socioeconomic profiles of revolutionary
coalitions. While the factors explaining participation in protests in Tunisia would be
nominally different from other MENA states, some scholars have argued that the
Tunisian Revolution was significantly more diverse in social composition compared to
other Arab nations such as Bahrain and Syria. While they have cited “the presence of
economic grievances as the overriding cause of participants’ motives, they did not
systematically analyze the role of such grievances in participation in protests” (Kilavuz
2020, p. 86).
Barrie, focusing on Tunisia, argued that the drivers of protest can be fluid and tied
to the process of protest itself. While local development, which is linked to economic
grievances, was a predictor of participation in the early stages of protests, it later shifted,
and the commitment to democracy was a better predictor in subsequent stages of the antiBen Ali protests (Barrie 2018). This is clearly substantiated by the fact that the Ben Ali
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regime lacked the principles of good governance that would have fostered economic
development for “all”. Thus, the protests’ shift from a social perspective to a political one
occurred as a result of Ben Ali’s detrimental policies.
The protests in Tunisia at the end of 2010 seemed to catch some students of
international politics off guard, but the country had experienced sporadic protests in the
past, though, of course, with little capacity to change the social order of the Ben Ali
regime. Prior to the 2010 protests, disgruntled citizens had organized collective actions
against a mining company in 2008, which soon expanded to involve protestors
demonstrating against rising inflation and unemployment in other parts of the country
(Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011).
Protesting against an authoritarian regime may result in serious ramifications,
ranging from beatings, to imprisonment, and even death in some cases. In fact, a
retrospective analysis of the protests in Tunisia and in other MENA countries such as
Syria and Bahrain shows that the protestors often suffered these dangerous consequences.
Since they had lived under the rule of repressive regimes, citizens had been aware of the
potential risks of participating in protests even before they left their homes. Nonetheless,
some of them resolved to protest, while others did not. This discrepancy was potentially
brought about by their varying perceptions of opportunities (Kilavuz 2020).
December 18, 2010 marked the beginning of major protests in Tunisia (Brownlee
2015, p.12). According to Kilavuz (2020, p. 87) “the main slogan of the Tunisian
Revolution was “Bread, Freedom, and Human Dignity” (Aish, Hurriyah, Karamah
Insaniyyah). In Tunisia, as in many other MENA countries, the large, educated youth
population became increasingly frustrated with its poor job prospects, which likely
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played a decisive role in fueling the unrest. Many of these educated youth joined the
growing ranks of the hittistes, Arab slang [especially in Tunisia and Algeria] for “those
who lean against walls” (Knickmeyer 2011). In 2005, the official unemployment rate in
Tunisia had reached 14.2 percent, leaving many youths exasperated with the political and
economic status quo and the impetus to plan and organize collective actions against the
regime. The government of Tunisia was slowly eroding because of its lack of effective
institutional mechanisms for sustaining long term internal cohesion among elites and
control over society. At the same time, “Tunisia also ranked high in their degree of
oppression. Citing the exceptional “robustness” of the coercive apparatuses of Middle
Eastern regimes”, Bellin (2004, p.p. 139, 57) and Brownlee (2010, p.p. 468, 89)
considered this capacity to be a primary reason for the remarkable resilience of
dictatorships in the region (Hess 2013). While Tunisia and other former regimes in the
MENA region had implemented some liberal reforms, these regimes for the most part had
unyieldingly maintained their discretionary grip on the economy (Bellin 2004), which
substantially precipitated the formation of a “rent-seeking urban bourgeoisie and landed
elite with no interest in democracy or political participation” (King 2007, p. 434 cited in
Hess 2013, p. 262).
Many commentaries written immediately after the Arab Spring argued that the
“sultanistic” nature of authoritarian rule in Tunisia and Egypt, compared with the better
institutionalized single-party rule of the CCP, left MENA regimes vulnerable to internal
divisions and collapse (Fukuyama 2011; Goldstone 2011b, p.p. 8-16 as cited in Hess
2013, p. 263).
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Tunisia’s military stance in politics
Because of Tunisia’s military’s stance before, during, and after the Arab Spring,
the transition to democracy flourished to the extent that Tunisia is now considered a posttransitional democracy. However, in the summer of 2013, the Tunisian transition
appeared to be on the verge of collapse. In the aftermath of the assassination of two leftist
politicians, a deadlock of the Constituent Assembly, and the negligent detention of
Islamic radicals by the Ennahda-led government, popular discontent ensued. Sixty
members of the Constituent Assembly resigned from their posts, and a coalition of
political parties supported by 100,000 protesters gathered in Bardo Square demanding the
dissolution of the assembly, the resignation of the government, and the replacement of
both with unelected technocrats. This was a coup d’etat moment: some activists
approached the military to ascertain its willingness to intervene as in Egypt. The Tunisian
military, however, indicated its reluctance to provide a military solution, and the civilians
were compelled to seek an alternative resolution. The military’s unique corporate culture
and self-understanding played a key role in preventing it from responding to these
triggers (Eva Bellin, 2018). Furthermore, despite lacking a strong army, Tunisia’s police
force served as the backbone of the coercive apparatus to control and repress the
opposition (Kilavuz 2020).
Tunisia’s Ben Ali summoned much despotic power as he could mobilize, but in
the toughest confrontation in his career, the backstop of the coercive apparatus, the
uniformed military, soon deserted him. The coercive apparatus enjoyed autonomy from
the political leadership through modern Tunisian statehood. Uniformed officers had never
been married to the regime through rents or dynasticism. Thus, the essential seeds of an
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effective challenge to the regime had been sown long before Bouazizi’s dramatic selfimmolation in December 2010 (Brownlee et al. 2015). However, when the Tunisian
Police intervened and appeared to be prepared to use force to defend former president
Ben Ali, the military defied him. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Rachid Ammar
disobeyed the order to attack the Kasserine protesters, signaling to the dictator and his
constituents that the military would not support their lethal campaign. In this case, the
military did not remain neutral and instead joined the fray, but not on the side of Ben Ali.
Rather than repelling the crowds, Ammar protected them, deploying soldiers into the
streets of Tunis and other cities to shield them from further assaults by the Ministry of the
Interior. With no other option, Ben Ali fled the country. In the coercive apparatus,
Tunisia has presented the clearest example of a divide between military and police forces
(Brownlee et al. 2015).
According to Schraeder and Redissi (2011, p.p.13, 14) after Ben Ali fled the
country, “Ammar ordered the troops to secure the major cities and crossroads and made it
clear that neither he nor the military had any intention of playing any political role
beyond protecting the demonstrators and the Tunisian public more generally and ensuring
the formation of a civilian led democracy.” This detachment from national politics would
unfold effectively in the years that followed, as civilians, not soldiers, led a contentious,
but by regional standards, promising transition to democracy. Although Tunisia observers
credited the Obama Administration with conveying to Ben Ali that he would not be
allowed to take refuge in United States (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 14), when former
U.S. President Obama hailed the Tunisian victory during his State of the Union address
on January 25th, 2011, Ben Ali had already been in Saudi Arabia for over ten days.
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Protests in Bahrain
Bahrain is a small island kingdom in the Arabian Gulf. Surrounded by other Gulf
monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates,
these countries are typically known for their oil wealth and their political systems rooted
in the principles of tribal hereditary monarchy (with the exception of Yemen, an oil-poor
republic). The Gulf countries share many common structural factors, including a history
of extreme pre-oil poverty, illiteracy, and a harsh subsistence existence in the desert, as
well as royal families that have ruled their respective regions for roughly 200 years (Pinto
2014). All of the Gulf countries have experienced varying degrees of popular protest and
dissent (Davidson 2012).
In Bahrain, social agitation reached levels that had not been witnessed in the other
Gulf monarchies. In countries like the UAE or Oman popular protest was limited both in
scope and in demands, but in Bahrain they were fiercely anti-system. Historically,
Bahraini society was relatively open compared to the other Gulf States. Since it had
begun to develop earlier, it featured a more publicly engaged and educated population.
There had been intermittent political protests since the country’s independence and
before the more recent uprisings, the last serious ones having taken place in the 1990s.
Featuring a Sunni royal family in a Shiite-majority country, the population has regularly
accused the government of favoring the Sunni minority both socially and in access to
jobs. A further accusation frequently leveled against the government has been the
purported attempt to alter the religious makeup of the country by granting citizenship to
Sunni Arabs from other parts of the Middle East and Asia, such as Yemenites and
Pakistanis (Pinto 2014). It should also be noted that about two-thirds of the population
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are under the age of thirty and that unemployment is in the range 30% (International
Crisis Group 2011).
According to Henry and J-Hyang (2012) at first, popular protests in Bahrain
during the Arab Spring had significantly challenged the survival of the monarchy, but the
hopes of toppling the regime were extinguished by the extreme force summoned by the
regime to quell the protesters. Scholars such as Henry and J-Hyang (2012) have argued
that some progressive monarchies, including Kuwait and Bahrain, have occasionally
experimented with parliamentary representation and might have experienced genuine
reform had Saudi Arabia not intervened.
Bahrain’s demonstrations, foreign blame, containment and securitization by
receiving military support under GCC protocols
Bahrain is not the only country that has experienced difficult relations with Iran.
Relations with the other Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, have been similarly strained. In the years following the 1979 Iranian
revolution, relations between the Gulf monarchies and Iran have deteriorated
significantly, due in essence to the strong anti-monarchy spirit of the revolution.
Regarded inside Iran as a victory of the oppressed masses against a despotic and amoral
ruler, the new republican regime aspired to spread the revolution to other parts of the
world, chiefly to their neighboring countries, to inspire the oppressed masses in the fight
against dictators (Pinto 2014).
Bahrain is the least populous of the cases in this study. However, it experienced
the largest uprising on a per capita basis. At its peak, according to Wehrey 2009, “the
demonstrations would involve about a fifth of Bahrain’s half a million people. Despite its
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proportional breadth, the revolt was the third shortest of the Arab Spring: thirty-three
days, compared with eighteen days in Egypt and twenty seven days in Tunisia”
(Brownlee et al. 2015, p. 86).
The protests began in February 2011 in the Pearl Roundabout, a central location
in the capital city of Manama. The demonstrators were a diverse group, representing
young and old, Sunnis and Shiites, as well as professional and political groups. As is
often the case in these types of gatherings, the demands varied. In addition to the
expansion of political rights, according to Brownlee et al. (2015), Bahraini protesters
called for reforms within government to include the replacement of the hardline prime
minister and member of the royal family, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa. Furthermore,
their demands included constitutional reforms, free parliamentary elections, the release of
political prisoners, and an end to torture (Gelvin 2012), cited in (Brownlee et al. 2015).
The government responded violently to the demonstrations. In the first four days, seven
protesters were killed. As the movement continued, Shi’a parliamentarians and members
of the judiciary joined the cause. The demonstrators took control of the Pearl Roundabout
in Manama and converted it into a tent city - Bahrain’s version of Tahrir Square
(Brownlee et al. 2015). As time passed and efforts for political dialogue between the
government and the opposition floundered, the demonstrations were increasing in size
and voices demanding the end of the al-Khalifa rule were growing louder (Pinto 2014).
However, as a strategic calculation, the protesters did not immediately call for the fall of
the regime; it replicated the tactics in Tunisia and Egypt, where the protesters had
incrementally revised their initial claims until finally calling for total regime change.
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Bahraini protest organizers consciously modeled their Egyptian peers in calling
for a “Day of Anger” on February 14, 2011. Since political parties were forbidden in
Bahrain, newly mobilized activists who operated apart from existing opposition groups
comprised the core of the demonstrations. In addition, the so-called “societies” served as
the equivalent to parties. Of these societies Al-Wifaq had been the leading political
representatives for Bahraini Shias in the country. (Wehrey 2013, cited in Browlee, et al.,
2015). Tens of thousands of Bahrainis participated on the first day of the protest, most of
them from the majority Shia community that had long been subject to discrimination by
the Sunni minority of the al-Khalifas (Brownlee et al. 2015).
In line with Pinto’s securitization theory, the Bahraini king securitized the
protests, identifying an existential threat to the country’s national sovereignty (and, by
implication, the sovereignty of other Gulf monarchies). The identified threat, of course,
was Iran, who was blamed for attempting to destabilize Bahrain by inciting the Shiite
masses to rebel against the government. In speeches, he implored his neighbors for help
in controlling the protests and in allowing rising levels of violence to take hold. On
March 14, 2011, troops from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states (a
regional group created in the midst of the First Gulf War, whose main goal was to defend
against Iran), operating under an agreement called the Peninsula Security Shield, entered
Bahrain. It was comprised of 1,000 Saudis, 500 Emiratis, and a small number of Qataris
(Pinto 2014, p. 168). The overall situation in the country was securitized and the King
imposed extraordinary measures, declaring a national state of emergency with partial
curfews, banning protests, and expanding military power.
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This was accompanied by an increase in violence and the imprisonment of
opposition leaders (Pinto 2012b as cited in Pinto 2014). The fact that the GCC countries
sent troops to Bahrain demonstrated that the process of securitization had resonated
among them. Likewise, concerns about an Iranian plot, whereby the latter would incite
the Shiite masses in other countries to rebel and provoke the fall of the Sunni regimes,
proved important. Consequently, the overall argument had consistency, mainly because
of Bahrain’s (and other Gulf countries’) difficult relationship with Iran and because of the
historical animosity between Sunnis and Shiites, two important points that explain the
success of the king’s implementation of securitization.
The Bahraini regime was not rescued from breakdown by external forces. Rather,
it displayed precisely the type of cohesive despotic power that routinely quell opposition
movements in authoritarian regimes. As for the Bahraini military stance, the military did
not split at all. “There were no defectors. Without GCC support, the crackdown might
have taken longer, but it still would have succeeded” (Browlee et al. 2015, p. 89-90).
Bahrain was the first Arab autocracy to survive the 2011 protests through a repressive
crackdown.
Protests in Syria
Hokaye (2014, p.478) has defined five critical fault lines running through the
Middle East as key to the origins of the Syrian uprisings and protests: “The first is the
breakdown of the social contract between regimes and society, which helped to spark the
Arab Spring. The second is the battle for regional dominance between Iran and several
Arab states. The third is the growing Sunni-Shi'a divide in the region, which equally
influenced developments in Syria. The fourth is the strength of political Islam, with
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implications for secular and non-Muslim groups. The final one pertains to ethnic
identities, whereby minorities and majorities are increasingly engaged in existential
battles”.
The Syrian regime neglected its own rural constituencies as a consequence of
flawed economic liberalization and cronyism. It then responded to the popular challenge
to its rule by the time-tested use of mass violence, coup-proofing methods, ingenious
military adaptation, and taking advantage of raw sectarian fears, especially among
Alawites and Christians (Hokayem 2014). In March 2011, anti-government protests
erupted in Syria. These protests were inspired by similar Arab Spring protests across the
Middle East. The Assad regime responded aggressively to the peaceful protests, which
escalated the situation. The regime unleashed its security and intelligence services to
break up rallies and demonstrations, and to arrest dissidents, often using live ammunition.
The events took a horrific turn near the end of 2011, as armed warfare began between
government forces and the opposition rebels. In the war, the Alawite ruling elite of the
state machinery have been battling an alliance of opposition rebels who are mainly
Sunnis (Ullah and Khan 2017). According to Henry and Ji-Hyang (2012, p. 47) “the
Syrian revolution represents perhaps the most tragic case of all of the Arab states
impacted by the Arab Spring”. As in the other cases, previously discussed here, Syria
experienced a steady rise in popular protest, initially non-violent, which spread
throughout the country. In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, (but similar to Bahrain) the
military elite proved willing to repress civilians brutally, employing the deadliest of
firepower and tactics. Unlike the case in Bahrain, however, the balance of power between
the regime and the opposition was unclear until motives of every foreign actor were
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apparent and constant. The revolutionaries could not hide the fact that most of them were
members of the country's Sunni Arab community, and despite attempts to remain
conciliatory, their most vocal members quickly adopted extremist Salafi agendas, thereby
pinning many secular and non-Muslim Syrians to the regime. Hokayem (2014) has
persuasively argued in this context that urban-rural divisions have helped to further
undermine the anti-regime opposition. Opposition leadership, mostly quarreling in exile,
has failed to gain sufficient credibility. Rebel commanders counted on the regime's total
defeat, and as a result prevented a more calculating political stance that could have
successfully fractured the regime's remaining support base and, perhaps, even its inner
circles.
Iran, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar quickly entered into the conflict in
defense of their own regional agendas, thus augmenting the violence to levels Syria had
never before witnessed. Russia came to the regime's defense due to of its suspicions
towards the West, its own apprehensions about political Islam, and its ties to the Syrian
regime and communities, including Orthodox Christians. Despite its rhetoric suggesting
that it would be glad to see the end of the regime, the United States for all intents and
purposes at first did nothing, even when the UK and France, at least initially, signaled
their willingness to arm the rebels operating under the command of the Free Syrian Army
(Hokayem 2014). The United States, as we will see in this study, did later intervene in the
Syrian crisis by providing some military materials and training to the opposition rebels.
However, the complexity of the war has intensified due to the interference of global and
regional powers as well as Islamic Jihadists. Hence, it is essential to first understand who
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is fighting whom in Syria before any peace plan can be envisioned, (Ullah and Khan
2017).
Opposition and Weapons Suppliers
The opposition primarily consists of anti-government rebels (including the Kurds)
whose goal is to overthrow the government. The largest anti-regime alliance, “The Army
of Conquest,” groups Islamist factions like Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq Al-sham with
jihadists such as Fateh al-Sham Front, which was previously known as Al-Nusra Front
(an affiliate of Al-Qaeda) (AFP 2016). At first, the main group opposing the regime was
the Free Syrian Army (FSA,) but it has weakened and disintegrated. It was formed by
officers who had defected from the Syrian Armed Forces. However, it has seen its power
diminished due to infighting. The West supports opposition forces which are thought to
be “moderate,” a definition which does not include Al-Nusra. These countries, including
the U.S., UK and France, support the opposition in its quest to overthrow the regime. The
West has publicly demanded that Assad to step down and has called for the
democratization of Syria (AFP 2016).
On the other hand, the opposition is also supported covertly by Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, and Qatar. The rationale for supporting the opposition in Turkey’s case is the
“democratic” argument, whereas the motivation for Saudi Arabia and Qatar is the
“sectarian” reason. Both of these countries support the removal of the Alawite (Shia)
Regime and its replacement by the Sunni opposition. It should be noted that these
countries also support the IS. However, the myriad opposition groups disagree in their
vision for the country. For instance, the Fateh Al-Sham strives to create an Islamic
emirate in Syria (AFP 2016).
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According to Stanek (2015) security void following the overthrow of Gaddafi left
state weapons arsenals open to looting by enterprising groups and individuals. Libyan
arms have since been spread to conflict zones all over northern Africa as well as further
destinations such as Syria (Security Council 2014[1]).
Libyan weapons were readily available for export beginning in 2011, and Syrian
rebels wasted no time in reaching out to potential suppliers. In the spring of that year,
Syrian National Council (SNC) representatives visited Libya to directly request arms
support. In return, the leader of the Tripoli Military Council flew to Turkey to meet with
FSA members in November 2011. This communication between Libyan and Syrian
opposition groups epitomizes a strong sense of solidarity that existed throughout the Arab
Spring revolutions. In this particular case, there was an even stronger connection because
Assad reportedly sent weapons and support to Gaddafi at the beginning of the Libyan
revolution (Stanek 2015).
The Assad Regime’s Reaction to Mass Protests
Almost as soon as the first major protest broke out in the southern city of Deraa
on March 18, 2011, the Assad regime began shooting. As more protestors took up arms in
self-defense, the regime escalated its violence, deploying armored units and heavy
artillery in a large-scale military offensive against major urban centers. It also moved to
portray a peaceful and cross-sectarian protest movement as a terrorist campaign led by
Islamist extremists. Peaceful protests continued across much of the country into 2012, but
the uprising gradually transformed into an all-out and increasingly sectarian civil war.
The regime's responses to these developments have included a set of internal institutional
adjustments and policy changes as well as modifications to its management of regional
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and international relations as they have found themselves up against deepening
international isolation and economic and diplomatic sanctions. Domestically, the Assad
regime has espoused sectarian mobilization to bolster defensive solidarity among the
regime's core social base in the Alawite community and non-Muslim minorities,
benefiting from, but also contributing to, more extensive regional sectarian polarization.
It has reorganized the security sector, including the armed forces, paramilitary criminal
networks, and the intelligence and security apparatus, to repel the opposition (in
particular, the decentralized guerrilla tactics of armed insurgents) for which the security
sector was unprepared and untrained (Heydemann 2013, p. 62).
For many years, critics have portrayed the ruling Assad family as nothing more
than an incapable mafia, sometimes comparing Bashar al-Assad to the fictional Fredo 27
Corleone. The Syrian regime's brutal tactics rank at the far end of a spectrum of reprisals
against anti- regime protests. These tactics reflect Syria's distinctive social and
institutional composition and its political stance as a lead member of the "resistance
front" against Israel. Therefore, the modifications that have redefined authoritarianism in
Syria may not be transferrable to regimes that govern differently configured societies and
polities. However, milder versions of the Assad regime's coercive tactics may been
present on the streets of both Bahrain and Egypt, highlighting the lessons that can learned
from the Syrian case about how Arab autocrats will react as the dynamic aspects of mass
politics continue to unfold in the modern Middle East. The adaptations of the Assad
regime can be documented to the earliest months of the Syrian uprising in March 2011,
and perhaps earlier.
27

Fredo is portrayed by American actor John Cazale in the Francis Ford Coppola 1972 film adaptation and
in the 1974 sequel, The Godfather Part II. He is the second son of the Mafia don Vito Corleone
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According to Heydemann (2013), Syrian scholar Hassan Abbas confirmed that in
February 2011, President Bashar al-Assad “formed a special committee" which
concluded that the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes had been toppled because they did not
crush the protests instantly. The Assad regime amplified its military tactics and modified
its security apparatus. With a capacity for adapting that has caught its detractors off
guard, the regime integrated loyalist shabiha militias (the word means "ghost" or
"thug")— including a wide array of armed criminal and other informal elements—into a
formal paramilitary known as the National Defense Forces (NDF), under the direct
control of the regime. Since mid-2012, hundreds (perhaps even thousands) of NDF
members have received combat training in Iran, a direct form of authoritarian knowledge
transfer.
In light of defections among lower ranking Sunni conscripts and officers, new
methods of monitoring and controlling soldiers' movements have been adopted. Iranian
and Hezbollah advisors arrived to train local commanders in the finer points of crowd
control, urban warfare, and insurgent tactics. The regime expanded its reliance on battlehardened Hezbollah combat units, which led to regaining control of strategic sites.
Taking advantage of its air superiority, the regime has wreaked havoc and instability in
areas held by the opposition, forcing millions of Syrians to flee their homes, eroding
popular morale and support for the opposition, and preventing stabilization or
reconstruction in these opposition-controlled areas. “Because opposition forces had
seized a great deal of ground, including most of the Damascus suburbs, many observers
had been predicting the regime's imminent collapse” (Heydemann 2013, p. 63). By mid2012, the regime's survival seemed to be very much in doubt.
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With defections sweeping through rank and file in 2012, rebel groups appeared to
be taking advantage by seizing territories; key units were being pushed to the brink of
exhaustion, and it was not at all certain that the cohesion of the officer corps and security
elites could prevent the overthrow of the regime. However, a second resource played a
critical role in restraining opposition advances and stabilizing the regime: informal
networks of nonstate actors, organized by familial ties, sectarian affinity, or simple
mercenary arrangements, and nurtured by regime elites to provide a wide range of duties,
often illegal, that could be performed without any formal scrutiny or accountability.
Before the uprising, members of these networks, typically described as shabiha, engaged
in officially sanctioned criminal activities, served as regime enforcers, and used violence
to protect the privileges and status of the regime elites. When the protests began in March
2011, the regime recruited from these loose networks to brutalize demonstrators. As the
opposition militarized, Assad regime loyalist networks were gradually transformed, first
into informal and decentralized paramilitary groups, and later into more formally
structured armed units that have been integrated into the regime's security apparatus.
Almost exclusively Alawite in composition, “Shabiha forces have committed some of the
worst atrocities of the civil war” (Heydemann 2013, p.66).
This mirrors the experience of African countries, where regimes enlist young men
and women from one ethnic group into armed and police forces, excluding other groups
from the security forces for the purpose of maintaining the incumbent in power and
reinforcing the interests of his or her ethnicity; a clear example is the Rwandan regime

133

under the RPF ruling party, in which the Tutsi 28 minority ethnic group exerts power and
dominates over the Hutu and Twa ethnic groups. It is very similar to the Syrian case,
where the Muslim Alawite minority dominates security forces and government in general
to the exclusion of the Muslim Sunni majority. My modest experience is to believe that
where security forces are formed on the basis of sectarianism, it will be difficult (but not
impossible) for opposition and rebel elements to defeat those forces, as they can fight
tooth and nail and be loyal to the incumbent while defending interests of their ethnic
groups.
Official media have frequently highlighted the prominent role of militant Islamists
associated with al-Qaeda in opposition ranks to reinforce the narrative of a Sunni terrorist
uprising, touting the regime's commitment to the protection of minorities and secularism
(its reliance on Iran and Hezbollah notwithstanding) to rally its base. The regime has also
reconfigured key institutions, including the Ba'ath Party, to solidify cohesion and ensure
the allegiance of senior officials to President Assad and his immediate family. By mid2013, this combination of improvised adaptations permitted the regime to reassert
authority over most of the country's urban "spine" from Homs in the north to Damascus
in the south. The adaptations solidified support among the regime's social base, prevented
the fracturing of its inner circle, and disrupted attempts to return life to normal in areas
outside regime control. The regime now controls the strategically important
Mediterranean coast and every major city. It has maintained “secure access to Hezbollah-
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controlled parts of Lebanon and to the sea” (Heydemann 2013, p. 64). Regime officials
have reasserted the role of the state as an agent of transformation and modernization, as
well as the provider of economic security, despite the absolute destruction of the
country's economy and infrastructure. Officials now blame the limited economic reforms
espoused by economist and former deputy prime minister Abdullah Dardari, as the root
of the grievances that caused citizens to rebel, a claim rebutted by numerous scholars.
The regime has also continued to use state-controlled Internet and telecommunications
infrastructure to interfere with communications among regime opponents, identify and
target opposition supporters, and disseminate proregime narratives. At the regional and
international levels, the Assad regime has exploited its strategic alliance with Iran and
Hezbollah both for direct military and financial assistance and also for expertise and
training in specific methods of repression, including urban and cyber warfare, in which
its own security sector lacked experience (Heydemann 2013).
Russia’s influence in the MENA region
Although Russia is once again playing a major military and diplomatic role in the
region, it is economically limited and more focused on advancing its geopolitical goals in
Europe to compete with the U.S. Nevertheless, Russia has returned and is now involved
in an unofficial alliance with Iran to protect the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in
Syria. One of the principal aims of Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin
is the restoration of Russia as a major global power and an essential power broker in the
MENA region. Russian intervention in Syria has ensured the survival of the Assad
regime and a permanent Russian military presence, critical to the expansion of Russian
power and influence in the MENA region. Russia has long maintained access to a Cold
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War-era naval facility on Syria’s Mediterranean Sea coast, but in 2015 it also deployed a
small, but powerful, military expeditionary force to reinforce the Assad regime’s faltering
military response to the rebellion (Paraschos 2017).
Foreign Intervention in the Syrian Civil War
The stakeholders in the Syrian civil war can broadly be classified into four
groups: the regime, the opposition rebels, foreign powers, and Islamic jihadists. The
Syrian factions in the civil war are both domestic and foreign: the Syrian armed forces
and its allies. The opposition is comprised of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army29,
Jihad Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, and the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Both Syrian defense forces and the opposition rebels
have received military support from foreign nations. And each has received diplomatic
support from their respective allies, which is why the Syrian civil war is characterized as
a proxy war. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah support the Syrian government; the U.S and
Turkey have maintained their firm backing of the opposition rebels. Some scholars have
argued that wars which are supported by external actors may last longer; Cunningham
(2010, p. 119) has echoed this idea by arguing that, “When external states intervene in
conflicts to pursue a separate agenda, the conflict will be harder to resolve and therefore
longer.” While Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah have sided with the Assad regime, another
group of countries has intervened in the Syrian civil war, siding with the Syrian
opposition groups. The U.S., in defending its interests in the Middle East, has sent arms
to counter the Iranian threat (Al-Jazeera, May 31, 2017), and Syrian rebels have
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acknowledged receiving arms and training from the Turkish government. (The Telegraph,
London). Saudi Arabia has also replenished Syrian rebels with weapons. (Business
Insider Oct. 21, 2015).
According to Roula Khalaf and Abigail F. Smith of Financial Times (June 3rd,
2013) Qatar subsidized the Syrian revolt with cash and arms. The Times of Israel
(January 14, 2019) reported that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) chief acknowledged
supplying weapons to Syrian rebels. On September 11, 2018, MSN aired a report that the
Dutch government was under fire for supporting the Syrian opposition. The civil war in
Syria has devolved into a quagmire with foreign interventions pouring in for myriad
reasons and purposes.
In September 2015, Russia forces conducted their first attacks, striking various
rebel opponents of the Assad regime, including groups backed by the U.S., Turkey, and
Saudi Arabia. Working closely with the Assad regime’s military and Iranian-backed
proxy forces, Russia managed to decisively tip the balance of power in favor of the
regime. In December 2016, the Russian-led military coalition ousted rebels from Aleppo,
Syria’s largest city, which stands as the Assad regime’s most important victory in the sixyear conflict. Russia then quickly took the lead on international diplomacy to put an end
to the fighting and arrange a peace settlement. Russian diplomats brokered a ceasefire
deal between the regime and several rebel groups that went into effect on December. 30,
2016. Russia then organized a new round of multilateral negotiations on January. 23,
2017, in Astana, Kazakhstan, involving Iran and Turkey, but excluding the U.S. In
January 2017, Russia signed an agreement with the Assad regime to expand its military
presence in Syria, including the deployment of additional naval vessels. “This new
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arrangement will continue to enhance Russia’s ability to project military power in the
Eastern Mediterranean and could interfere with U.S., Israeli, and European capabilities
for conducting military operations in this critical maritime region during a future crisis”
(Paraschos 2017, p. 19).
The U.S., Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar have transformed the
Syrian conflict into a “proxy war” in the heart of the Middle East with the potential to
reshape the regional geopolitical order at the expense of the U.S. and its regional allies.
“The Islamic State, an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq, has captured vast areas of Syria and
Iraq, emboldening the organization’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdad, to declare the rebirth
of the Islamic Caliphate in June 2014. Al-Qaeda has likewise established major branches
in Syria”, (Paraschos 2017, p. 18); as I write this report, most of these terrorist groups
(nonstate actors) in both Iraq and Syria, have been dislodged.
Last (2019) Key Battleground Development in Syria
The Islamic State (IS) militant group was pushed out of its territory in Syria in
March 2019 after Kurdish forces overran its last stronghold. IS fighters have since
employed guerrilla tactics to attack security forces and local civilian leaders. In April
2019, the government launched an offensive into the Idlib Governorate to defeat rebel
forces there, killing hundreds of people and displacing at least 440,000. An August 2019
cease-fire offered a respite before the government launched a new offensive in December
2019, forcing 200,000 to flee by the end of the year. The Turkish government launched
an offensive into northern Syria in October 2019, targeting armed Kurdish fighters in the
region and pledging to create a “buffer zone” that could house as many as one million
Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey (Freedom House 2020).
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Peace Efforts
Ton et al. (2016, p.6) has drawn three irregular developments for the Syrian peace
talks in Geneva:
1) The talks kept on despite different parties to behave differently in the search of a
negotiated compromise. 2) The peace discussions collapsed due to a divided opposition, a
governmental uncompromising position and insisted zero-sum focus by parties involved
in the talks. With this persistence of all parties to the negotiations, the Plan B of John
Kerry could be next on the table for which he made allusion to likely partition the Syrian
territory if the stalemate persists. For some experts and scholars, this proposal could be
subject to moral concerns and to international legal problem which could not be easy to
solve. 3) The talks met resistance as the Syrian government and its allies resume their
offensive pursuing to regain parts captured by the opposition. And the Assad regime
intended to consolidate its hold on the Western Syria.
According to Ullah and Khan (2017) since the beginning of the war, there have
been numerous peace efforts, though none have succeeded in bringing peace to Syria (see
table 5). The following peace efforts have been undertaken since the start of the war
(MEI 2017): most of the peace effort initiators (Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar)
have interests in the conflict.
Table 6: Syrian Peace Talks Initiatives
N°
1
2
3
4
5

Peace’s name
Arab League I and II

Date(s)
November, 2011- January, 2012

Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan
Geneva I
Cairo I
Geneva II

April 14, 2012- March 27, 2012
June 30, 2012
July 2, 2012- July 3, 2012
January 22, 2014- February 15,
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Result(s)
No tangible
result(s)

2014
6 Cairo II
January 22, 2015- January 24,
2015
7 Moscow I
January 26, 2015- January 29,
2015
8 Moscow II
April 6, 2015- April 10, 2015
9 Astana Conference
May 25, 2015- May 27, 2015
10 Vienna I
October 30, 2015
11 Vienna II
November 14, 2015
12 Riyadh Conference
December 9, 2015- December
10, 2015
13 Munich Conference
February 11, 2016- February 12,
2016
14 Inter-Syrian Geneva Talks
2016
Source: Ullah and Khan (2017) Compiled by the author, 2021
Rather than going into the details of each peace effort, this sub-section focuses on
the overall picture of the peace process, including impediments to the peace process. The
current peace process, led by Mr. Geir Pedersen, the UN Envoy to Syria, is now focusing
on drafting a new Constitution with the fifth session to have taken place in Geneva
between January 25-29, 2021; the main point of contention between the regime and the
opposition is the fate of President Assad. The regime considers a “minus-Assad” formula
as the redline. Whereas the opposition rejects any peace deal that allows Assad to stay in
power. Without Russian backing, Assad would have been ousted long ago. Russia and
China have repeatedly vetoed UNSC resolutions calling for actions against the Syrian
government under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. One of the greatest obstacles to the
Syrian crisis is the support given by foreign powers to the stakeholders (Dawn 2016).
Fisk (2016) has suggested that regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey as well as global powers including the U.S. and Russia should come to a
consensus on the Syrian issue.
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Table 7: Current Peace Talks Progress
15

Geneva [Under UN auspices]

16 Geneva, UN 30
Compiled by the author, 2021

From 30 November to
4 December 2020.
Drafting New Constitution
January 25-29, 2021

Mr. Geir Pedersen, the UN Special envoy for Syria expressed his dissatisfaction
to the committee which is tasked with drafting a new Syrian Constitution on the slow
progress of the peace talks and he warned that the desired changes that would enable the
country to run free and fair elections seem to be a challenge in the future.
The Tested Hypotheses
This study of Impact of the Arab Spring throughout the Middle East and North
Africa, in attempting to test the following hypotheses, has reached the following
results:
Hypothesis 1.
The more accumulated political and socio-economic grievances, the more people
are likely to experience dissatisfaction and to begin forming and joining social
movements with the aim of changing the current social and political order to satisfy their
needs.
With regard to the above hypothesis, all of the cases (Bahrain, Syria and
Tunisia) have shared common problems that their respective citizens have
experienced during and before the Arab Spring. Since Mohamed Bouazizi’s self
immolation in Tunisia, with the accrued mixed grievances (political and economic),
30
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citizens started protesting in Tunisia and the revolutions spread rapidly throughout
the Arab world.
It confirmed that the Syrian government neglected its own rural
constituencies as a result of flawed economic liberalization and cronyism (Hokayem
2014). The political role of engaged young people radiated in all categories of
Tunisian society and has drawn in its wake teenagers and adults, women and men,
and the middle class and the poor (Henry and J-Hyang 2012, p.81).
The reasons that underlined these demonstrations in Bahrain are the same as
in other Arab countries: “To redress economic grievances, the expansion of political
rights while limiting the power of the ruling family, and an end to the perceived antiShiite policies of the Bahraini government” (Davidson 2012, p.p. 205, 208).
Hypothesis 2.
The more structured and united the leadership of a social movement, the
more likely it is to gain success.
This hypothesis is likely to be specific for the few countries in the Arab
world that have enjoyed success after protesters were able to topple dictators in
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Because the three latter countries are not among
the cases we have studied, the focus for the hypothesis is only on Tunisia as a
successful case. “In Tunisia, the successful uprising stemmed from preexisting
networks of dissent that centered on prior challenges to the Ben Ali regime,
particularly from the country’s organized workers” (Chomiak 2011, p.p.72,73).
Unlike other MENA countries, the history of Tunisia’s structured and united
social organizations played a prominent role in its success. The tradition of the
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Tunisian military defending the nation, instead of ruling it, aided in the success of
the uprising. And according to Brownlee, J. et al. (2015, p. 69), this tradition had
been inherited from independence in 1956 onward. Moreover, Tunisia endorsed
Western culture, French culture in particular, a culture that leans towards ‘la laïcité’
(secularism); this helped Tunisians to move forward. The words of the Al-Nah’da
political party spokesperson, Samir Dilou, “we are not an Islamist party, we are an
Islamic party that gets its inspiration from Quran,” he went on to assert that “AlNah’da is not an Islamist party but rather an Islamic party”, Bayat (2017, p. 150).
Hypothesis 3.
Support of the state by an outside great power increases the resilience against
regime change. By contrast, support of state’s opponent [protesters] by an outside great
power increases the chances of regime change.
The Syrian case is somehow complicated as it split into two groups and each
group receives foreign support, whether militarily or economically. One group is the
Syrian government, supported specifically by Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and China. For
example, the latter sided with Russia in the UN Security Council to veto any resolution
that would go against the Assad regime’s interests. The second group are the opposition
groups (different factions) supported mostly by the Gulf States and other Sunni-leading
Muslims such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Turkey.
In February 2012, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, was asked
by the press 31 what he thought about arming the Syrian rebels. He replied that he thought
it was “an excellent idea,” and “Saudi weapons were provided predominantly to FSA
31
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aligned groups, including the Southern Front and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front”
(Stanek 2015, p.14). A Carter Center report stated that the kingdom also tends to favor
the brigades of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, which is described as more moderate
than the Islamic Front (The Carter Center 2014). Some countries, like the United States,
fear that Iran’s power will rise in the region. According to Angela Joya, the Gulf states
"share with the U.S. and Britain the common goal of neutralizing Iran as a potential
nuclear power that could shift the ‘balance of power’ against the Sunni ruled states of the
Gulf” (Joya 2012, p. 37). To this perspective, even though the United States had been
reluctant to arm and support the Syrian rebel groups in the beginning, the Obama
administration finally ended up supporting the rebel groups, and President Obama openly
asked President Assad to resign. The United States’ concern was how the opposition arms
suppliers would be manageable to the extent that weapons would not end up reaching
more radical groups. In late 2012, there were accounts of Qatar providing and distributing
arms through the March 14th camp in Lebanon, which were then smuggled across the
Syrian border (Stanek 2015).
Qatar chose to work primarily through Turkey to supply rebel brigades in
northern Syria. And it has reportedly channeled weapons to another militant group
under the Islamic Front banner, called Ahrar al-Sham, which has been known to
fight in coordination with Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda linked group. However,
Ahrar al-Sham also has received substantial funding from Kuwait (Stanek 2015).
The Assad regime has leveraged its strategic relationships with Iran, Hezbollah,
and other authoritarian actors for reasons that go well beyond the upgrading of its
coercive apparatus. Iran has provided the regime with billions of dollars in the form of
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loans and contracts. As the Syrian conflict intensified and more insurgents flowed across
Syria’s borders to fight, Haas and Lesch (2017, p. 182) confirmed that the Iranian
government began to interpret the events in the region as an extension of a proxy war
with Saudi Arabia and as an uprising supported by the United States and its regional
allies. To Iran, this in effect shed doubt on the sincerity of the opposition movement in
Syria. Iran viewed the Syrian event not as opposition to Assad’s rule, but as a Saudi and
Western intervention against an Alavi ruler allied with Iran. Iran gains regional influence
through political, financial, and military support of its allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and
Palestine (Haas & Lesch 2017, p. 190).
Russia has provided arms, money, and diplomatic cover, voting numerous times
to prevent the UN Security Council from imposing sanctions. China has followed
Russia’s lead in the UN, though it has otherwise not played a prominent role with respect
to Syria. Nonetheless, the reconfiguration of the Assad regime's coercive apparatus, and
the consolidation of power within institutions organized along exclusionary sectarian
lines, are most consequential for the kind of postwar political arrangements that will
emerge, and least conducive to the prospects for an eventual transition to democracy
(Heydemann 2013, p.p. 67, 68).
According to Haas and Lesch (2017, p. 210) Turkey has provided, at a
minimum, tacit support of radical Islamists groups in Syria, including Jab’hat alNusra (Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate) and ISIS. The objective of this support is to
overthrow the Assad regime.
As for Bahrain, scholars have debated the counterfactual question: Was the
GCC intervention necessary for the Bahraini regime to survive? The answer is no.
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Because GCC forces were not involved in repressing demonstrators; instead, they
provided “a deterrent to further popular mobilization and offered some leeway for
the Bahraini government” (Brownlee et al. 2015, p. 89). Gelvin (2012, p. 138) cited
in Brownlee et al. (2015, p. 89) has gone far as to say the GCC “freed up Bahrain’s
own military and security forces to partake in a binge of repression.” Still, the
auxiliary role performed by foreign troops does not indicate that the Bahraini regime
itself lacked the coercive capacity to defeat the uprising (Brownlee et al. 2015). The
above hypothesis is only concerned with the two cases of Bahrain and Syria.
Hypothesis 4.
The more government offers in payouts, the less likely protests will lead to change.
The Bahraini government engages in sectarian game playing by giving
incentives to minority Sunni political elites and citizens in order to control the
majority Shia community (Ross 2013, p. 20 as cited in Brownlee et al. 2015, p. 86).
The Bahraini monarchy benefits from significant oil wealth ($3,720 per capita in
2009 dollars), which helps ensure the loyalty of domestic political elites. Ruling
family members reportedly saw their monthly stipends increase, while local elites
enjoyed generous housing grants in new developments near the capital city of
Manama (Brownlee et al. 2015).

In this case, the above hypothesis was not

positively tested in any example pertaining to our study because Bahrain offered
payouts to one part of the population to manage and control the other part of the
population (majority Shia), who tended to take to the streets in Bahrain. The other
cases (Syria and Tunisia) were unlikely to match with this hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 5.
The more unified the coercive apparatus of the state, the more likely it is to
repress protests and allow it to survive with its illegitimate status.
The MENA region, in particular Muslim majority countries, from Morocco to the
Persian Gulf, have relied on high levels of domestic repression (Bellin 2004; Skocpol
1979). This hypothesis concerns two of the three cases, that is, Syria and Bahrain, as
cases that have witnessed the coercive apparatus against demonstrators. With regard to
Syria, the Syrian government responded to the popular challenge to its rule by the timetested use of mass violence, coup-proofing methods, ingenious military adaptation, and
playing on raw sectarian fears, especially among Alawites and Christians (Hokayem
2014). Heydemann projected a negative outcome in Syria of any possibility that
protesters might cause authoritarianism to break down and that a transition to democracy
might be initiated, because according to him, “the opposition’s opportunity was
extinguished early on by the Assad regime's ferocious repression” (Heydemann 2013,
p.59). As for Bahrain, Brownlee, J. et al. said, “it was the first Arab autocracy to survive
2011 through a repressive crackdown. And when the Bahraini security forces rolled into
the Pearl Roundabout in the middle of March 2011, they had backup from the Saudi
military and from the member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However,
“it was the Bahraini coercive apparatus that struck demonstrators and cleared the streets”
(2015, p.86). So, with regard to the coercive apparatus approach in this study, we can
confirm that Syria and Bahrain used extra force to repress and crack down on protesters;
and, in the former, the protests transformed into a civil war which has ravaged the
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country (with a stalling diplomatic effort to end the conflict in Syria), even though the
incumbent Assad regime is on the verge of winning.
Conclusion
Protest in the form of social movements has been taking place in the MENA
region over various time spans, but the manner by which the Arab Spring started and
spread in just a few days across the Arab world was quite different from previous
revolutions. Iran experienced an Islamic revolution in 1979; Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain,
Syria, and other Middle Eastern countries have seen sporadic protests, but not to the
degree of the Arab Spring of 2010-2011.
With regard to democracy and democratization, earlier generations of scholars
and writers blamed Islam as the cause for the absence of democracy. The 18th century
French philosopher Montesquieu declared that “despotic government” was the special
province of “Mohammedanism,” while moderate government is better suited to
Christianity (Cohler 1989, p. 461).

The scholar Kedourie (1992, p.6) echoed

Montesquieu’s argument, saying that “Islam was profoundly bereft of the core
democratic ideals of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political
institutions being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, [of] the secularity of
the state and [of] society being composed of multitude of self-activating , autonomous
groups and associations.” In an attempt to refute these claims, Stepan and Robertson
(2003) noted that Muslim countries such as Turkey and Indonesia (I would add Malaysia
and now Tunisia) have managed to sustain democracy. This is true for Turkey, Indonesia,
and Malaysia, and Tunisia recently has been able to realize a successful transitional
democracy and is now in a new phase of post transition (new democracy). Stepan,
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Robertson, and I disprove the link between Islam and authoritarianism. Instead Stepan
and Robertson suggest that it is Arabs, not Muslims, who have proven to be
democratization-resistant. With the recent case of Tunisia, I may disagree with them.
Although it is a unique Arab case, it could be viewed as an example of how even Arabs
can endorse democracy. By contrast, Diamond (2010) has argued that the answer to the
riddle of Arab authoritarianism lies not in the cultures, but rather in “political economy”
and institutions – particularly the dynamism of rentierism and the machinations of the so
called “liberalized autocracies” to keep societies weak and oppositionists fragmented.
Ruling such a society would be easy; the divided opponents could allow any country in
the MENA to have an uncomplicated political task, and as we have seen in the Syrian
case, it could also give foreign powers an opportunity to intervene in the internal affairs
of a country because of the fragmented and divided society.
In the second chapter we have discussed the interests of great powers in the
MENA. It is unlikely that these interests will allow the United States and its allies to
intervene to the extent of victory for democracy; in the countries that have already
experienced protests, and radical Muslims were on the forefront to take the helm of the
country (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nah’da in Tunisia; the former failed to
cope with democratic values and principles and the latter succeeded in endorsing
democracy as outlined in hypothesis number two). Most radical Muslims, if not all,
oppose Western interests in the region, and for this reason, there is a little chance that the
path of authoritarianism to democracy in the MENA will garner support from Western
countries. On the other hand, the MENA rulers (emirs, monarchs, and heads of state)
always side with the status quo. Furthermore, there is the resistance of citizens to Western
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cultures and political governing methods, as some Arab citizens will likely oppose
Western styled democracy. Finally, Huntington (1991, p. 28) has declared that “Islamic
concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics.” All of
these are serious factors that impede democratic endorsement by the MENA region.
Nevertheless, the new model of the Tunisian government may influence other Arab
governments and citizens to reconsider their leadership, to change their political
behavior, and endorse democratic governance in the region. The below table summarizes
the examined cases.
Table 8: Summary of hypotheses
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1:
The more
accumulated political
and socio-economic
grievances, the more
people are likely to
experience
dissatisfaction and to
begin forming and
joining social
movements with the
aim of changing the
current social and
political order to
satisfy their needs.

Tunisia
Sparked by
Mohamed
Bouazizi’s selfimmolation and
due to political
and socioeconomic
concerns,
Tunisians took to
the streets,
starting the Arab
Spring at the end
of 2010.

Hypothesis 2:
The more
structured and
united the
leadership of a
social movement;
the more likely it
is to gain success.

Unlike other
MENA countries,
Tunisia’s
structured and
united social
organizations
played a key role
in its success.

Syria
The Syrian people
rebelled against the
Assad regime
because of the
regime’s policies on
political and socioeconomic issues.
Public discontent,
especially among
the Sunni Muslims,
led to people taking
to the streets to
show their
dissatisfaction for
the regime of
Bashar Al Assad.
Hypothesis 2 did
not yield any
positive result for
Syria, as the
protests failed to
reach their goals of
regime change and
the country has
fallen into civil war.
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Bahrain
Bahrain has also experienced
political and socio-economic
issues that have caused discontent
among Bahrainis. Following the
Arab Spring in the region, the
Shia community seized the
opportunity to show their
discontent by taking to the streets
against their own government.

With regard to Bahrain, after
Saudi and GCC military
intervention, Bahraini security
forces used force to quell
protesters.

Hypothesis 3:
Support of the state
by an outside great
power increases the
resilience against
regime change. By
contrast, support of
the state’s opponent
[protesters] by an
outside great power
increases the chances
of regime change.

The hypothesis 3
did not test
positive in
Tunisian case.

Hypothesis 3 has
tested positive in the
Syrian case as the
country split into
two groups: one
group is the Syrian
government,
supported
specifically by
Russia, Iran,
Hezbollah, and
China. The second
group are the
opposition groups
(different factions)
supported mostly by
the Gulf States and
other Sunni-leading
Muslim nations
such as Saudi
Arabia, Qatar,
Kuwait, and
Turkey. And the
U.S. played also a
supportive role
toward the rebel
groups.

Scholars have raised the
counterfactual question for
Bahrain: Was the GCC
intervention indispensable for
the Bahraini regime to
survive? The answer is no.
They argue that the GCC
military forces were not
involved
in
repressing
protestors;
rather,
they
provided “a deterrent to
further popular mobilization
and offered some leeway for
the Bahraini government”
(Brownlee et al. 2015, p. 89).
Gelvin (2012, p. 138) cited in
Brownlee et al. (2015, p. 89)
has gone as far as to say the
GCC “freed up Bahrain’s
own military and security
forces to partake in a binge of
repression.”
Still, the auxiliary role
performed by foreign troops
does not indicate that the
Bahraini regime itself lacked
the coercive capacity to
defeat the uprising (Brownlee
et al. 2015). But again, these
foreign military forces have
offered support to the
Bahraini government and
security forces to stand firm
against the demonstrators,
and then, to suppress protests.

Hypothesis 4:
The more a
government offers in
payouts, the less
likely protests will
lead to change.

Tunisia was
unlikely
to
match
with
this
hypothesis.

Syria
was
unlikely to fall
within
this
hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5:

The Tunisian case

The Syrian

The Bahraini government engages
in sectarian game playing by
giving incentives to minority
Sunni political elites and citizens
in order to control the majority
Shia community (Ross 2013, p. 20
as cited in Brownlee et al. 2015, p.
86).
Brownlee, J. et al. (2015, p. 86)
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The more unified
the
coercive
apparatus of the
state, the more
likely it is to
repress protests
and allow it to
survive with its
illegitimate
status.

did not test
positive with this
hypothesis.

government
responded to the
popular challenge to
its rule by the timetested use of mass
violence, coupproofing methods,
ingenious military
adaptation, and
playing on raw
sectarian fears,
especially among
Alawites and
Christians
(Hokayem 2014).

said, “the Bahraini coercive
apparatus struck demonstrators
and cleared the streets; and it was
the first Arab autocracy to survive
2011 through a repressive
crackdown”.

Compiled by the Researcher 2021

And as we have seen in our first hypothesis, if there are accumulated political and socioeconomic grievances, then people are likely to experience dissatisfaction; thus, social
movements are born, and protesters gather and take to the streets for mass demonstrations
against the incumbent regime. At the very least, the world has witnessed a new energy
and new sense of possibility thanks to the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain,
Syria and beyond. Successful tools such as social media and satellite television have
facilitated protests in being seen and heard around the world. Even though in these case
studies we still encounter authoritarian regimes (Bahrain and Syria as the former failed
revolution and the latter being in between failed and successful revolutions pending the
outcome of the current civil war), “no regime will enjoy immunity from collective action
or international exposure of its atrocities as was possible in the past” (Henry and JHyang, 2012, p. 48). However, international political order seems not to favor new waves
of protests that would lead to radical change in the best interest of the Arab nations.

152

Authoritarian survivors across the Middle East have adapted to the challenges
posed by the Arab uprisings. Yet the form that such adaptations have taken is a product
of specific domestic resources (security apparatus and sectarian armed forces: Sunni
against Shiite community) and external resources (Saudi military intervention) that define
any given regime's "opportunity set." “There is a strong path-dependent quality to the
adaptive choices of regimes: existential crises have not been moments of creative
innovation among the Arab world's authoritarian survivors” (Heydemann 2013, p. 65).
Instead, adaptations have tended to magnify regimes' existing attributes as rulers turn to
strategies that have proven to be effective in the past. The adaptations can be seen as
extensions of earlier strategies of authoritarian upgrading, but with a more compact,
militarized, sectarian, exclusionary, and repressive core (Heydemann 2007). All of these
active compacts of militarization, sectarianism, exclusion, and repression reflect the
Bahraini and Syrian cases.
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